



# SAFEGUARDING THE RIGHTS OF ASIAN MIGRANT WORKERS FROM HOME TO THE WORKPLACE



# **SAFEGUARDING THE RIGHTS OF ASIAN MIGRANT WORKERS FROM HOME TO THE WORKPLACE**



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# FOREWORD

International migration of workers is growing. The global economic slowdown of the late 2000s and the early 2010s put a brake on employment opportunities in many countries across the world, and the crisis is not fully behind us. Nonetheless, the number of labor migrants is still increasing, and this publication shows that 2015 may well be a peak year for labor migration from Asian countries, both within the region and toward OECD countries outside of Asia. Neither political shifts nor persistent low oil prices have yet put a dent in the legal movement of Asian workers to employment in other countries.

These large-scale flows are nothing new, yet policies are in flux, both for the management of labor migration and for the protection of migrant workers. Asian countries are making constant adjustments to their policies to better match the flows of migrant workers to the needs of their countries, to protect migrant workers, and to strengthen compliance mechanisms.

There is increasing attention to migrant workers in multilateral frameworks. Two of the UN Sustainable Development Goals targets relate directly to the need to lower costs borne by migrant workers, especially those who leave their families to support them by working temporarily abroad. There has been a growing focus on fair recruitment practices—those which do not charge fees and related costs to migrants and allow them to keep a greater share of their earnings.

Another important issue in protecting workers is to ensure that they are not exploited at the workplace, and this extends equally to those who are undocumented. The publication provides evidence on the extent of irregular migration in Asia. Reducing irregular migration requires a comprehensive approach, and cannot be limited to immigration enforcement measures only. The need to improve labor protections for all workers can be matched with mechanisms to ensure that legal matching between workers and employers can occur without exorbitant costs, and that appropriate channels are in place for orderly and safe migration.

One of the most vulnerable groups of labor migrants are women working in domestic work and home-based care work, particularly since their work is often not recognized as real work with economic value, and as they work in isolation in the household of employers. The chapter in this year's publication highlights the importance of gender responsiveness in managing labor migration and in developing policies to protect all migrant workers.

Since 2011, the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have organized an annual Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia. Since 2013, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has also participated, and the three organizations have put together an annual report on the themes of the roundtable. The February 2016 event, held in Tokyo, focused on Safeguarding Labor Migrants from Home to Workplace. The question of how best to ensure that migrants are not subject to harm as they move abroad to work is one on which governments in Asia are working, on behalf of their own citizens and those who have come as migrants. This publication is intended to help make a contribution to the work of policy planners, experts, and practitioners in the region.

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## Trends in Labor Migration in Asia

Philippe Hervé and Cansin Arslan

### 1.1 Introduction

People move to another country or area for a myriad of reasons: to seek work, to follow family members, to pursue their studies. Migration can be driven by shocks, such as conflicts or natural disasters; climate change; and demographic pressure in times of rapid population increase as people look for more opportunities.

In Asia, most international migration is labor migration, and, as elsewhere, labor migration movements are highly sensitive to economic cycles in destination countries. Migration to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, which hit a peak in 2007, recovered in 2014–2015 to its pre-global financial crisis levels (OECD 2016a). A large share of Asian labor migration is also to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]), which although affected by recent fluctuations in oil prices, has maintained strong demand for foreign workers. The 2008 pre-global financial crisis migration peak to these countries was surpassed in 2012, and today, it shows no sign of a decline.


An additional distinguishing factor of Asian labor migration to GCC countries is that it is generally temporary and has only a small share of highly qualified workers. Structural factors, especially demography, play important roles. In OECD countries, populations are aging, while the youth cohorts entering the labor force are more educated than the workers who are retiring, creating more of a demand for less-skilled workers. This is especially true for OECD countries in Asia (i.e., Japan and the Republic of Korea) as well as smaller highly developed economies in Asia, such as Hong Kong, China and Singapore, where demographic transitions are well advanced.

This chapter first presents the latest available data on the main trends in migration from and within Asia. The next section discusses labor migration flows to Asia and GCC countries, followed by a description of flows from Asia to OECD countries. Labor market outcomes of Asian migrants are then discussed, and then international students—for which Asia has been the fastest-growing region of origin since 2000. Finally, an overview of trends in remittances is provided.

### 1.2 Asia and Global Migration Patterns

The United Nations definition of an international migrant is one who has resided outside of his or her country of birth for at least 12 months (UN 2014). Using this definition, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015) estimated the stock of international migrants at 244 million in 2015. In 2015, there were 100 million Asian immigrants around the world, 40% of the world's migrant stock, 50% more than in 2000 (Figure 1.1).



**Figure 1.1: Asia in the Global Migration Pattern, 2000 and 2015**

Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs. World Population Prospects, 2015 Revision. <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/> (accessed October 2016).

Different parts of Asia play various roles in migration. In particular, West Asia (principally the GCC countries) has become a major destination for migrants, notably for those coming from other parts of Asia. Almost 40 million migrants now live in West Asia, compared with less than 20 million migrants in 2000.<sup>1</sup>

As a destination region, Asia hosts one in seven international migrants worldwide. Relative to its population size, however, Asia has less international migration than all other continents—only 0.9%—compared with 3.3% globally, 1.7% for Africa, and up to 10.3% for Europe and 15.2% for North America. Asian figures are partly lowered by the exclusion of enormous internal migration flows within Asian countries with wide geographic extension and large demographic size. The People's Republic of China (PRC) alone reported 168 million internal labor migrants (i.e., persons working outside of their home regions for at least 6 months) in 2015, more than 10% of its population (NBS 2016). In India, internal interstate migration levels are lower, estimated at 3%–5% in 2001 and 2011 (Mistri 2015), but still amounting to millions of people. Although migration within these countries involves great distances and often crosses language barriers, it is not considered international migration, but similar flows among European countries, for example, are registered as international migration.

<sup>1</sup> In the remainder of this chapter, “Asia” excludes West Asia.

**Table 1.1: Outflows of Workers from Selected Asian Countries, 2006–2015 ('000s)**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Philippines	687	716	870	991	1,124	1,319	1,435	1,469	1,431	1,438
Pakistan	179	282	425	396	358	453	635	620	752	947
India	677	809	849	610	641	627	747	817	805	781
Bangladesh	377	820	875	475	391	568	608	409	426	556
PRC		372	427	395	411	452	512	527	562	530
Nepal		205	249	220	294	355	385	451	520	500
Indonesia	690	690	636	630	567	594	460	469	430	276
Sri Lanka	202	218	250	247	268	263	282	293	301	263
Viet Nam		64	87	73	86	88	80	88	107	116

PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: National authorities.


Most labor migration in Asia, as noted, is semi-skilled or low-skilled, is directed toward GCC countries or within the region, and has seen swings in the size of outflows. The Philippines has long been the largest country of origin, with more than 1.4 million emigrants in 2015 (Table 1.1), showing no major shifts since 2012. Between 2013 and 2015, Pakistan witnessed two sharp annual increases in outward labor migration and is now the second origin country in Asia. In the meantime, outflows of workers from India remained relatively stable at around 800,000 per year. After several years of steadily increasing deployment of contract workers, the PRC saw its first decline in 2014, with outflows declining slightly but remaining above 500,000.<sup>2</sup>

Over the last decade, labor migration from Bangladesh has been volatile. In 2015, it increased by one-third, totaling more than 500,000 workers. The variation in Bangladeshi migration is also related to the imposition of a recruitment ban in Saudi Arabia at the end of 2008, which was lifted in early 2016, and the UAE, in which a 2012 ban is still in place.<sup>3</sup> After a 5-year steep increase, the number of Nepalese workers going abroad seems to have leveled off in 2015, at around 500,000. Relative to the population of Nepal, however, this represents a large number, about 2% of the population.

Following the opposite trend, labor migration from Indonesia, which was comparable to rates from India and the Philippines in 2006, has been steadily decreasing over the last 10 years. Only 280,000 Indonesian workers left the country in 2015, a 36% decrease from 2014 and one of the largest drops in 2015. Similarly, only around 260,000 Sri Lankan workers were deployed in 2015, down from 300,000 in 2014, a return to late 2000s levels. However, this number still represents a significant share of Sri Lanka's population, about 1.3%. In contrast, in Viet Nam, following three years of expansion, labor migration outflows reached 120,000 workers, 50% more than in 2012.

<sup>2</sup> These workers are usually employed in PRC projects abroad.

<sup>3</sup> These bans were imposed due to concern in the destination countries over illegal recruitment practices.

**Figure 1.2: Total Outflows of Workers from Select Asian Countries, 2006–2015**

Note: Total outflow of workers from Bangladesh, the People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam. Outflows from the Philippines are assumed to be stable from 2014 to 2015.

Source: National authorities.

Overall, the decline in the number of migrants does not appear to be due to lower oil prices in 2015. Indeed, total labor migration from Asian countries rose from 2013 to 2014, at 5.2 million workers (Figure 1.2). In addition, assuming that outflows from the Philippines remain stable, the total may actually be higher in 2015 (5.3 million).

Excluding the Philippines (for which data were unavailable at time of writing), intra-Asia labor migration rose 12% in 2015. The Philippines, which has a well-established channel sending migrants to Singapore, was the main origin country for intra-Asia migration in 2014 (Table 1.2), with Indonesia close behind. Labor migration from Nepal to Malaysia doubled to 200,000 in 2015, accounting for much of the overall increase in Nepalese labor migration.

**Table 1.2: Flows of Workers to Select ASEAN Countries, by Select Origin Countries, 2014–2015**

Country of Destination	Philippines 2014	Indonesia 2015	Nepal 2015	Bangladesh 2015	India 2015	Pakistan 2015	Thailand 2015	Sri Lanka 2015
Singapore	140,205	20,895	75	55,523		68	7,265	1,461
Malaysia	31,451	97,635	196,497	30,483	21,000	20,216	3,318	3,239
Thailand	6,653	90	37					0
Brunei Darussalam	11,478	9,993	139	6,354		85	1,846	9
Total 2015		128,613	196,748	92,360	21,000	20,369	12,429	4,709
Total 2014	189,787	171,840	206,327	66,517	22,979	20,701	19,002	4,782

ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Sources: ILO. ILOSTAT. [www.ilo.org/ilostat/](http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/) (accessed October 2016); and national authorities of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

An additional labor migration route runs from Indonesia to Malaysia. In 2015, this route was taken by 100,000 Indonesian workers going to Malaysia, a 25% decrease from the previous year. This was the second consecutive year that all Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries received fewer Indonesian workers than the year before. In addition, although one may assume that flows from Bangladesh rose to compensate for recruitment bans in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it remained relatively stable during 2013–2014, at around 65,000 people, but it rose by 40% to almost 100,000 in 2015. In addition to the ASEAN countries shown in Table 1.2, Hong Kong, China is an important destination for Asian labor migrants, especially from the Philippines and Indonesia, which together sent almost 98,000 domestic workers to Hong Kong, China in 2015.

### 1.3 Labor Migration Flows from Asia to Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

The main destination for Asian workers remains the Middle East, in particular GCC countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For the seven major origin countries for which data are available in 2015 (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka), GCC countries received 72% of all placements, up from 70% in 2014. The GCC thus appears to be increasing its market share of deployment from these countries.

**Table 1.3: Flows of Workers to Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, 2015 ('000s)**

Country or Region	Philippines 2015	India 2015	Pakistan 2015	Nepal 2015	Sri Lanka 2015	Bangladesh 2015	Indonesia 2015
Saudi Arabia	406	306	523	97	75	58	23
United Arab Emirates	227	225	327	53	44	25	8
Qatar	133	59	13	124	65	124	2
Other GCC countries	130	85	57	17	49	168	10
Total GCC 2015	896	675	919	291	233	376	43
Total GCC 2014	869	776	722	274	269	255	96

GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council.


Sources: ILO. ILOSTAT. [www.ilo.org/ilostat/](http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/) (accessed October 2016); and national authorities of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia received over 500,000 migrant workers from Pakistan and over 300,000 from India (Table 1.3). Another 330,000 Pakistani workers went to the UAE. Due to the 2012 recruitment ban, Pakistan replaced Bangladesh as the main Asian source of labor migration to the UAE. Qatar received 7% more workers in 2015 than in 2014, equaling the increase from 2013–2014 and clearly indicative of continuing recruitment for construction projects related to the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

## 1.4 Migration Flows from Asia to OECD Countries

Migration from Asia to OECD countries, although not of the same magnitude as migration to GCC countries, is a growing phenomenon. During 2000–2005, 5.5 million Asian citizens left their countries to live in an OECD country, 7.3 million did so in the following 5-year period, and in the last 5 years, this figure amounted to 8.2 million people. On an annual basis, these flows increased in 2013 (4%) and in 2014 (5%) to reach a new historical high of 1.7 million, representing almost 30% of global migration flows to OECD countries (Figure 1.3).

**Figure 1.3: Migration Flows from Asia to OECD Countries, 2000–2014**



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD. International Migration Database. <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG> (accessed October 2016).

The largest origin country of new migrants to OECD countries has been the PRC for more than 20 years.<sup>4</sup> Every year since 2006, around 500,000 PRC citizens emigrate to an OECD country. In 2014, this number reached 550,000 (Table 1.4) and represented more than 9% of total flows to OECD countries. Two European countries followed, Romania and Poland, and then India, with more than 260,000 emigrants—also a record high level.

The Philippines is the fifth-largest sender, with 160,000 emigrants and a 4% increase in 2014. Viet Nam saw 125,000 of its citizens leave for an OECD country, 22% more than in 2013. About 87,000 Thai nationals migrated to OECD countries, an increase of 41%, together contributing to half of the 5% overall increase. This is a historically high level for these two countries as well, as it is for Afghanistan (45,000) and Nepal (42,000). For many Asian countries, including these five countries and the Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka, emigration to the OECD area represents more than 1 person per 1,000 population.

<sup>4</sup> With one exception, Romania, in 2007, although this exception was due to statistical carrying-over of flows that occurred in previous years.

**Table 1.4: Top 15 Asian Countries of Origin for Migration to OECD Countries, 2004–2014**

Country	Average Flows 2004–2013 (thousands)	Flows 2013 (thousands)	Flows 2014 (thousands)	% of Total OECD Inflows 2014	% Change 2013–2014	Rank in 2014	Difference in Ranking versus 2013	Difference in Ranking versus 2004–2013	Expatriation Rate 2014 (per million inhabitants)
PRC	489	547	555	9.3	1	1	0	0	407
India	227	241	262	4.4	9	4	0	0	206
Philippines	171	152	158	2.6	4	5	1	1	1,617
Viet Nam	87	102	125	2.1	22	9	3	4	1,370
Thailand	50	61	87	1.5	41	17	7	10	1,287
Pakistan	81	73	78	1.3	7	19	0	–4	433
Korea, Rep. of	72	75	70	1.2	–7	21	–3	–1	1,409
Bangladesh	42	43	47	0.8	8	34	1	–5	298
Afghanistan	21	34	45	0.8	32	36	11	24	1,459
Nepal	22	39	42	0.7	7	39	1	20	1,495
Indonesia	29	36	35	0.6	–3	47	–4	–1	140
Japan	36	37	34	0.6	–9	50	–9	–12	267
Sri Lanka	31	30	29	0.5	–3	52	–1	9	1,419
Myanmar	16	23	23	0.4	0	61	1	12	433
Malaysia	19	23	19	0.3	–18	72	–13	–9	645
Asia	1,499	1,666	1,756	29.6	5				

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: OECD. International Migration Database. <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG> (accessed October 2016).

The overall 5% increase is mostly due to higher inflow levels observed in the main destination countries (Table 1.5), and more precisely, to the higher levels in a few specific corridors. Indeed, in 2014, twice as many Thai citizens immigrated to the Republic of Korea than in 2013, the United Kingdom received 50% more Indian citizens, and the number of Vietnamese citizens going to Japan increased by 33%. Unsurprisingly, the Republic of Korea and Japan, the two Asian countries that are members of the OECD, were the destinations of large flows from within Asia (341,000 and 254,000, respectively, in 2014). In the Republic of Korea, more than half of these Asian immigrants were from the PRC. In Japan, while the PRC is also the main origin country, flows are more diversified in terms of countries of origin, with significant numbers of migrants coming from Viet Nam, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. Reciprocal flows between the two countries are somewhat imbalanced, with more than 20,000 Koreans entering Japan in 2014, against less than 5,000 Japanese moving to the Republic of Korea.

**Table 1.5: Top 15 OECD Countries for Asian Migration, 2014**

Country	Number of Migrants in 2014 (thousands)	Difference with 2013 (thousands)	% of Inflows from Asia to OECD Countries	Main Asian Countries of Origin
United States	363	15	21	India, PRC, Philippines, Viet Nam
Korea, Republic of	341	28	19	PRC, Thailand, Viet Nam, Philippines
Japan	254	28	14	PRC, Viet Nam, Republic of Korea, Philippines
United Kingdom	138	16	8	India, PRC, Pakistan, Republic of Korea
Canada	132	7	8	Philippines, India, PRC, Pakistan
Australia	130	-3	76	India, PRC, Philippines, Pakistan
Germany	110	12	4	PRC, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan
Italy	64	0	2	PRC, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan
New Zealand	37	8	1	India, PRC, Philippines, Japan
France	24	-1	1	PRC, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh
Spain	24	-11	1	PRC, Pakistan, India, Philippines
The Netherlands	18	1	1	India, PRC, Indonesia, Japan
Sweden	15	0	1	Afghanistan, India, PRC, Thailand
Switzerland	12	1	1	PRC, India, Sri Lanka, Japan
Austria	10	-2	1	Afghanistan, PRC, India, Pakistan

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.


Source: OECD. International Migration Database. <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG> (accessed October 2016).

Larger permanent migration flows from Asia to the United States also contributed to the rise. Overall, the number of new Asian immigrants rose by 15,000 persons, rising back to its 2012 level to stand at 363,000 in 2014. Increased flows from India, which replaced the PRC as the main country of origin in 2014, contributed most of this increase. The number of migrants from the PRC also slipped from first place to second in the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, replaced by those from India; and in Austria, replaced by those from Afghanistan.

Looking beyond permanent migration, temporary labor migration also involves large numbers of Asian nationals. In the United States, most H-1B temporary visas (i.e., those for specialty occupations, mostly in technology) have been given to Asian citizens (Figure 1.4). Of a total of 173,000 H-1B visas issued in 2015, 150,000 were to Asian citizens, up 10% from 2014. In particular, the number of Indian citizens who received these visas more than doubled between 2010 and 2015, reaching 120,000.

Migration from Asia to the United Kingdom declined rather sharply between 2011 and 2013, with far fewer new Indian and Pakistan immigrants. In 2014, the very sharp increase in Indian migration led to an overall 13% rebound, making the United Kingdom the second-largest non-Asian OECD destination country for Asian



**Figure 1.4: H-1B Visas Delivered, by Region of Origin, 2010–2015**

Source: Government of the United States, Department of State. U.S. Visas: Nonimmigrant Visa Statistics. <https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics/non-immigrant-visas.html> (accessed January 2017).

migrants. After India, the second main origin country to the United Kingdom is the PRC, contributing 40,000 persons. Pakistani citizens used to constitute a large group of migrants, but their number has fallen since 2011, to around 10,000 in 2014, reflecting the more restrictive family reunification conditions.

Canada has also witnessed a 7% rebound in the number of new entries of Asian citizens in 2014, as the Philippines once again became the number-one origin country. Most Asian migrants to Canada are admitted through economic channels: 7 out of 10 permanent Asian migrants to Canada were economic immigrants in 2014, up from 6 out of 10 in 2013.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the number of persons from Asia entering under the family reunification category fell sharply in 2014, both in absolute and relative terms. In 2013, Canada admitted a particularly high number of new permanent residents as parents or grandparents, due to backlog reduction measures. Migration from Asia to Australia, another long-standing destination for Asian migrants, seems to have leveled off, at around 130,000 persons in 2014.

In spite of the geographical distance and the lack of historical or linguistic bonds, Asian migration to Germany has been increasing by about 10,000 annually. In 2014, more than 110,000 Asian citizens immigrated to Germany, representing a 10% increase for the second consecutive year. Prior to 2010, the number of Asians migrating to Germany had never exceeded 80,000. The increase has continued into 2015, even disregarding large flows from Afghanistan.

<sup>5</sup> Government of Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada. CIC Facts and Figures 2014—Immigration Overview: Permanent Residents. [www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2014/permanent/08.asp](http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2014/permanent/08.asp) (accessed January 2017).

## 1.5 Labor Market Situation of Asian Immigrants in Australia, Europe, and the United States

Australia, Canada, and the United States are among the main OECD destination countries of Asian workers, particularly of highly educated Asian migrants, yet their labor market outcomes do not always reflect this. In the United States, the situation of Asian immigrants worsened during the global financial crisis. Since 2008, their employment rate has fallen by 3.6 percentage points (68.6% in 2015) but is still 1.4 points higher than that of the native-born, although it is lower than that of other foreign-born immigrants (Table 1.6). Their current unemployment rate, at 3.6%, is now below the 2008 level, and lower than those of other immigrants and for the native-born.

**Table 1.6: Labor Market Indicators for Native- and Foreign-Born Persons in the United States, Canada, Australia, and European OECD Countries, Ages 15–64, 2008, 2011, and 2015 (%)**

Residence	Place of Birth	Employment Rate				Unemployment Rate				Participation Rate			
		2008	2011	2015	Change 2011–2015 (% pts)	2008	2011	2015	Change 2011–2015 (% pts)	2008	2011	2015	Change 2011–2015 (% pts)
United States	Asia	72.2	68.6	68.6	0.0	3.9	6.7	3.6	–3.1	75.1	73.5	71.2	–2.4
	Foreign-born	70.8	67.5	69.2	1.7	5.9	9.1	5.0	–4.2	75.2	74.3	72.9	–1.5
	Native-born	69.4	65.1	67.2	2.1	6.0	9.2	5.6	–3.6	73.8	71.7	71.1	–0.5
Australia	Asia	67.6	67.6	66.7	–0.8	5.8	5.8	6.6	0.8	71.8	71.7	71.4	–0.3
	Foreign-born	69.8	70.5	69.9	–0.6	4.7	5.2	6.2	1.0	73.2	74.4	74.6	0.1
	Native-born	75.0	73.8	73.5	–0.4	4.2	5.2	6.2	1.0	78.2	77.9	78.3	0.5
Canada	Asia	69.9	67.7	70.6	3.0	7.1	8.8	6.9	–2.0	75.3	74.2	75.8	1.6
	Foreign-born	70.7	68.9	70.9	2.1	7.2	8.9	7.4	–1.5	76.1	75.6	76.7	1.0
	Native-born	74.3	72.7	73.0	0.3	6.0	7.2	6.9	–0.4	79.0	78.3	78.4	0.0
European OECD countries	Asia	63.2	62.1	63.2	1.1	7.6	10.0	9.1	–0.8	68.4	69.0	69.6	0.6
	Foreign-born	65.5	61.5	62.1	0.5	10.2	15.5	15.3	–0.3	72.9	72.8	73.2	0.4
	Native-born	65.8	63.7	65.1	1.4	6.4	9.6	9.7	0.1	70.3	70.4	72.1	1.7

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Sources: Australia, Canada, and Europe labor force surveys; United States Census Bureau. Current Population Survey. [www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html](http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html) (accessed October 2016).

As indicated above, in Australia, Asian immigrants' outcomes in the labor market are slightly weaker than those of the rest of the population, and appear to be deteriorating. In 2015, their employment rate was 0.9 point lower than in 2011 (66.7%), and their unemployment rate (6.6%) was higher than that of the native-born and of all immigrants as a whole (6.2%).

In Canada and European OECD countries, Asian migrants have fared better in the labor market than other immigrant groups, but still have had lower employment rates than nonimmigrants. In Canada, Asian immigrants represented the only group with a lower unemployment rate in 2015 (6.9%) than before the global financial crisis, closing the gap with nonimmigrants.

In the European Union, 9.1% of the Asian-born labor force was unemployed in 2015. Compared with 2008, the Asian immigrant unemployment rate declined less than that of the native-born and other immigrants. Not only has the gap been closed with the native-born, but the difference in unemployment rates is negative.

## 1.6 International Mobility of Students to and from Asia


International student mobility involves students going abroad for tertiary and advanced tertiary education, and is a major phenomenon in global higher education. Asia is an important origin and destination region, and many Asian countries have set objectives to increase enrollment of international students in their higher education institutions.<sup>6</sup>

In 2000, Asia and the Middle East were places of study for 16% of all foreign students. In 2014, together, these areas hosted 20% of all international students, of which 12% were in Asia. Even if data are not fully comparable, this reflects the growing prominence Asia is taking on this front, although Europe and North America still figure prominently.

In 2014, the PRC, including Hong Kong, China and Macau, China, became the main destination in Asia for international students, with almost 150,000 of them in their universities (Figure 1.5). Japan was second, with just over 130,000 international students, while the Republic of Korea and Singapore followed, hosting around 50,000 tertiary international students each. Data for India refer to 2013 and show a 20% increase, but the internationalization of universities in India remains limited.

Every year, Asia strengthens its position as a major source of international students for OECD countries. In 2014, 1.4 million students from Asia were registered in universities in OECD countries, up 6% from 2013. Its share in all international students in OECD countries is likewise increasing, reaching 45% in 2014 (Figure 1.6). The share of Europeans in the international student population of OECD countries remains stable at 26%, and those coming from the Middle East and from Africa account for 9% each.


<sup>6</sup> This report uses post-2015 European Union, OECD, and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) data, which refer to international students (OECD 2016b). These data include only students who actually move to another country to study and not those who were already living in a foreign country before they started the school year. However, the post-2015 data are not directly comparable with previous data (which used a broader definition).

**Figure 1.5: Top 15 Asian Destination Countries and Areas for International Students, 2014**

PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: 2014 or most recent available year.

Sources: OECD.Stat. Share of International or Foreign Students Enrolled by Country of Origin. [http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=EAG\\_ENRL\\_MOBILES\\_ORIGIN](http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=EAG_ENRL_MOBILES_ORIGIN); UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Education. [http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EDULIT\\_DS](http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EDULIT_DS) (accessed October 2016).

**Figure 1.6: International Students in OECD Countries by Region of Origin, 2014 (%)**


OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD. Online Education Database. [www.oecd.org/education/database.htm](http://www.oecd.org/education/database.htm) (accessed October 2016).

According to the OECD Education Database, exactly half of Asian students in OECD countries come from the PRC (690,000). They now represent 23% of all international students in OECD countries, up 5 percentage points from 2008. Their primary destination country is the United States, where almost 300,000 of them are enrolled, but Australia and the United Kingdom (with 90,000 each) are also attractive countries for these students. The second main provider of international students to OECD countries is India (190,000), up 14% from 2013. About 54% of them study in the United States, making India the second-largest provider to the United States. The other main Asian countries of origin are the Republic of Korea, with around 3.0% of the total; Viet Nam, with 1.8%; and Malaysia, with 1.5%.

As a result of the distribution of students from the PRC and India, the United States is the favorite OECD destination country for tertiary students from Asia, with 38% of them studying at United States universities. Australia (16%), the United Kingdom (14%), and Japan (9%) follow, so that more than 3 of 4 Asian students are studying in one of these countries (Figure 1.7).

**Figure 1.7: Main OECD Destination Countries of International Asian Students, 2014 (%)**




OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD. Online Education Database. [www.oecd.org/education/database.htm](http://www.oecd.org/education/database.htm) (accessed October 2016).


Besides the two Asian OECD countries, Japan and the Republic of Korea, Asian students comprise a large proportion of international students in English-speaking countries. They account for 82% of the total in Australia, 66% in New Zealand, 65% in the United States, 45% in Canada, 44% in the United Kingdom, and 33% in Ireland (Figure 1.8). The other countries with more than 25% of Asian students among international enrollments are Finland, Germany, Norway, and Turkey.

Recent data on students distinguish between sublevels of tertiary education. They show that Asian students in OECD countries are key to tertiary education as a whole, and that it is also true at every level, including the highest ones. As shown in Figure 1.9, on average, 40% of international students from Asia in OECD countries are at the master's or doctoral level. This share reaches around 60% for students from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Thailand.

**Figure 1.8: Students from Asia among International Students by Country of Destination, 2014 (%)**

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD. Online Education Database. [www.oecd.org/education/database.htm](http://www.oecd.org/education/database.htm) (accessed October 2016).

**Figure 1.9: Share of Master's and Doctoral Students among Tertiary International Students from Asia Enrolled in Schools in OECD Countries, 2014 (%)**


OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD. Online Education Database. [www.oecd.org/education/database.htm](http://www.oecd.org/education/database.htm) (accessed October 2016).

## 1.7 Remittance Flows to Asia

The volume of remittance flows to Asian countries from migrants abroad depends not only on the number of migrants working abroad but also on factors such as their education levels, wages in the countries where they are employed, and degree to which they still have family to support in the country of origin. Since more than half of migrants born in Asian countries and living in OECD countries have tertiary degrees (Arslan et al. 2015), they can remit more money even if this is a smaller share of their income. In OECD countries, despite their lower number, high-skilled, high-wage-earning migrants send more remittances to Asia than their low-skilled, low-wage-earning peers (OECD 2012). In contrast, relatively low-skilled migrant workers in other Asian and GCC countries are usually temporary workers who send most of their earnings home, although they earn much less.

**Figure 1.10: Remittances to Asia, 2000–2015**



e = estimate.

Source: World Bank staff calculation.

In 2000, Asia received remittances of \$36 billion (Figure 1.10). Between 2000 and 2008, the total amount of remittances sent to Asia increased steadily and at a faster pace, especially after 2004. In 2008, Asia received remittances of \$173 billion. From 2008 to 2009, there was a slight decrease in the total amount of Asia-directed remittances due mainly to the global financial crisis, which broke out in a major remittance provider, the United States. In 2010, the total amount of remittances to Asia was about \$192 billion and has been steadily increasing since then. From 2014 to 2015, the increase was relatively small (\$3 billion), and the total amount of remittances to Asia remained around \$266 billion in 2015. Between 2000 and 2015, the total amount of remittances multiplied sevenfold.

India and the PRC are the two Asian countries with the highest numbers of emigrant populations in the world, and they also receive the largest amounts of remittances. India alone accounts for more than one-quarter of all remittances to Asia, and the PRC follows closely (Table 1.7). India has been leading in terms of remittances received since 2000. The PRC, on the other hand, was ranked much lower in 2000, but remittances



flowing to the PRC have been increasing steadily. The Philippines is currently the third remittance-receiving Asian country. Other main Asian remittance-recipient countries are Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Viet Nam, each receiving remittances larger than \$10 billion (Figure 1.11a). In 2015, India received remittances of about \$69 billion, while those from the PRC sent \$64 billion to their home country. During that same year, \$28 billion was remitted to the Philippines.

As remittances are here reported in US dollars, changes in the exchange rate can affect the ranking of different corridors. This has been particularly true for countries whose labor migrants are employed in the Russian Federation, where the ruble has slid. Indeed, since 2000, the highest growth rates in remittances were observed in Central Asian countries, such as the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (Table 1.7). However, remittances to these Central Asian countries reached their peak levels in 2013 and decreased the next 2 years. The ruble lost more than half of its value relative to the US dollar between 2013 and 2015, so the decline in the remittance value reflects the exchange rate more than a drop in worker remittance behavior.

**Table 1.7: Remittances by Receiving Country, 2000–2015 (\$ billion)**

Country	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e
India	12.8	22.1	53.5	62.5	68.8	70.0	70.4	68.9
PRC	0.8	23.6	52.5	61.6	58.0	59.5	62.3	63.9
Philippines	7.0	13.7	20.6	21.9	23.4	25.4	27.3	28.5
Pakistan	1.1	4.3	9.7	12.3	14.0	14.6	17.1	19.3
Bangladesh	2.0	4.6	10.9	12.1	14.1	13.9	15.0	15.4
Viet Nam	1.3	3.2	8.3	8.6	10.0	11.0	12.0	13.2
Indonesia	1.2	5.4	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.6	8.6	9.6
Sri Lanka	1.2	2.0	4.1	5.2	6.0	6.4	7.0	7.0
Nepal	0.1	1.2	3.5	4.2	4.8	5.6	5.8	7.0
Korea, Republic of	4.9	5.2	5.8	6.6	6.6	6.5	6.6	6.5
Thailand	1.7	1.2	3.6	4.6	4.7	5.7	5.7	5.2
Japan	1.4	0.9	1.7	2.1	2.5	2.4	3.7	4.5
Myanmar	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.6	3.1	3.5
Uzbekistan	0.0	0.0	2.9	4.3	5.7	6.7	5.8	3.1
Tajikistan	0.0	0.5	2.3	3.1	3.6	4.2	3.4	2.6
Kyrgyz Republic	0.0	0.3	1.3	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.2	1.7
Malaysia	0.3	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6
Georgia	0.2	0.4	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.6
Azerbaijan	0.1	0.6	1.4	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.5
Cambodia	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4


e = estimate, PRC= People's Republic of China.

Source: World Bank. Migration and Remittances Data. Bilateral Remittance Matrix (Version April 2016). [www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data](http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data) (accessed September 2016).


Remittances to the PRC increased 80 times between 2000 and 2015 (Table 1.7). Remittances to Nepal, Myanmar, and Mongolia have increased by over 60, 30, and 20 times, respectively, in the same time period. Looking at remittances from 2010 onward, the highest increase in the first half of the decade is observed for Myanmar (30 times). Remittances to Cambodia, Japan, Nepal, and Pakistan more than doubled between 2010 and 2015.

OECD countries are the main source of remittances to many countries in the world, including several in Asia (Figure 1.11b). Of the \$266 billion in remittances that Asian countries received in 2015, \$113 billion was sent from the OECD area. For instance, 95% of the remittances in Viet Nam are sent from OECD countries. Similarly, 87% of remittances in Hong Kong, China and the Republic of Korea come from the OECD area. Other countries that receive a significant share of their remittances from OECD countries are Thailand (73%), Mongolia (61%), the PRC (60%), and the Philippines (57%).

**Figure 1.11a: Share of Asian Remittances by Recipient Country or Area, 2015**




**Figure 1.11b: Source Countries and Areas for Asian Remittances**



PRC = People's Republic of China, UAE = United Arab Emirates, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.

Source: World Bank staff calculation.

The United States is the dominant source of remittances in several Asian countries (Figure 1.11b and Figure 1.12). This country alone sent \$53 billion of all OECD remittances, which represents around 20% of all remittances sent to Asia in 2015. Other important OECD sources are Canada and Australia, from where, respectively, \$12 billion and \$9 billion were remitted to Asia. Besides these three major sources, European countries, mainly

**Figure 1.12: Amount of Remittances Received by Asian Economies, by Source, 2015 (\$ billion)**

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: World Bank. Migration and Remittances Data. Bilateral Remittance Matrix (Version April 2016). [www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data](http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data) (accessed September 2016).

the United Kingdom, matter in terms of the remittances that Bangladesh, the PRC, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand receive. Germany, Italy, and Spain are other important sources of remittances for these Asian countries. In 2015, the Asian OECD countries, Japan and the Republic of Korea, produced remittances for Asia amounting to \$8 billion and \$6 billion, respectively. They are major sources of remittances in some Asian countries, such as the PRC, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Thailand.

About 23% of all remittances going to Asian countries are sent from non-OECD Asian countries (Figure 1.11b). Among non-OECD Asian sources of remittances, Hong Kong, China stands out; about \$16 billion was remitted from this area to the rest of Asia in 2015. Those in Hong Kong, China alone send about one-quarter of all remittances going to the PRC. Pakistan and India are other important sources of Asian remittances, each providing about \$4.5 billion. Remittances sent from India are considerable in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> World Bank. Migration and Remittances Data. Bilateral Remittance Matrix (Version April 2016). [www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data](http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data) (accessed September 2016).

Further, about 85% of remittances in Bhutan are sent by those residing in Nepal. Malaysian workers in Singapore account for almost two-thirds of the remittances to their home country. The major source of remittances in Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Myanmar are their workers in Thailand. Bhutan, Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, and Myanmar are countries where remittances are mainly sent by workers in other Asian countries. Central and West Asian countries receive remittances mainly from migrant workers in the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation accounted for \$9 billion of all Asian remittances in 2015.<sup>8</sup>

About 30% of all remittances flowing to Asia originated from GCC countries in 2015 (Table 1.8). Workers in Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the second and third major sources of Asian remittances after the United States. Remittances of about \$26 billion from Saudi Arabia and \$24 billion from the UAE were sent to Asia in 2015. About 71% of remittances in Nepal and 61% of remittances in Pakistan were sent from GCC countries. Workers in these GCC countries are also providing more than half of the remittances in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka.

Remittances from GCC countries have increased considerably in the last few years. For example, between 2010 and 2015, the total amount of remittances sent from Saudi Arabia to Bangladesh and Indonesia more than tripled. Similar increases are also observed in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, albeit to a lesser extent. The amount of remittances sent back by Filipinos in GCC countries more than doubled in the same time period. The UAE is becoming a major source of remittances for the Philippines, with 300% growth in remittances in the last 5 years.

From the perspective of the remittance-sending countries, Asian remittances account for roughly 20% of all remittances sent from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and 40% of all remittances sent from Japan and the Republic of Korea. On the other hand, despite their importance for Asian workers and their home countries, remittances to Asia actually make up a relatively small share of all remittances sent from GCC countries.

Remittances are an important source of foreign currency and income in several developing countries (Figure 1.13). Asian countries with the heaviest reliance on remittances are the Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, and Tajikistan. Remittances account for over one-third of Tajikistan's gross domestic product (GDP) and roughly 30% of those of the Kyrgyz Republic and Nepal (Figure 1.13). Other Asian countries with relatively higher levels of remittances include Georgia (12%), the Philippines (10%), Bangladesh (9%), and Sri Lanka (9%). Japan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have the lowest remittance–GDP ratios (around 0.1% each). India and the PRC have remittance–GDP ratios of 3% and 1%, respectively. The ratio of remittances to GDP is, on average, less than 1% in the world, and less than half of that in OECD countries.

<sup>8</sup> World Bank. Migration and Remittances Data.


**Table 1.8: Distribution of Sources of Remittances Received by Asian Economies, 2015 (%)**

Remittance-Receiving Country or Area	OECD	Non-OECD Asia	GCC	Russian Federation
Afghanistan	11.9	31.0	15.4	
Azerbaijan	8.2	7.2		58.3
Bangladesh	10.3	34.4	54.9	
Bhutan		100.0		
Cambodia	38.0	62.0		
China, People's Republic of	59.9	37.3		0.5
Georgia	19.3	3.8		59.5
Hong Kong, China	87.1	12.6		
India	31.4	15.4	52.1	
Indonesia	11.4	35.8	51.6	
Japan	61.8	30.8		0.1
Kazakhstan	22.4	3.4		64.9
Korea, Republic of	86.8	11.8		0.1
Kyrgyz Republic	14.3	3.6		77.6
Lao People's Democratic Republic	27.1	72.9		
Macao, China	16.3	83.7		
Malaysia	19.5	79.7		0.1
Maldives	50.0	50.0		
Mongolia	61.1	6.4		26.8
Myanmar	7.8	64.7	27.5	
Nepal	10.1	18.9	71.0	
Pakistan	22.0	16.0	61.2	
Philippines	56.7	10.3	31.7	
Sri Lanka	38.4	9.1	51.0	
Tajikistan	5.5	11.1		77.1
Thailand	72.5	22.7	4.1	
Turkmenistan				100.0
Uzbekistan				100.0
Viet Nam	94.5	4.9		0.4
Asia Total	42.5	22.4	30.0	3.3

GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Empty cells indicate no reported bilateral remittance flows.

Source: World Bank. Migration and Remittances Data. Bilateral Remittance Matrix (Version April 2016). [www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data](http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data) (accessed September 2016).

**Figure 1.13: Share of Remittances in Gross Domestic Product by Country or Area, 2014 (% of GDP)**

GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: World Bank staff calculation.

## 1.8 Conclusion

Asia has maintained its important role in global migration, although there has been some change in the relative size of origin countries, with Pakistan becoming more important. The decline in oil prices has not yet affected the deployment of workers to GCC countries, although this is a concern in origin countries. Policies to reduce dependence on foreign workers in GCC countries have also yet to show an effect on the flow of workers. However, the impact of policies directed at the welfare and protection of deployed workers is apparent.

Immigration of Asian citizens to OECD countries is at its highest peak ever, driven by rebounds in key destination countries. Asian immigrants in Europe and in North America fare better in the labor market than other immigrant groups, sometimes even better than native-born residents. The weight of Asian international students among all those studying at universities abroad is also high, in particular as a sending region. The presence of Asian students is particularly visible at the highest levels of tertiary education.

Remittances sent by Asian migrants to their home countries are still increasing, albeit at a slower pace than in the past. A large share of these remittance flows come from the OECD area, and a little less than one-third from GCC countries. There is no clear sign yet of an impact of oil prices, as this share is stable.

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# Fair Recruitment for Low-Skilled Migrant Workers: Issues and Challenges

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## 2.1 Introduction

Migrant recruitment issues have come to the forefront of the international agenda recently, with a growing realization that malpractices in recruitment processes erode the benefits of labor migration for migrant workers and their families (Afsar 2009; Gordon 2015; ILO 2016b; Jones 2015; Jureidini 2014, 2016; Martin 2016; UNODC 2015; Wickramasekara 2014). The International Labour Organization (ILO) recently launched the Fair Recruitment Initiative, and in September 2016, it conducted a tripartite experts' meeting to develop and adopt associated fair recruitment general principles and operational guidelines (ILO 2016c). In addition, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is promoting the International Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS), which focuses on developing an accreditation framework for recruitment (IOM 2014), and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants submitted a thematic report to the United Nations General Assembly in 2015 on recruitment practices and the human rights of migrants, arguing for a transition to an ethical system of recruitment (UNGA 2015).

Furthermore, reduction of migration costs has been proposed as an indicator to measure progress against targets in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). One major component of migration cost is the high fees paid to recruiters, which reduce the impact of migration on development by both exposing workers to indebtedness and contributing to unbalanced distribution of gains from migration. High recruitment costs can also lead to irregular migration<sup>1</sup> by deterring migrants from using legal channels or leading them to abscond from their employers when excessive recruitment fees are deducted from their wages.

<sup>1</sup> Irregular migration encompasses migrant workers who enter a country without legal authorization, as well as those who have entered a country lawfully but who engage in employment without authorization. This conforms to the definition in the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), which stipulates in Article 5 that migrant workers and members of their families are considered to be in an undocumented or irregular situation if “they are (not) authorized to enter, stay and to engage in a remunerated activity in the State of employment pursuant to the law of that State and to international agreements to which that State is a party to” (OSCE-IOM-ILO 2006).

## 2.2 International Labor Standards

### 2.2.1 Definitions

“Fair recruitment” became popular following the elaboration of the ILO Fair Migration Agenda in 2014, which included fair recruitment as one of its main pillars. As the ILO observed, there is no internationally accepted definition of fair recruitment (ILO 2016b). One ILO discussion paper noted that

it can generally be understood to mean recruitment carried out within the law, in line with international labour standards, and with respect for human rights, without discrimination and protecting workers from abusive situations (ILO 2016b: 2).

Taking this further, an ILO meeting of experts, representing governments, workers, and employers, adopted 13 general principles for fair recruitment (ILO 2016c). At the heart of these are a recruitment process in line with international human rights and fundamental rights at work, recruitment responding to labor market needs, and no recruitment fees or related costs borne by workers or job seekers. These ILO principles are accompanied by 31 operational guidelines stipulating the responsibilities of governments, enterprises, public employment services, labor recruiters, and employers.

The International Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS) website has a brief definition of fair recruitment that acknowledges the perspective of workers, employers, and recruiters (Box 2.1). It does not, however, refer to international instruments or laws, or to the roles of origin- and destination-country governments.

#### Box 2.1: Definition of Fair Recruitment by the International Recruitment Integrity System

*Fair for Employers...*

Hiring the right person with the right competencies for the job without fear of being duped by unscrupulous intermediaries.

*Fair for Migrant Workers...*

Finding suitable and legal employment without paying for the right to work, having your passport retained, or becoming a victim of labour trafficking or forced labour.

*Fair for Recruiters...*

Fair competition for professional recruiters and employment agents who practice honest, transparent, and fair recruitment.

Source: International Recruitment Integrity System. <http://iris.iom.int> (accessed September 2016).

ILO instruments, including the ILO Migrant Worker Conventions and Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration (ILO 2006), do not use the term “fair recruitment.” ILO Convention No. 97 distinguishes among recruitment, introduction, and placement (Box 2.2), while ILO Convention No. 181 refers to “recruitment, placement and employment” as distinct processes (ILO 2015b). In recent usage, however, recruitment for employment is sometimes used to capture all three stages. While the manner of recruitment often affects employment conditions, these are, in fact, two distinctive stages in the labor migration cycle.

**Box 2.2: Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97): Annex I – Recruitment, Placing and Conditions of Labour of Migrants for Employment Recruited Otherwise Than under Government-Sponsored Arrangements for Group Transfer**

For the purpose of this Annex –

- (a) the term “*recruitment*” means –
  - (i) the engagement of a person in one territory on behalf of an employer in another territory, or
  - (ii) the giving of an undertaking to a person in one territory to provide him with employment in another territory, together with the making of any arrangements in connection with the operations mentioned in (i) and (ii) including the seeking for and selection of emigrants and the preparation for departure of the emigrants;
- (b) the term “*introduction*” means any operations for ensuring or facilitating the arrival in or admission to a territory of persons who have been recruited within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this Article; and
- (c) the term “*placing*” means any operations for the purpose of ensuring or facilitating the employment of persons who have been introduced within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this Article.

Source: ILO. 1949. Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97).

A reference to “fair” is found in the ILO Recommendation on Private Employment Agencies, 1996 (No. 188), Article 13: “Private employment agencies and the competent authority should take measures to promote the utilization of proper, fair and efficient selection methods.” The reference however, is to selection methods only.

Another term that has long been in use is “ethical recruitment.” Ethical recruitment concerns mostly arose in the context of recruitment of skilled workers from developing countries, raising concerns about “brain drain.” This has been highlighted in large-scale recruitment of health workers, leading to serious health care issues in developing countries; public and private employment companies hire workers directly without consulting origin-country governments, showing little concern for health outcomes in these origin countries.

The ILO report for discussion at the tripartite meeting on fair recruitment guidelines (ILO 2016b) did not contain the term “ethical,” although the guidelines do cover all workers including skilled workers. This may be because the focus of concern in the fair recruitment debate is largely on low-skilled workers who more often face abuse and exploitation during recruitment, placement, and employment.<sup>2</sup>

## 2.2.2 Relevant Instruments of the International Labour Organization

Regarding international labor standards, Convention No. 181 (Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997) and the accompanying recommendation (No. 188) have provided the most comprehensive guidance on the regulation of recruitment. Convention No. 181 recognizes the role of private employment agencies in job placement as well as third-party employment relations. It also set the standards in regard to fees and costs (Box 2.3).

<sup>2</sup> This chapter uses the OECD (2008) definition of “low-skilled,” which can be based either on the skills required for the job performed or according to the education level of the worker.

**Box 2.3: Recruitment Fees and Related Costs**

In the International Labour Organization (ILO) General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment (2016c), the term “recruitment fees and related costs” refers to “any fees or costs incurred in the recruitment process for workers to secure employment or placement, regardless of the manner, timing or location of their imposition or collection.” The general principles state that “no recruitment fees or related costs should be charged to or otherwise borne by workers or job-seekers.”

ILO Convention No. 181 contains a general prohibition on private employment agencies charging workers fees or costs (Article 7[1]), but there is no formal definition of fees or costs in Convention No. 181 or other ILO instruments.

“Migration cost” is a broader term and covers all costs associated with finding and securing employment, preparation, and transport. There is no agreed classification of recruitment costs at the international level. While payments to secure a job (legal or illegal) is commonly understood as a recruitment cost, the classification or inclusion of other cost items is somewhat unclear.

At the national level, Ethiopia, which has ratified Convention No. 181, provides an illustration of legislation on recruitment costs. Ethiopia amended its regulation in 2009 through Employment Exchange Services Proclamation No. 632/2009 to clarify the costs that private employment agencies can legally charge to migrant domestic workers. Article 15 prescribes the following:

1. An employer shall, through the private employment agency, be responsible for the payment of the following costs in relation to the employment of a worker:
  - (a) visa fee of the country of destination,
  - (b) round-trip ticket,
  - (c) residence and work permit fees,
  - (d) embarkation fee, and
  - (e) insurance coverage.
2. The worker shall be responsible to cover the costs of:
  - (a) issuance of passport,
  - (b) authentication of documents within the country,
  - (c) medical examination,
  - (d) vaccination,
  - (e) birth certificate,
  - (f) skill testing, and
  - (g) certificate of clearance from any crime.
3. The cost of medical examination referred to in sub-article (2) of this Article shall be covered by the agency if conducted for more than once.
4. Unless the worker fails to be deployed for work for reasons attributable to himself, the agency shall refund all the worker’s expenses referred to in sub-article (2) of this Article.
5. Where the worker fails to be deployed for work for unjustified reasons after all necessary conditions are fulfilled, he shall cover all the expenses incurred by the agency in accordance with sub-article (1) of this Article.

Source: ILO (2015b).

Further, special protection for migrant workers is outlined in Article 8 of Convention No. 181, which requires member states to seek adequate protection for and prevent abuses of migrant workers recruited or placed in their territories by private employment agencies, including laws or regulations that have penalties for agencies that engage in fraudulent practices and abuses. It also requires member states to consider bilateral agreements to prevent abuses and fraudulent practices in the recruitment, placement, and employment of migrant workers. So far, 28 countries have ratified Convention No. 181: 18 in Europe, 1 in the Middle East, 2 in Africa, 2 in Latin America, and 3 in Asia and the Pacific (i.e., Fiji, Japan, and Mongolia).

Several ILO standards that have been adopted since Convention No. 181 include provisions on recruitment: Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188); Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189); and Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (P029). All are consistent with Article 7 of Convention No. 181 on fees and costs.

ILO standards on migrant workers are complemented by the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, which comprises nonbinding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labor migration (ILO 2006). It contains specific guidelines on the licensing and supervision of recruitment and contracting agencies for migrant workers under principle 13. Most recently, an ILO tripartite meeting of experts adopted general principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment (ILO 2016c).

### 2.2.3 Sustainable Development Goals

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The importance of decent work and well-managed migration is also recognized in the SDGs. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development acknowledges “the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development,” representing a shift from the Millennium Development Goals, which barely made reference to migration and migrant workers. SDG 8 aims to promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, including full and decent work for all. One of the targets under the goal (8.8) is to protect labor rights and safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers and particularly female migrants. SDG 10 aims to reduce inequalities within and among countries, including a target to facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies. The indicator framework is a key piece of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development architecture and is at the core of the monitoring system (ILO 2016a). A recommended indicator for target 10.7 is the recruitment cost borne by an employee as a proportion of yearly income earned in the destination country.

## 2.3 Current Systems of Recruitment in Countries of Origin and Destination

Recruitment is a major function of the labor market where employers seek workers and workers seek jobs. Employers have three strategies to recruit workers (and workers to find jobs): (i) directly through job announcements and screening, (ii) through public employment services, and (iii) through private intermediaries

that include licensed recruitment agencies and social networks. In Asia, private recruitment agencies directly or indirectly account for a majority of workers placed abroad from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. With the exception of the Employment Permit System in the Republic of Korea, private recruitment agencies unquestionably dominate international low-skills placement in Asia. There is significant variation among countries of origin in the share of women among their total migrant workers. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka have typically had large outflows of female migrants engaged in domestic work. Flows to construction in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) are dominated by, if not solely consisting of, men.

The private recruitment industry in Asia and the GCC countries is characterized by a range of enterprises or agents varying in size, scale, and status: (i) small and medium-sized recruitment agencies that are registered and licensed; (ii) some private companies with a proven track record of ethical recruitment practices; (iii) unregistered and unlicensed small and medium-sized operators; (iv) unregistered and unlicensed subagents or brokers; (v) social networks of immediate family members, friends, and relatives; (vi) overseas recruitment companies with links to local agencies or direct hiring;<sup>3</sup> and (vii) sponsors (i.e., *kafalas* in GCC countries) and labor brokers in destination countries (ILO 2015a). The private recruitment process, too, has three distinct layers: (i) the employer in the destination country and recruiter, (ii) recruiter in the origin country, and (iii) subagent and worker (Martin 2016).<sup>4</sup>

Some of these categories overlap with others. For instance, unregistered brokers and subagents may overlap with returnees and social networks of family and friends.

Researchers have pointed to the increasing role of social networks—family, friends, and relatives—of workers in matching employers with workers (ILO 2015a). Moreover, as Gordon (2015: 8) observed, “[u]ntouched by regulation, but critical to the migration industry, are the many local actors at the bottom of the chain whose status and trust within their communities in remote areas makes them invaluable as brokers who can deliver migrants, and their fees, to the agency at the top.”

Private recruitment agencies perform a useful role in expansion of overseas markets, and they are often able to assess emerging labor market demands and trends better than government agencies. In this sense, they perform a useful labor market matching function, and they are more easily accessible to potential migrants than government agencies (Wickramasekara 2014; ILO 2007, 2009). Indeed, ILO (2009) recognized private employment agencies’ contributions, including in “contributing to decent conditions for cross-border labour migration.” The role of private recruitment agencies is also acknowledged in various South Asian government policies (Wickramasekara 2014), including Sri Lanka, whose national Labour Migration Policy states that “[t]he State recognizes the contribution of Recruitment Agencies (State and Private) as a key stakeholder in the process” (MFEPW 2008: 10).

<sup>3</sup> Direct hiring is not allowed in most countries.

<sup>4</sup> The dominance of private recruitment agencies in international recruitment in the Asia–GCC country migration corridor needs to be examined in the context of scale and complexity of cross-border regulations. Employers generally find it more convenient to turn to private recruiters that have networks abroad and are familiar with immigration laws.

At the same time, widespread evidence exists that the migration recruitment industry is responsible for numerous abuses that erode the benefits of migration for workers. The ILO Committee of Experts in its 2016 general survey of migrant worker instruments stated, “[i]n recent years, it has become increasingly clear that governance of recruitment practices has an essential role to play in preventing migrant workers from experiencing abusive and fraudulent conditions, including trafficking in persons and forced labour” (ILO 2016d: 65). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants added, “[t]he practices of unethical recruiters and their subagents sit on a complex spectrum of human rights violations....[s]uch recruiters commonly exploit migrants, directly or indirectly, at every stage of the migratory process” (UNGA 2015: 7).

There has been extensive research on recruitment agencies and their operations and malpractices in Asia and GCC countries, and country-specific variations do exist (Afsar 2009; DLA Piper 2014; Gordon 2015; Jones 2015; Jureidini 2014, 2016; UNGA 2015; UNODC 2015; Verité 2016; Wickramasekara 2014). Most of the issues raised are well documented and similar across countries, including

- (i) layers of intermediaries in both origin and destination countries, collusion between local and foreign agents, and corruption (Verité 2016);
- (ii) use of subagents effectively separating good from bad recruiters (Jones 2015);
- (iii) excessive fees that land migrants in onerous debt and forced labor situations, and a high level of rentier income;
- (iv) flawed project-tendering processes that do not specify recruitment costs (Jureidini 2016);
- (v) free visas and visa trading, resulting in the irregular status of migrant workers;
- (vi) agencies providing false information to workers on the nature, terms, and conditions of employment, and contract substitution upon arrival in a destination country;
- (vii) withholding and/or confiscating travel documents; and
- (viii) ineffective complaint and grievance procedures.

High recruitment costs lead to indebtedness and wage deductions. Information from recent migration cost surveys conducted by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) and the ILO showed that recruitment costs represented 80% of total migration costs in Nepal and more than 50% in the Philippines for migration to Qatar (Table 2.1).

Bangladesh and Pakistan show the highest migration costs, accounting for 6–9 months of earnings for migration to four GCC countries (Table 2.2). For India, the cost amounted to 2–3 months of wages, while for the Philippines, it represented 1 month’s wage (Martin 2016).

Recruitment fees are generally high in relation to several criteria: (i) legally stipulated costs, as actual migration costs often exceed legally allowed limits, especially to premium destination countries; (ii) norms set by international instruments; (iii) published codes of conduct; and (iv) the migrant worker’s capacity to pay (Wickramasekara 2014). This results in an inequitable distribution of the potential gains from migration.



**Table 2.1: Recruiters and Earnings, Workers Leaving Qatar, 2015 (\$)**

	Nepal		Pakistan		Philippines	
	With Agent	No Agent	With Agent	No Agent	With Agent	No Agent
No. of workers sampled	319	32	513	120	65	56
Payment to recruiter	759		434		362	
Total migration cost	942	663	3,346	3,207	696	204
Recruitment cost as % of total migration cost	80.6		13.0			52.0
Earnings per month	259	269	452	475	375	481
Months to recoup costs	3.6	2.2	7.4	6.1	1.6	0.3

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: Martin (2016).

**Table 2.2: Worker-Reported Migration Costs, 2014–2015**

Destination	Origin	Worker-Paid Migration Costs (\$)	Earnings in COD per Month (\$)	Costs in Months of Earnings (\$)	Earnings in COO (\$ per month)	Ratio COD/COO Earnings
Kuwait	Bangladesh	3,136	347	9	102	3.4
	Egypt	2,979	611	5		
	India	1,248	494	3	192	2.6
Qatar	India	895	556	2	151	3.7
	Philippines	463	503	1	443	1.1
Saudi Arabia	Ethiopia	861	327	3	273	1.2
	Pakistan	3,812	428	9	137	3.1
United Arab Emirates	Pakistan	2,148	387	6	140	2.8

COD = country of destination, COO = country of origin.

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: Martin (2016).

Several Asian origin countries have extensive regulations governing licensing and operation of recruitment for overseas employment, yet achieving fair recruitment has been elusive. There has been limited success in curbing abuses in recruitment, implying that structural factors and interests around the recruitment industry are difficult to regulate. This problem is rooted in the combination of scarce jobs, poor governance, and complex cross-border regulations. Given that the supply of workers in low-wage origin countries far outstrips the demand in wealthier destination countries, migrant workers are highly vulnerable to abuses during recruitment. For example, 1.4 million workers are registered for 10,000 jobs in the Malaysian plantation sector under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Bangladesh and Malaysia. A lack of decent jobs at home

makes it easy for recruiters to promise good jobs abroad and to charge high fees. The poor bargaining position of migrants and governance gaps gives rise to rent-seeking behavior of local recruitment agents and their foreign counterparts, sometimes linked with politicians and officials. In some cases, politicians and power elites own private employment agencies, charging recruitment fees far in excess of actual costs incurred (Afsar 2009; Wickramasekara 2014).

Existing legislation is often inadequate or has loopholes that raise migration costs. Most Asian migration legislation, including that of the Philippines as an example, allows for levying of fees by private employment agencies. Even some government-managed recruitment systems, such as the Employment Permit System of the Republic of Korea, allow a “sending fee.” Limited capacity and insufficient allocation of resources also contribute to ineffective enforcement in countries of origin.

The lack of organization and empowerment of low-skilled workers exacerbates recruitment malpractices as well. There are hardly any effective organizations to represent their interests, and many workers may not be aware of their rights under employment contracts. Migrant workers find it difficult to take private employment agencies to court because of lack of resources and absence of needed documents such as receipts for payment. In destination countries, these barriers are more pronounced because of lack of language skills, fear of retaliation by employers and recruiters, unfamiliarity with local laws, and absence of access to legal aid. Finally, as a recent ILO report pointed out, “a major obstacle in the way of fair recruitment is also the changing landscape of employment relationships, and the opportunities [that] this creates for evasion of workers’ rights” (ILO 2016b), which highlights the increasing role of intermediaries and brokers in the labor market.

Both Convention No. 189 (Article 15[d]) and Convention No. 181 (Article 8[2]) provide for negotiation of bilateral agreements to prevent abuses and fraudulent practices in recruitment, placement, and employment. In the 1950s and 1960s, bilateral labor agreements played a major role in migration of workers between countries, with public employment services emphasized. For example, migration of workers from Turkey for employment in Germany was in line with fair recruitment principles and based on international guidelines (Wickramasekara 2015). The second generation of bilateral cooperation in migration since the 1990s has, however, adopted a looser form of MOU in Asia, as recruitment is mostly arranged by private employment agencies.

A review of MOUs for Asia conducted for the ILO found that fair recruitment issues are generally left out (Wickramasekara 2015). MOUs have been superimposed on a long-standing system of migration, with large stocks of migrant workers already in destination countries. Domestic workers are not covered under most MOUs, but Jordan, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia have concluded separate dedicated MOUs on domestic workers with some origin countries.<sup>5</sup> A review of 64 Asian MOUs found that only 13 referred to recruitment at all, and references to ethical or fair recruitment were few (Box 2.4). Even the few references to fair or ethical recruitment do not cover issues of nonlevy of fees, consistency with international labor standards on recruitment, and corresponding legislation (Wickramasekara 2015).

<sup>5</sup> Some countries have attempted to protect female migrant domestic workers through selective bans and raising age barriers; however, these approaches deny women the opportunity to make their own decisions about migration. They may also result in leaving women with no options other than to migrate irregularly and without protection.

**Box 2.4: References to Fair Recruitment in Asian Memoranda of Understanding on Migration****Philippines–Saudi Arabia 2012 domestic worker agreement:**

Art. 3. Ensure the recruitment of domestic workers through recruitment offices, companies or agencies that practice ethical recruitment and are licensed by their respective governments

Art. 4. Regulate or endeavour to control recruitment costs in both countries.

Art. 5. Ensure that recruitment offices, companies or agencies of both countries and the employer shall not charge or deduct from the salary of the domestic worker any cost attendant to his/her recruitment and deployment or impose any kind of unauthorized salary deductions.

(Similar provisions are found in other Saudi Arabia agreements with India and Sri Lanka.)

**Jordan–Philippines 2012 memoranda of understanding:** Mentions principle of fairness in recruitment, deployment, and entry of workers.

**India–United Arab Emirates 2011 memoranda of understanding:** “The two parties agree to strengthen their respective regulations of private employment agencies to enforce fair and transparent recruitment practices in their respective jurisdiction and compliance of all actors in the process of recruiting Indian workers for employment in the UAE with the rule of law.”

Source: Wickramasekara (2015).

There is limited information and evidence on effective implementation of these MOUs. For instance, the continuing stories of abuse of domestic workers from countries that have bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia casts doubt on the effectiveness of agreements (Hayden 2016). Research has shown that bilateral agreements and MOUs often play only limited roles in fair recruitment (Wickramasekara 2015) due to the nonbinding nature of MOUs that carry no obligation on either the origin country or destination country to enforce their provisions. Also, there is a lack of transparency in MOUs, and they are not disseminated to critical players in the recruitment process. Unless employers in destination countries know their obligations under MOUs, it is unrealistic to expect any changes. Similarly, workers must know what their rights and obligations are in MOUs to insist on their rights.

MOUs and bilateral agreements that arrange new migration flows appear to have better prospects for fair recruitment. A good example is the Employment Permit System of the Republic of Korea, which initiated new migration programs with 15 Asian countries based on MOUs. Recruitment is done by the public sector, resulting in a substantial decrease in migration costs. Still, workers pay placement costs to public employment services of countries concerned, and, as such, this is inconsistent with fair recruitment.

## 2.4 Way Forward

Essentially, a fair recruitment system is one that is gender-responsive, is in line with international labor standards, efficiently matches jobs to job seekers, eliminates worker fees and labor exploitation, and reduces migration costs. Measures to protect migrant workers during recruitment generally have consisted of information dissemination on safe migration and rights; legislation on regulating recruitment and its

enforcement; emigration clearance and vetting of employment contracts; use of public placement agencies; complaint mechanisms and support services; self-regulation and corporate social responsibility; and international cooperation, such as bilateral agreements and regional processes. While all of these measures can be improved to better achieve fair recruitment, six policy areas are particularly important.

**Ending worker-paid recruitment fees and costs in policy, and ensuring labor rights during employment.** Some sectors and migration corridors have been successful in implementing a zero fee and cost policy. A number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have prohibited recruitment fees from being collected from migrant workers, although enforcement is limited. Seafarers are not required to pay placement fees in the Philippines, nor are performing artists and entertainers bound for Japan. Recruitment costs are borne by employers in the Australian and New Zealand seasonal worker programs. Zero fees and costs for domestic workers have been legislated in the Philippines and Sri Lanka.

While zero fees and cost legislation is a necessary first step, enforcement is key, and has been uneven. Further, recruitment, immigration, and employment are a continuum, and fair recruitment legislation must be followed by immigration and labor legislation in line with international standards. In some cases, even when recruitment laws in migration corridors are coherent and recruitment fees are employer-paid, migration outcomes are negative for the worker. For example, in Sri Lanka, women are often enticed into domestic work through cash advances from agents that cover the migration costs to GCC countries. As this amount comes from prospective employers who have thus invested, it has implications for barriers to switching jobs or even returning to the origin countries.

**Subsidizing recruitment costs and increasing options.** Given the employment and economic growth dimensions of labor migration, government support for job centers, job portals, and public placement agencies can be increased from their current low levels in Asia, as the few existing exceptions have significantly reduced migration costs. The Republic of Korea has established offices of the Human Resources Development Service in countries of origin to support the recruitment process, and origin countries have engaged public placement agencies to administer registration, applicant databases, and language tests and selection.<sup>6</sup>

As mentioned, the Republic of Korea introduced the Employment Permit System in 2004, which recognized the need for low-skilled workers in enterprises (particularly small and medium-sized) in construction, manufacturing, agriculture, and services. It operates a government-to-government labor recruitment program based on mandatory MOUs with 15 countries in Asia. In 2015, 51,019 workers were admitted. A major achievement has been the reduction in the average cost paid by a worker, from \$3,509 under the trainee system in 2002 to \$927 under the Employment Permit System in 2011 (Kyung 2014).

Another example comes from the 2012 Bangladesh and Malaysia MOU on the employment of Bangladeshi workers in the plantation sector of Malaysia, which provided a quota of 10,000 Bangladeshi workers. The Bureau of Employment and Training of Bangladesh spent considerable resources in creating the needed infrastructure for registration, selection, and placement of workers. As of June 2015, 7,616 workers were placed, and migration costs fell from \$3,000–\$4,000 to \$400 (Wickramasekara 2016).

<sup>6</sup> However, sending fees (for origin country governments) to recover costs are allowed, which is questionable.

E-based recruitment, either through state-funded or private sector portals, also minimizes the number of intermediaries involved. Direct recruitment can take place by accredited or screened employers. EURES is the publicly funded jobs portal to facilitate the free movement of workers within the European Union's 28 countries, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. About 1,000 EURES advisors maintain daily contact with employees and employers, and partners include both public and private employment services (EURES 2016).

New Zealand launched the Recognized Seasonal Employers Scheme in 2007 to fill labor shortages in its horticulture and viticulture industries. It began with an initial annual cap of 5,000 workers, which was raised to 8,000 for the 2009 season and to 9,000 in 2015. Migrants are recruited from Pacific island countries by accredited employers through work-ready pools (i.e., a database of workers prepared by the origin-country government) or by village communities. In an evaluation of the program, Gibson and McKenzie (2014) concluded that migrants who participated in the program benefited from increases in per capita income, expenditure, and savings. The scheme has also achieved a high degree of circularity of migrant workers, with very low overstay rates.

**Simplifying immigration rules and vacancy-driven recruitment.** According to the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) migration cost studies, the migration corridor is the key determinant of worker-paid costs (Abella 2016). In some corridors, costs are equivalent to only a few days of work (e.g., Bulgaria to Spain) and in others, up to 7–9 months of work (e.g., Pakistan to the United Arab Emirates). Free or freer movement of labor reduces costs, while complex regulations are an obstacle to the reduction of intermediaries and costs. Further, in some corridors, revenue from recruitment appears to be driving recruitment more than skills and labor shortages. Recruitment should always be tied to actual job vacancies.

**Improving regulations.** An interesting development has been the concept of joint liability in countries of destination. Legislation in the European Union, United Kingdom, and United States makes lead contractors liable for recruitment abuses in their supply chains (Jureidini 2016). In Canada, under Manitoba's Worker Recruitment and Protection Act, employers are liable for recruitment fees charged to workers. The United Kingdom's Gangmasters Licensing Authority requires origin-country recruitment agencies to apply for licenses and to comply with those terms and conditions (Andreas, Nasri, and Swinairski 2015). In the country of origin, the Philippines has "joint and solidary liability" for both private recruitment agencies and foreign employers for violations of contract. In practice, however, while local recruitment agencies have been held accountable, foreign employers have not (MFA 2014).

Government regulations can be supplemented by both industry self-regulation and monitoring by trade unions and civil society organizations. There has been some promising self-regulation by private employment agencies through ethical codes of conduct. In Viet Nam, the ILO has supported the development of a monitoring mechanism that ranks agencies according to their compliance with the code of conduct of the Association of Vietnamese Manpower Agencies. Further, trade unions and civil society can help develop a monitoring system in both origin and destination countries, which can alert authorities in case of violations.

**Advocacy, trade, and the media.** Recent experience from the fishing industry in Thailand has shown that media reports, followed by pressure from buyers and retailers due to reputational damage and the possibility of trade sanctions, are influential drivers for change. A \$7 billion industry, Thailand's seafood industry has been plagued labor exploitation and trafficking of migrant workers, including a graphic report by the Associated Press in 2015 (McDowell, Mason, and Mendoza 2015). The United States Trafficking in Persons Report gave Thailand a Tier 3 ranking in 2015, a status that requires a waiver from the executive branch to avoid trade sanctions, and the United States Generalized System of Preferences trade preference program with Thailand is under a formal review, following a petition submitted by the AFL-CIO trade union on the basis of worker rights. The European Union's report on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing also issued Thailand a "yellow card" in April 2015. Simultaneously, buyers looking to minimize risk were diversifying, looking at other countries to source seafood. With the distinct possibility of trade and market repercussions, the Government of Thailand introduced new legislation including zero recruitment fees.

As another example, in the electronics sector, Apple stated that it does

not tolerate unfair recruitment fees . . . [in] cases of bonded labor, [it makes] suppliers repay the employees the recruitment fees in full whether or not the suppliers were directly involved in the recruiting process . . . [resulting] in over US\$25.6 million repaid to workers since 2008, including US\$4.7 million in 2015 alone (Apple 2016).

**Empowering migrant workers.** The role of trade unions, migrant associations, and civil society organizations in providing support services to migrant workers to help them take advantage of complaint mechanisms, organize workers, and promote campaigns and advocacy is a potent force for fair recruitment. Migrant worker resource centers, managed by these entities, provide a means for outreach and advice. With ILO support, trade unions, civil society organizations, and government job centers have established 26 migrant worker resource centers in Southeast Asia to provide a range of protective services to migrants, potential migrants, and members of their families. At these centers, migrants can access advice and legal assistance to help them make complaints when faced with recruitment- or employment-related abuses. Beyond services delivery, however, migrant workers should be empowered to represent their own interests and to safeguard their rights through migrant associations and trade unions.

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# Addressing Irregular Migration and Violations of Migrant Workers' Rights

Max Tunon and Benjamin Harkins

## 3.1 Introduction

In June 2014, more than 250,000 migrant workers from Cambodia returned home from Thailand within the space of only a few weeks. This exodus occurred following a military coup in Thailand, amid fears of a crackdown on migrant workers and their employers in an irregular situation. Many returned without their due wages, while others complained of harassment and extortion. A follow-up survey of 667 migrants found that nearly one-fifth had experienced some type of abuse at work (Dickson and Koenig 2016). The same month, Thailand was relegated for the first time to Tier 3 on the United States Department of State's Trafficking in Persons Report—the lowest ranking—in large part due to the abuse and exploitation suffered by migrant workers from neighboring countries.

With several industries hit by a sudden, significant shortage of workers, the new government in Thailand opened a new window of regularization. The link between the large, irregular migrant population and their exposure to labor abuses was recognized. The registration of nearly 1.6 million migrant workers, in a period of 5 months, was featured prominently in government reports to demonstrate its commitment to combating trafficking and forced labor (MFA 2015). However, several studies have questioned that legal documentation on its own is sufficient to increase protection for migrants employed in Thailand (Harkins et al. 2013; MAP Foundation 2012).

Irregular migration is one of the few areas of labor migration policy in which there is a general consensus; nearly all governments in countries of origin and destination seek to prevent it from occurring. However, history has demonstrated that irregular migration is unlikely to be eliminated since migration flows across borders are not always entirely under the control of governments (ILO 2010).

Increases in irregular migration can give rise to political tensions between countries, national security concerns, and critiques from the public that migration flows are out of control. Lost in this rhetoric, considerations of the human and labor rights of irregular migrants are not typically heard. In fact, some rights advocates have argued that “stringent border controls have not reduced the flow of migrants but have weakened their access to human rights protection and triggered the formation of increasingly sophisticated smuggling and trafficking networks” (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2010).

Within Southeast Asia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand host large migrant populations and must continuously contend with irregular migration and the exploitation of migrant workers. Large, irregular flows and widespread abuse of migrant workers are key indicators pointing to gaps in their effective management of labor migration.

Yet in these countries, as well as other countries of destination, the issue of irregular migration is discussed only as an issue of security and sovereignty, without consideration of labor market needs or protection of workers' rights. Similarly, evidence-based economic arguments are often disregarded, including in relation to competition and complementarity with native-born workers, contribution to the informal economy, and revenue to the state.

The chapter examines the relationship between irregular migration and labor rights violations, and explores the approaches that different countries and areas have adopted to address these issues. Key elements of relevant international labor standards are presented, as is the way in which these topics are covered in regional instruments. While the chapter focuses on the situation in countries of destination, it also notes factors in countries of origin that have contributed to, and sought to mitigate, these challenges. Gender-specific vulnerabilities are also considered, particularly for women migrant workers.

It should be noted that within this chapter, when discussing irregular migration, the focus is on labor migration rather than refugee flows and forcibly displaced persons. There are a much broader set of issues and problems related to irregular migration and labor rights violations, but this chapter focuses primarily on the intersection between these two themes. The emphasis is also on the more vulnerable low- and semi-skilled migrant workers rather than skilled workers. Geographically, the chapter focuses primarily on Southeast Asia, with some examples from East Asia and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In these countries, the recruitment and employment of low-skilled migrants is governed through temporary labor migration schemes, which prohibit family reunification and do not provide for any path to citizenship.

This chapter uses the definition included in the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), in which migrant workers are

considered as documented or in a regular situation if they are authorized to enter, to stay and to engage in a remunerated activity in the State of employment pursuant to the law of that State and to international agreements to which that State is a party; and...are considered as non-documented or in an irregular situation if they do not comply with [these] conditions.

## 3.2 International Standards and Frameworks

**International labor standards.** All of the International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions and recommendations apply to migrant workers, unless otherwise specified.<sup>1</sup> However, because of the specific vulnerability of migrants, a number of international instruments have been adopted to govern labor migration, and to cover irregular migration and the protection of migrant workers' rights. These include the Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant Workers Convention, 1975 (No. 143) and accompanying

<sup>1</sup> ILO and United Nations conventions on the protection of migrant workers do not generally distinguish between migrant workers admitted for settlement and those admitted through temporary schemes (Cholewinski 2005).

recommendations. In addition, several other conventions and recommendations are particularly relevant to migrant workers, including the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181); Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189); Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925 (No. 19); and Forced Labour Protocol, 2014. As indicated in the name, the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) draws attention to the particular vulnerability of irregular migrant workers.

International labor standards respect the sovereign right of countries to determine who enters the country and under what grounds. Convention No. 143 was also the first international convention to address irregular migration and trafficking. Convention No. 143 and the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) both call for action to prevent, suppress, and eliminate irregular migration, in jurisdiction and in collaboration with others, to penalize not only irregular migrants, but also those who organize their movement and employ them.

From a protection perspective, the principle of equal treatment is at the heart of Convention No. 97. It calls for treatment “no less favorable than that which it applies to its own nationals” in relation to wages, working conditions, and trade union rights. However, this applies only to those that are admitted through regular channels. Article 1 of Convention No. 143 then calls on member states to “respect the basic human rights of all migrant workers” regardless of their legal status. This includes irregular migrants’ access to equal treatment in respect of rights rising out of past employment, including remuneration and social security. The United Nations convention also states that these employers cannot be relieved of their obligations because of the workers’ irregularity.

Part II of Convention No. 143 also substantially widens the scope of equality between migrant workers in a regular situation and nationals, particularly by extending it to equality of opportunity allowing for greater job mobility (ILO 2008). It states that workers who have migrated legally for employment shall not be considered illegal or irregular because of loss of employment. In this situation, migrant workers should enjoy equality of treatment with nationals with regard to employment security, the provision of alternative employment, relief work, and retraining. The Migrant Workers Recommendation, 1975 (No. 151) provides that a migrant who has lost his or her employment shall be afforded sufficient time to find alternative employment, and that authorization of residence shall be extended accordingly. Further, migrant workers who have appealed against the termination of their employment shall be allowed sufficient time to obtain a final decision about their termination. If the termination was not justified, the worker is entitled to reinstatement, compensation for loss of wages or other payments, and access to a new job (or sufficient time to find alternative employment) in line with the rights afforded to national workers. The Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration identifies a good practice in Canada that permits temporary workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own to remain in-country to seek other employment (ILO 2006).

The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work identified eight core conventions in four key areas: the abolition of child labor, elimination of discrimination in respect to employment and occupation, freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, and elimination of forced or compulsory labor (ILO 1998). These conventions are relevant to the situation of migrant workers, and the

declaration specifically stated that “ILO should give special attention to the problems of persons with special social needs, particularly the unemployed and migrant workers.” In recent years, representations have been presented against a number of member states in Asia and the Pacific in relation to the application of the Convention on Forced Labour, and particularly the treatment of migrant workers.<sup>2</sup> The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has also made several observations calling on governments to better protect migrant workers’ fundamental rights.<sup>3</sup>

In Asia, only a few countries have ratified these migration-specific conventions. Typical reasons for not ratifying relate to political, legal, and practical concerns. Some origin countries are concerned that ratifying these conventions would make it more difficult to conclude agreements with countries of destination, while several destination countries are reluctant to offer equal treatment to nationals and migrants, particularly in terms of social security, and feel that they may encourage irregular migration. Aside from ratification, these standards, and the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, have been key reference materials in the review of legislation and migration policy documents in numerous countries in the region.

**United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.** In 2000, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It includes the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. Commonly referred to as the Palermo Protocols, they establish the basis in international law for government responses to trafficking in persons and human smuggling and have been widely ratified by United Nations member states.

The trafficking in persons protocol calls for a “three Ps” approach (i.e., prevention, protection, and prosecution) to eliminate labor and sexual exploitation. While many observers have applauded the increased attention that the Palermo Protocols have brought to the issue of human trafficking (e.g., Ezeilo 2015), others have pointed out that the increase in global efforts have focused on the prosecution of traffickers rather than expanding protection of rights for the most vulnerable groups (Wijers 2015). Research has shown that this emphasis has often led to negative consequences for irregular migrant workers, as a result of tightly restrictive border controls that force them to take greater risks, raids on places of employment,<sup>4</sup> and making protection services and permission to stay conditional on cooperation with law enforcement officials (GAATW 2007).

**ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers.** The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, known as the Cebu Declaration, was adopted by ASEAN heads of state in 2007. The declaration calls on countries of origin and destination to ensure the dignity of migrant workers by outlining their obligations

<sup>2</sup> ILO. Representations (Art. 24). [www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:50010:0::NO::P50010\\_ARTICLE\\_NO:24](http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:50010:0::NO::P50010_ARTICLE_NO:24) (accessed September 2016).

<sup>3</sup> ILO. Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. [www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-of-experts-on-the-application-of-conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-of-experts-on-the-application-of-conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm) (accessed September 2016).

<sup>4</sup> There is a long history of law enforcement officers in several countries raiding brothels and massage parlors to demonstrate strict enforcement of anti-trafficking laws, with the primary outcome of detaining and/or deporting sex workers (GAATW 2007).

in the areas of protection from exploitation, discrimination, and violence; labor migration governance; and the fight against trafficking in persons.

Following the signing of the declaration, the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers was established to oversee the implementation of the agreement. However, since that time, no consensus has been reached among ASEAN member states on a way forward. The protection afforded to irregular migrant workers remains a key issue of contention in drafting a regional instrument to realize the principles outlined in the Cebu Declaration. In particular, Malaysia and Thailand, the two largest destination countries within the region, have voiced strong opposition to the provisions on undocumented migrant workers included in drafts of the agreement, as they feel it would disincentivize regular migration (Bacalla 2012).

**Sustainable Development Goals.** Whereas the Millennium Development Goals did not include goals or targets on migration, the United Nations General Assembly's Declaration on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognizes "the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development." Migration cuts across many of the goals and targets, and will be an enabler in reaching those on poverty reduction, economic growth, education, health, and gender equality. There is a pledge in the 2030 agenda to leave no one behind, and as they are a particularly vulnerable group, migrants are identified as a specific and distinct group to reach out to in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8 on Economic Growth and Decent Work, as with SDG 5 on gender equality, and target 17.16 on the collection of data.

Under SDG 10 on reducing inequality, target 10.7 is to "facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies." There are two indicators for measuring progress against this target. The first is the "recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of yearly income earned in country of destination," and the link between high migration costs and irregular migration must be noted. The second indicator is "number of countries that have implemented well-managed migration policies," which should be in accordance with relevant international human rights and labor standards.

## 3.3 Irregular Labor Migration

### 3.3.1 Scale of Irregular Migrant Worker Stocks

Because of their avoidance of authorities and transient presence in a country, it is difficult to count or even to accurately estimate the numbers of irregular migrant workers. In Malaysia, the ratio of 1:1 is often used to describe the number of regular and irregular migrant workers (i.e., around 2 million regular and 2 million irregular migrant workers). In November 2014, the minister of human resources put the total number of migrant workers in the country at 6.7 million, and stated that only 2.1 million had valid work permits (*FMT News* 2014). Similarly, in Thailand, the number of workers from Cambodia was thought to be around 200,000–300,000 before the registration of 750,000 Cambodian migrants in 2014.



Estimating the number of irregular migrants is a sensitive topic politically, which makes any figures presented the subject of much debate. For example, the Department of Employment in Thailand recently discounted the generally accepted estimate of over 3 million migrant workers in Thailand in an effort to show there was no need to extend the government's registration deadline (*Bangkok Post* 2016a).

Irregular migrants are not effectively captured in labor force surveys or through administrative data. Amnesty and regularization processes can provide an indication but not the whole picture. In Thailand, a comparison of registration data collected from provincial administrations with the number of work permits issued has been used to generate figures on irregular migration, as the latter are thought to provide a fairly comprehensive account of immigration. Countries of origin may also be able to provide some indicative figures. In certain provinces in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and Viet Nam, data have been collected at the household level on workers going to work abroad, and these can be compared with official figures (ILO 2015b).

**Table 3.1: Regular Migrant Workers Registered and Estimates of Irregular Migrant Workers in Destination Countries of Southeast Asia, 2014–2016**

Country	Regular	Irregular
Brunei Darussalam	52,700	No estimate available
Malaysia	2,139,474	4,600,000
Singapore	1,387,300	No estimate available
Thailand	2,053,383	1,592,870

Sources: Official registration data from Government of Brunei Darussalam, Department of Economic Planning and Development; Government of Malaysia, Immigration Department; Government of Singapore, Ministry of Manpower; Government of Thailand, Department of Employment; estimates from FMT News (2014); Huguet (2014).

### 3.3.2 Taxonomy of Irregular Migrant Workers

It is difficult to estimate the size of the irregular migrant population also due to its heterogeneity. In Asia and the Pacific, irregular migrant workers can be broadly categorized into the following groups: (i) migrants who entered a country through irregular channels and are working without permission; (ii) migrants who entered through legal channels, but do not have the right to work (e.g., tourists or students); (iii) migrants who entered through legal channels, but are working with an invalid work permit (e.g., their work permits are for specific employers, sectors, geographical regions, or for skilled workers, or, in the case of migrants in GCC countries, workers with “free visas”<sup>5</sup>); and (iv) migrants who entered through legal channels and were working regularly, but have since become irregular because their visas and/or work permits have lapsed (i.e., overstaying or not renewing work permits).

In the migration process, information asymmetry exists, so migrants are largely dependent on recruitment agencies, brokers, and employers. In Thailand and some other Southeast Asian countries, smugglers facilitating the movement of migrants across borders are also “often involved in securing work permits, documentation and employment” (UNODC 2015a). However, more experienced migrants or those with contacts within a

<sup>5</sup> “Free visas’ are not free in the monetary sense, but free of an employer or job. The sponsor named on the visa does not actually employ the worker” (ILO forthcoming).

country of destination would likely prefer to separate these migration and employment functions. There have been cases in which migrant workers have paid to obtain or to maintain their regular status, but then find that no action has been taken on their behalf. An agent may provide a migrant with the wrong visa, or an employer may choose not to renew a work permit because of the costs involved (or even tear up a work permit to avoid having to pay the worker).

Another important category of irregular migrants is those who work without any documentation in border areas on a short-term or seasonal basis. Because of their frequent movement, and often an informal employment relationship or even self-employment, this population is even more difficult to monitor and regularize.

The categorization of irregular migrants outlined above focuses on migrant workers' status from the perspective of the country of destination. However, if taking the definition of the International Organization for Migration (IOM)—“movement that takes place outside [of] the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries” (IOM 2011)—then migrants who do not follow the regulations of a country of origin could also be considered irregular, regardless of their status in a destination country.

Migrant workers' status is not static and can change according to various circumstances. Within these categories there are also workers who have entered and completed, or entered and fallen out of, amnesty and regularization processes, affording different rights and benefits to an individual migrant during their time abroad.

### 3.3.3 Factors Contributing to Irregular Labor Migration

**Geography.** Irregular migration flows are largely determined by geography. Large, irregular migration flows are inevitable when dealing with long, porous, and nonmilitarized land borders between countries with varying levels of economic development and employment opportunities. For example, to enter Thailand from three of its neighboring countries (i.e., Cambodia, the Lao PDR, or Myanmar), there are many established routes and crossings at multiple points through forests, rivers, and unstaffed checkpoints (UNODC 2015a). Migrants from Indonesia are typically smuggled into Peninsular Malaysia by boat across the Strait of Malacca, while Eastern Indonesia (i.e., Sabah and Sarawak) can be reached by land from the part of Borneo (UNODC 2015a). In comparison, Singapore's geography, a city-state, requires most migrant workers to fly into the country, allowing for tighter border controls.

**Social networks.** In several Southeast Asian countries, long-standing traditions of cross-border migration existed long before legal channels were established, often based upon ethnic and kinship links. Particularly for migration to Thailand, irregular migration in border areas is often facilitated by networks of friends and family. Surveys conducted by the ILO in Shan State and Tanintharyi Region of Myanmar found that the majority of potential migrants used this type of assistance to migrate to Thailand irregularly. This was explained as a matter of greater trust in personal or family relations than in official sources of information and formal recruitment processes (Hein et al. 2015). Similar results were found in a survey of migrants from the Lao PDR, which noted that strong cultural, linguistic, and familial linkages make brokers and recruitment agencies less essential in facilitating migration (IOM and Asian Research Center for Migration 2016).



### 3.4 Migration Policy Making

To ensure labor migration policies are coherent, effective, and fair, a principle in the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration is to provide “labor ministries with a key role in policy formulation, elaboration, management and administration of labor migration to ensure that labor and employment policy considerations are taken into account” (ILO 2006). Even within ministries, however, challenges in communication and coordination exist. The authorities responsible for labor protection argue that their job is complicated by poor admission and recruitment regulation policies that are the responsibility of other departments.

Governments are taking steps to address these gaps, moving the responsibility for labor migration issues under the purview of labor agencies. In the United Arab Emirates, the portfolio for domestic workers has moved from the Ministry of Interior to the new Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation, the first such move in the GCC region. Similarly, the Eleventh Malaysia Plan, 2016–2020 states that a comprehensive immigration and employment policy for foreign workers will be developed, with the labor ministry assuming the lead role in policy making (Harkins 2016).

Even where regular migration channels do exist, there can be several disincentives that make them inaccessible or unattractive to low-skilled migrants. Reliable information is not readily available, and procedures for regular migration are costly, lengthy, and complicated. Irregular migration becomes the preferred option when alternative migration options are more restrictive (Jayasuriya 2014).

To migrate through the legal channels to Thailand, in a best-case scenario, there is a 3–4 month waiting period from the point at which an employer identifies a vacancy to the arrival of a worker at the worksite. It then takes a minimum of 3–4 months working in Thailand to earn the amount paid in recruitment and migration costs (Table 3.2) (ILO 2015c). A further challenge is obtaining the necessary travel documents and permissions, as potential migrants must travel to and stay in capital cities for extended periods of time to complete centralized migration processes. In comparison, the costs and time frame for migrating irregularly are minimal.

**Table 3.2: Using Regular Channels to Enter Thailand**

From Country	Cambodia	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Myanmar
Minimum number of days	62	55	89
Reported costs	\$560–\$620	\$470–\$650	\$463

Source: Tunon (2015).

In 2012, the Republic of Korea temporarily suspended the Employment Permit System with Viet Nam because up to half of Vietnamese migrant workers were overstaying their work permits. A study found that there were several reasons for this, including that workers had to overstay to pay back the high recruitment fees incurred through payment of informal fees (The Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs 2014). At the same time, wages in the Republic of Korea far exceed those in Viet Nam; therefore, for most, the benefits outweigh the risk of arrest and deportation.

The ILO Committee of Experts expressed that “the successful regulation and transparent management of recruitment of migrant workers plays an important role in effectively suppressing irregular migration and reducing labour migration in abusive conditions” (ILO 2016b: 83). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also drew a connection between high recruitment fees and debt bondage, as well as workers becoming irregular for the opportunity to earn more money before leaving a destination country (UNODC 2015b).

In an increasingly interconnected Southeast Asia, new labor migration flows have emerged, and a number of origin countries are now becoming destination countries. However, legal labor migration options do not always exist between the countries. For example, some estimate that over 200,000 migrant workers from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Viet Nam are in the Lao PDR, as many as the estimated number of migrants from the Lao PDR in Thailand. Moreover, there are many workers from Myanmar and Viet Nam in the PRC. To regularize the movement of workers from Viet Nam to Thailand, the two countries signed a memorandum of understand (MOU) in 2015.

### 3.4.1 Policies on Job Mobility

The type of work that migrants can access is sometimes restricted by countries of destination, in some cases without clear reference to the actual needs of the labor market. For example, the newly signed MOU between Thailand and Viet Nam only covers the construction and fishing sectors, not the services sector where the bulk of the estimated 50,000–100,000 irregular migrants from Viet Nam are currently working (*Vietnam News* 2015).

Thailand’s Ministry of Labour maintains a list of 39 occupations prohibited to foreigners based upon a royal decree (MOL 2016b). There have been periodic crackdowns when foreigners are thought to be working irregularly in some of these professions. A recent survey in eight provinces by the National Economic and Social Development Board revealed that a small share of traders who work at stalls in department stores, weekend markets, fresh markets, and community markets are undocumented migrants, which triggered immediate calls for their arrest and deportation. The Department of Employment has acknowledged that a root cause of the issue is that the rigid job restrictions established for migrant workers are not responsive to labor market demand, indicating the need for the law to be reviewed (*Bangkok Post* 2016c).

In several countries of origin, protectionist policies restrict women from accessing regular migration channels. These restrictions can be based on their age, the age of their children, or the sectors in which they are working. Many countries across South and Southeast Asia have created bans on migrant women going to work in domestic work.<sup>6</sup> The Government of Cambodia does not allow recruitment agencies to place workers in the fishing sector because it is considered dangerous. The labor law in the Lao PDR prohibits migrants from taking jobs that “do not develop skills levels and do not provide technical knowledge such as cleaning or sweeping,

<sup>6</sup> Indonesia has banned the deployment of domestic workers to 21 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and from 2009–2011, it banned sending domestic workers to Malaysia. Myanmar has a ban on sending domestic workers to a number of countries. Sri Lanka, similarly, prohibits women with children from migrating.

transporting by physical strength, digging canals or ditches.”<sup>7</sup> Such bans, however, are not preventing workers from moving into these sectors—they move through alternative means—so the intention to protect them could in fact be adding to their vulnerability.

Work permits are typically tied to one employer, and a lack of flexibility in changing employers can also lead many workers to become irregular (Baruah 2013). Prohibiting or limiting the ability of migrant workers to change employers can add to workers’ vulnerability by creating a dependency that is easy to exploit. It can also contribute to the preference to migrate through irregular channels, which, while still posing risks, is often perceived by workers as allowing greater agency and flexibility during their employment.

Flexibility clauses vary across the region (Box 3.1), but restrictions exist for several reasons. For example, a worker can be admitted to address a particular labor shortage in a sector or geographical region, and job testing has been carried out to show that the employer has already explored recruitment among national workforce. In GCC countries, the mobility of domestic workers is restricted, because they “are privy to the intimate relationships within the family and it is important that such information is not shared publicly or to other households” (ILO forthcoming).

### Box 3.1: Law and Practice on Changing Employers

While there are varying degrees of flexibility, in practice, it is challenging for many migrant workers to change employers, even in dire circumstances. The inaccessibility and lack of clarity around procedures for changing employers means workers are vulnerable to deportation, even if they have a valid grievance against their employer. Workers, employers, and even government officials are not fully aware of the procedures for changing employers and maintaining a valid visa and work permit.

**Gulf Cooperation Council countries.** In several of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, a *kafala* or sponsor ties a migrant worker’s immigration status to his or her employer. The worker cannot enter or leave the country or change employers without authorization from the original employer. This complete dependency on an individual employer can put the worker at risk of abuse and exploitation. Efforts are under way, however, to reform the *kafala* system. In Qatar, Law No. 21 will reportedly abolish the *kafala* system and allow migrant workers to change employers at the end of a fixed-term contract and after 5 years for contracts of an indefinite duration without the employer’s consent. If a worker seeks to change employers before the end of a fixed-term contract, a temporary transfer can be approved in cases where the worker’s wages or passport is being withheld, pending settlement of the lawsuit.

**Malaysia.** According to Immigration Regulations (1963), a work permit issued to migrant workers is valid only in respect of the particular employment and employer specified in the permit; therefore, changing employers is a violation of the conditions of entry, and irregular migrants are liable for immediate imprisonment and/or fine or both. It is possible for migrant workers to change employers with permission from the Department of Immigration. In 2016, the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants Act was amended to allow victims of trafficking the right to work in Malaysia. For labor rights abuses and exploitation without trafficking, a complaint must be lodged against an employer, and workers may be granted a special pass at the discretion of the Department of Immigration, allowing them to stay in Malaysia while their case is heard. Special passes are valid for 1 month, after which they can be renewed on a monthly basis for up to 3 months, costing about \$25 each time. Workers with special passes are not able to work or seek employment during this period.

*continued next page*

<sup>7</sup> Labor Law (Amended 2014).

**Box 3.1:** *continued*

**Republic of Korea.** Under the Employment Permit System, migrant workers are allowed to change their employers up to three times during the initial 3-year period, and two more times if their employment period is extended. They are allowed a fourth change during the initial period if they are able to prove that the first three changes were solely attributable to the employer. Justifiable reasons include termination or failure to renew the employment contract, closure or temporary shutdown of the business, labor rights violations, failure to meet the terms of the employment contract, or noncompliance with regulations. In such cases, migrants do not need to receive their employer's release through signing of a "notification of change of workplace" form, and the changes are not supposed to count against their allotted number of job changes. In acknowledgment of the difficulties faced by migrants in completing the process to change employers within 2 months, the law was amended to extend the job-seeking period to 3 months, which can be extended still further for cases of workplace injuries, illness, pregnancy, or childbirth.

**Singapore.** The admission, rights, and entitlements of migrants in Singapore depend on their skills, qualifications, and sector of work. Low- and semi-skilled foreign workers can only work in the occupation and for the employer specified in their work permit cards. Migrant workers can change employers (i) at the end of their term of employment; (ii) in case of a dispute or grievance, as verified by the Ministry of Manpower; and (iii) with the consent of the employer. Domestic workers can change employers through agencies, but if the employer has changed more than four foreign domestic workers within 1 year and he or she wants another foreign domestic worker, he or she may be required to attend either the Employers' Orientation Programme or an interview with a Ministry of Manpower officer. The *2013 Tripartite Guidelines on the Job Flexibility Scheme for Services Sector Employers* increase mobility for workers in the services sector.

**Taipei, China.** Migrant workers need approval from the Council of Labour Affairs to change employers. The conditions for change of employment are stipulated in the Employment Services Act as follows: (i) the employer of the migrant worker, or if he or she is a caretaker, the patient, dies or migrates; (ii) the employer closes the factory, suspends its operations, reduces the workforce, or goes out of business; (iii) the employer fails to pay the worker's wages in accordance with the employment contract or violates any of the worker's other labor rights; (iv) the worker is physically or sexually abused by his or her employer (in some cases, incidences of verbal abuse may lead to permission to change employers); (v) the worker is forced to do work for an unauthorized employer or to undertake duties not provided for in his or her work permit, and evidence of this has been obtained by a government inspector; or (vi) the worker, former employer, and a new employer all agree to the change of employment. Even in these situations, workers will generally only be able to transfer to employers who are in the same line of work, and the former employer must cancel the original work permit before work with the new employer can commence. Workers found to be working for another employer can be fined \$948–\$4,739.

**Thailand.** A cabinet resolution stipulates four conditions under which registered migrants are allowed to change employment: (i) the employer terminates the employment contract, (ii) the employer closes down his or her business or the unit employing the migrant worker, (iii) the employer commits an act of violence, or (iv) the employer delays wage payments or violates the labor rights of the migrant worker. Migrants must provide proof of one of the above conditions and are permitted 15 days to complete the process of changing employers; they are also required to leave the country within 7 days of becoming unemployed. If they change employers without appropriate justification, they are not permitted to work in Thailand for a period of 2 years and must return to their country of origin. Responding to pressure from the international community on human trafficking in the fishing and seafood processing sectors, in November 2015, the Ministry of Labour removed the conditions for employers for migrants working in these industries, permitting an unlimited number of changes.

Sources: ILO (2016) and Government of Thailand (2016).

Often, workers find, on arrival in the country of destination, that the contract signed or terms promised prior to departure do not reflect their actual employment or living conditions. Workers that enter a country through regular channels may have to change employers to earn more (because of deductions from the salary for recruitment fees, or because of the need to repay debts) or to escape abusive conditions.

### 3.4.2 Gaps in the Protection of Migrant Workers

The preamble to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families discourages the employment of irregular migrant workers, and states that granting certain additional rights to migrant workers with regular status will encourage migrants and their employers to comply with the law. In practice, however, this is not always the case.

While irregular status adds to the vulnerability of a worker, migrants may prefer to take the risk. Even for regular migrants, there is no guarantee of decent living and working conditions. In Thailand, many migrants have experienced the range of statuses—regular, irregular, and in the process of regularization—and prefer the flexibility of irregularity in terms of movement into the country and in changing employers. That said, it should be noted that Thailand has a relatively progressive policy for irregular migrant workers compared with Malaysia and other countries. The Ministry of Labour in Thailand has explicitly made clear that the Labour Protection Act applies to all, regardless of nationality and legal status, but in practice, it is often more difficult for irregular migrants to obtain access to justice. Moreover, the rights to free educational services for migrant children and to purchase public health insurance coverage regardless of legal status have been established in law (Khoon 2015; Petchot 2014).

## 3.5 Actions and Measures against Illegal Employment of Migrant Workers

### 3.5.1 Information, Education, and Communication Campaigns

In countries of origin and destination, information, education, and communication campaigns are designed to discourage irregular migration by informing potential migrants of the regular channels available and why those are preferable to irregular migration. In areas with high migration rates, these campaigns are delivered through safe migration training in the community, schools, training centers, and at job fairs. In the Philippines, preemployment orientation seminars have been delivered by the local labor authorities for several years and are now conducted online, for free, and are required. This move is part of government efforts to combat illegal recruitment.

These information, education, and communication campaigns are insufficient alone, however, and need to be complemented by infrastructure and systems to provide migrants with the opportunity and motivation to migrate through regular channels. In this regard, the regulation of recruitment actors is a key prevention measure.

### 3.5.2 Identification Cards

One of the main sectors of concern for working conditions, especially for migrant workers, is construction. Construction sites often involve numerous subcontractors, and the chain of responsibility can be obscured, with site managers unsure of responsibilities. In 2008, Norway introduced a requirement that all construction workers must carry identification cards indicating their employer. Cards are issued to employers upon proof of business registration and tax number. This provision was extended in 2012 to the cleaning sector, with all cleaning subcontractors required to carry a card. The card is issued to registered employers for a nominal fee (about \$14).

The effect of the card requirement on the construction sector has been to facilitate the identification of noncompliant businesses and sites. It took some time for the measure to reach foreign workers, however. In a 2010 survey in Oslo, almost half of workers from Poland and self-employed workers still did not have cards. In the European Union, the number of workers with cards doubled from November 2009 to December 2013, to 51,000, or 18.3% of the construction workforce holding cards (Table 3.3).

**Table 3.3: Active Identification Cards in the Construction and Cleaning Sector in December 2013, by Country of Origin**

Origin	Construction		Cleaning	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Norway, European Union 10	184,605	69.7	9,265	42.9
	51,322	19.4	6,804	31.5
Nordic countries	17,879	6.8	398	1.8
Pre-2004 European Union, excluding Nordic countries	7,232	2.7	928	4.3
Other	3,648	0.8	4,210	19.5
Total	264,686	100	21,605	100

Source: OECD (2014b).

Norway is not the only country to address the risk of tax evasion and violation of labor law in construction subcontracting through identity cards. In Finland, foreign workers employed by foreign companies are required to contact tax authorities themselves, while Finnish companies are required to report their employees to the tax authorities. The construction trade union, Rakennusliitto, pushed for a tax register requirement, in agreement with the employers' association. While in 2012, prior to introduction of the tax card, there were fewer than 200 foreign names in the tax register, by February 2013, there were more than 36,700. From mid-2014, site managers also had to file monthly reports to the tax authorities.

This proposal is gaining ground in other countries as well. In Luxembourg, following tripartite discussions, an identity badge was introduced for construction sites, with implementation originally planned for 2013, in conjunction with increased inspection. In Belgium, a similar scheme, Checkinetwork, was introduced in April 2014, although only for sites where work exceeds \$878,000 annually.



### 3.5.3 Labor Inspections

Beyond the legal and policy framework, the effective management of labor migration depends on the capacity of institutions. Labor inspection is globally recognized as a key tool in labor market governance. In countries that receive large numbers of migrant workers, specific procedures are required to allow labor inspectors to monitor their working conditions. As noted above, migrant workers are often engaged in sectors or geographical areas that are difficult for authorities to reach, including domestic work, the fishing sector, and agriculture. Moreover, the practice of outsourcing, and triangular relationships involving migrant workers (i.e., a worker contracted to work for a company by another company), have made it more difficult to assign responsibility over employment and working conditions.

As such, the mandate and resources available to inspectors should be considered. Inspectors need to build up relationships with various government departments, civil society groups, and trade unions, and invest in carrying out their prevention functions in terms of publicizing the law among employers and workers as well as with other government agencies that may come into contact with migrant workers. Information must be shared among government departments that host information registries and databases that could be used to better target labor inspection activities (ILO 2014). Interpreters should be routinely engaged in inspections of workplaces where migrants are predominantly employed.

Because labor inspectors often have the authority to enter workplaces without prior permission, they are given the additional responsibility to detect and report irregular migrants. It is essential that there is a clear distinction between the role of labor inspectors and immigration officials, however. A conflation undermines their ability to carry out their primary function to identify abuses of the labor law. Without trust, migrant workers will not cooperate with labor inspections or lodge grievances about labor rights violations (ILO 2012). Neither of the ILO conventions on labor inspection (No. 81 and No. 129) “contain any provision suggesting that any worker be excluded from the protection afforded by labor inspection on account of their irregular employment status” (ILO 1999).

Trafficking and forced labor are criminal offenses, and clear guidance is needed in the law on the mandate and role of labor inspectors in investigations and collecting evidence. In Malaysia, the Ministry of Human Resources is an enforcement agency under the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants Act. There is a risk of further exploitation and victimization if officials do not understand the differences and similarities between the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons (UNODC 2015a). Providing labor inspectors with a mandate to combat trafficking and forced labor requires strong political will and investment to strengthen the labor inspection systems as a whole (ILO 2012).

### 3.5.4 Firewall Protections

The presence of firewalls between enforcement of immigration laws and public service providers is also critical to ensuring that migrants have access to assistance. Due to fears about the repercussions of approaching government institutions, migrants are often prevented from obtaining the services to which they are entitled.

These concerns exist even where irregular migrants have been granted *de jure* access. In Thailand, for example, children wishing to enroll in public schools are typically required to show identification documents prior to matriculation (Harkins 2014). Similarly, a recent study in Thailand found that public hospitals often request documentation before allowing the purchase of health insurance even though it contradicts the intent of the policy to provide access to irregular migrants (Sunpuwan and Chamchan 2014).

By establishing firewalls, immigration enforcement authorities cannot access information concerning the immigration status of individuals who seek services at health facilities, schools, labor offices, and other public institutions. They also guarantee that the staff of these service providers do not have an obligation to request or share information about a migrant's legal status (Crépeau and Hastie 2015). In Canada and the United States, several municipalities have passed local laws establishing themselves as “sanctuary cities,” which prevents public service providers from inquiring about the immigration status of their clients.

### 3.5.5 Penalties

Irregular migrant workers are subject to arrest, detention, and deportation. Countries of destination also have laws to penalize the employers of irregular migrants (Box 3.2), but often the number of workers deported or in detention does not correspond with penalties issued against employers. The enforcement of these laws appears to be lax because of the different power dynamic. Around the world, one only has to think of how often the term “illegal migrant” is used in political discourse and in the media, compared with the term “illegal employer,” to illustrate this disproportion.

#### **Box 3.2: Provincial Registration Schemes for Irregular Migrant Workers in Thailand**

In some parts of Thailand, provincial authorities have established unofficial but well-organized schemes that provide irregular migrants with permission to stay and work for a specific employer. They are set up in fishing port and border areas where workers are highly transient and may not be able to register during national amnesties. An International Labour Organization study in Rayong found a local registration arrangement that charged regular monthly fees of B300–B500 to issue a photo identification card listing their name and employer. This scheme was clearly preferred to the official registration process by many migrant workers because it allowed for small monthly payments, unrestricted registration periods, a quicker and easier administrative process, and recognition by authorities.

Similar schemes have been implemented in the port areas of Pattani and Ranong. A study of working conditions in Thailand's fishing sector revealed that the governor of Ranong had issued a directive as part of anti-trafficking efforts to provide temporary passes for the crews of fishing boats directly on the docks. This initiative involved a multidisciplinary team of provincial authorities from the immigration, welfare, and employment offices. More recently, discussions have been taking place on province-to-province agreements in border areas, which are being negotiated between law enforcement agencies.

A key problem with these provincial models for the registration of migrant workers is that they lack any clear legal basis and are only respected by the authorities directly involved, who are profiting considerably from the schemes. For example, when the Marine Police inspect fishing boats in Ranong, they must arrest migrants with only provincial passes provided because of the legal ambiguity.

Sources: Harkins (2013); Chantavanich et al. (2013); ILO (2015c).



In Thailand, the enforcement of these laws is poor, and senior officials have acknowledged the corruption within the immigration police and border agents (*Bangkok Post* 2015). Employers are subject to penalties of up to B100,000 for each irregular migrant worker hired. In the seafood processing sector, enterprises that are found to hire more than three irregular migrants can be shut down. In practice, irregular migrants and their employers often make informal payments to local authorities to avoid deportation, with migrants referred to as “walking ATMs” and a major source of income. A Human Rights Watch study in 2010 found that migrant workers could be asked to pay B200–B8,000 or more in exchange for their freedom, either when stopped by the police or during detention (Human Rights Watch 2010).

In Malaysia and Singapore, penalties are more severe and more strictly enforced to act as a deterrent.<sup>8</sup> In Malaysia, undocumented migrants are held in police custody, prisons, and detention centers for the purpose of investigation, remand hearing, or until deportation. There are 14 immigration depots in Malaysia, including two in Sarawak, which can accommodate 13,700 detainees (ILO 2015d). The Immigration Act (1959) states that employers found to be employing a person not in possession of a valid pass are subject to a fine, imprisonment, or both. For those employing more than five irregular migrants, they can be jailed for 6 months to 5 years, and also “be liable to whipping of not more than six strokes.” The effectiveness of these measures in deterring irregular migration is questionable given that there have been no indications of a decline despite stringent enforcement efforts against migrant workers.

The lower rate of irregular migration in Singapore is partly due to the fines and jail terms given to employers of irregular migrants. The Employment of Foreign Manpower Act was amended in 2012 to further strengthen the powers of the Ministry of Manpower to punish errant employers. Employers who hire foreign workers seeking illegal employment face a fine of about \$3,697–\$22,184, up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or both. They may also be barred from employing foreign workers. For foreigners who work without valid work passes, they face a fine of up to \$20,000, 24 months’ imprisonment, or both.<sup>9</sup> They may also be barred from entry to the country for a period of time. In comparison with Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have large informal economies that are difficult to regulate and inspect, and many workers in hard-to-reach sectors, such as plantations and fishing boats.

Typically, countries of origin are reluctant to extend services to irregular migrants, depending on how cognizant they are of the situation. Viet Nam has introduced penalties against irregular migrants following a temporary ban on migrants from Viet Nam entering the Republic of Korea under the Employment Permit System because of the high rate of overstays. Decree No. 95 (2013) states that migrant workers from Viet Nam who abscond from their employers face fines of about \$3,800–\$4,700. A 3-month grace period was introduced before it came into force in January 2014 (MOLISA 2013). In a few years, the rate of overstay fell from over 50% to around 35% (VBN 2016).

<sup>8</sup> Even so, Malaysia’s Department of Immigration recently had a major corruption scandal involving 100 personnel at Kuala Lumpur International Airport who had been deliberately disabling passport screening software for the last 6 years (ABC News 2016).

<sup>9</sup> In Singapore, 1,070 foreigners were caned for committing immigration offenses in 2012 (Shen 2015).

### 3.6 Amnesty and Regularization

Several countries have held amnesty or regularization windows for irregular workers. Each country adopts its own processes and criteria, but IOM defines regularization as “any process by which the authority in a State allows non-nationals in an irregular or undocumented situation to stay lawfully in the country” (IOM 2011). Article 69 of the United Nations convention calls on states to consider regularization and to take “appropriate account [...] of the circumstances of their entry, the duration of their stay in the States of employment and other relevant considerations, in particular those relating to their family situation.” Generally speaking, this is considered a good practice, but some researchers have suggested that frequent regularization windows contribute to the problem and serve as a magnet for more irregular migration (*Bangkok Post* 2016b). Many who migrate irregularly into Thailand do so expecting to register and regularize their status at a later date.

In Thailand, there were eight rounds of registration between 2004 and 2014. The registration in 2014 saw the most migrants register—over 1.6 million—due in large part to fears from workers and employers that the new military regime would seriously enforce immigration laws. Thailand has allowed workers from three neighboring countries to work in the country provided that they have an employer (Table 3.4) and that the job is in a specific low-skills sector.

**Table 3.4: Migration to Thailand through Memorandum of Understanding Channels, Registration, and Regularization**

Country of Origin	Number of MOU Migrants with Valid Work Permit as of February 2016	Number of Migrants (Including Dependents) Registered in 2014	Number of Migrants Who Have Completed Nationality Verification as of February 2016
Cambodia	117,424	738,947	111,493
Lao PDR	31,795	222,839	44,372
Myanmar	143,461	664,449	909,916
Total	292,680	1,626,235	1,065,781

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, MOU = memorandum of understanding.

Source: Department of Employment (2016).

The requirements have changed from simply registering with authorities to a nationality verification process to be completed by the country of origin. However, there are a number of challenges that prevent workers from completing nationality verification and obtaining a work permit. Many stay in limbo (i.e., registered with the right to work, but pending deportation) or drop out and become completely irregular. Migrants have been reported who had regular status entering the regularization process because it would facilitate a longer stay in the country, and thus many migrants are thought to have multiple identity documents. Reliable information is not readily available, and procedures for regularization can sometimes be costly and complicated.

Since 2011, Malaysia has also carried out the 6P Programme, a comprehensive set of measures for amnesty, registration, legalization, supervision, enforcement, and deportation of migrants. This followed amnesty in 1999 and 2004 that allowed irregular migrants to leave the country and to return if they had an employer. The 6P Programme saw 521,734 irregular migrants register, and they were given work permits of 2–3 years, depending on the sector (Zolkepli 2015). Overall, however, the program has been deemed unsuccessful because of a lack of transparency and communication with workers and employers on procedures required to complete the regularization process, and restrictions on the type of workers able to apply. Some employers in the construction industry complained that the process of regularization was more expensive and complicated than hiring migrants from their home country. Moreover, some agents were taking payments from migrants and not providing them with work permits, and some were charging them excessive fees, as high as \$685–\$1,140, in some cases (Harkins 2016).

The Malaysian model is similar to amnesty and regularization programs in GCC countries. There, amnesty has been carried out in the United Arab Emirates (2007, 2012), Saudi Arabia (2013), Kuwait (2011), Oman (2015), and Bahrain (2010, 2015) (Migrant-rights.org 2016). In September 2016, the Government of Qatar announced its third amnesty, the last one being in 2004. Workers without legal status had a 3-month grace period to leave Qatar and would not face any penalty. In 2013, Saudi Arabia regularized over 4 million immigrants as part of the *nitaqat* or Saudization program to reduce unemployment of nationals. Migrants could transfer to *nitaqat*-compliant enterprises, change their profession, renew their work permits, or return home (ILO 2016a).

Some Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have also held regularization in recent years (OECD 2014a). However, regularization is not a solution if it is unaccompanied by structural policy change that addresses the root causes of the growth in irregular migrant populations. Carefully designed regularization can ensure that beneficiaries do not slip back into irregular status. Two relevant examples are from Italy and Spain, both of which held employment-based regularization programs in the 2000s. Italy granted temporary permits, but many of these permits expired when beneficiaries failed to hold formal employment contracts at the time of renewal. Spain, in contrast, instituted a mechanism whereby irregular migrants obtain permits on the basis of demonstrable employment and contribution to local life, attested by certification obtained from the local government.

Without offering permanent track migration, it is still possible to offer regularization. The Republic of Korea, for example, allowed overstaying trainees to transfer into its new work permit system when it was introduced in the late 2000s.

### 3.7 Protection in Policy and Practice

In recent years, the legal frameworks governing labor migration and rights of migrant workers have been strengthened in several countries. Most destination countries have labor laws that protect national and migrant workers equally. However, studies have repeatedly demonstrated gaps in the application of these laws, and how migrant workers are vulnerable to multiple labor and human rights violations. A safe, regular migration experience does not always result in decent work.

For irregular migrant workers, few countries have protections enshrined in law. In Thailand, the Department of Labour Protection and Welfare has been explicit that its policy is to protect workers regardless of their nationality and legal status. A 2009 European Commission directive requires employers of irregular migrants to pay due wages, which must be at least equal to the minimum wage in the country. However, not all countries are bound by this directive (Thornton 2012). For example, Ireland's employment law is based around the validity of the employment contract, so illegality in the formation of a contract (i.e., recruitment of an irregular migrant) makes it void. Similarly, in Sweden, the Swedish Labour Court has ruled that the Employment Protection Act does not apply to persons not permitted by law to perform work in Sweden (i.e., irregular migrant workers) (Selberg 2012).

The vulnerability of migrants stems from the power imbalance between them and their employers. Their work permits are usually tied to one employer, they are often unaware of their rights or unable to assert their rights, and they have limited access to support services. Where migrants do not have the right to work, this power imbalance and dependency on the employer are even starker. Moreover, migrants often work in sectors that are not fully covered by labor laws, such as domestic work and work in fishing. This work is carried out in isolated or hard-to-reach sectors, out of sight of the wider community and authorities, allowing irregular migrants to find employment with less likelihood of being detained and deported.

The most common abuses suffered by migrants include nonpayment of due wages and overtime pay; unlawful wage deductions; withholding of identity documents; restrictions on movement; substandard living and working conditions, including hazardous working environments; and threats of denunciation to the authorities. These conditions mirror several of the ILO indicators of forced labor, and they can, alone or in conjunction, add up to a forced labor situation. A study in the United States showed that labor rights violations in unregulated work sectors were slightly higher for migrants than native-born workers, but considerably higher for irregular migrants, particularly if they are women (NELP 2011).

One of the areas in which migrants generally do not have equal protection is in freedom of association. While migrants can join existing trade unions in Malaysia and Thailand, they are unable to take up leadership positions or form their own unions. Trade union rights are also restricted in GCC countries. This becomes particularly problematic when there are no trade unions that can adequately reflect the interests of migrant workers in a certain sector or geographical area (e.g., plantation workers in Malaysia or fishers in Thailand). The Republic of Korea has established much broader rights for migrants to organize, and in June 2016, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea ruled that irregular migrant workers had the same rights to form and join a union as other workers (Amnesty International 2016).

There are certain protections that irregular migrant workers cannot avail themselves of because of their status, including social protection. Even regular migrants that are paying into social security suffer from unequal access. The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has made observations related to the unequal treatment of migrant workers in terms of accident compensation in Thailand and Malaysia. This is particularly relevant given that migrants often work in hazardous occupations.<sup>10</sup>

Another factor adding to the vulnerability of migrants is their perception by the public, and the lack of pressure on governments to provide them with fair, equal treatment. A four-country study by the ILO on attitudes toward migrant workers found that respondents make a distinction in what they term “illegal” and “legal” migrant workers. While a majority felt that regular migrants cannot expect to have the same pay and working conditions as nationals (52% in the Republic of Korea, 58% in Singapore, 64% in Thailand, and 73% in Malaysia), about 80% of respondents in three of the countries felt that irregular migrants cannot expect to have any labor rights at all.<sup>11</sup> The survey also found strong public support for more enforcement of penalties against employers for hiring irregular migrants (Tunon and Baruah 2012).

### 3.8 Conclusions

Government efforts to address irregular migration and labor rights violations within the region have focused on MOUs, implementation of registration and regularization policies, and enhancing enforcement of immigration laws. However, the effect of these policy responses is likely to be limited if the governments fail to address the root causes, or if their policies are not based on research, data, and multistakeholder dialogue. A more comprehensive set of measures would help ensure that migrant workers are able to migrate through safe and regular channels and to obtain legal employment and decent working conditions. Given the priority that countries and regions are placing on governance of labor migration, there is extensive opportunity to strengthen bilateral and regional cooperation, and also to learn lessons from different experiences.

<sup>10</sup> For example, even in the Republic of Korea, where occupational health and safety standards are relatively high, there were 6,165 reported cases of migrant workers involved in accidents in 2012, affecting approximately 1% of the migrant workforce. In comparison, the injury rate for all workers was 0.6%. Accidents were more likely to involve migrants who had been working for less than 6 months (66.7%) and in small enterprises with less than 50 employees (89.2%) (Lee 2013).

<sup>11</sup> Compared with 40% in the Republic of Korea.

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# From Domestic Work to Care Work: Governance Challenges

Marie-José Tayah and Maria Gallotti

## Abstract

This chapter examines the intersection between care and migration regimes, argues in favor of investing in the care economy, and reflects on three governance challenges comprising this connection (i.e., the lack of coherence in legislative and policy frameworks related to international recruitment, portability of social security entitlements, and recognition of skills for home-based care and domestic work).

## 4.1 Migration, Domestic Work, and Home-Based Care: Making the Connection

Migration for work in the domestic and home-based care sector is linked to demographic and structural changes in the economies and societies of both developed and developing countries. An increase in women's employment, rapid population aging, increasing life expectancy, and lower fertility rates strain traditional care arrangements. These transformations are taking place in a broader context, where tight fiscal policies and social policy budgets are weakening already inadequate public care services and forcing households to purchase domestic and home-based care services from private purveyors (Tayah 2016).

Concomitantly, a crisis in human resources is emerging in the health sector. The World Health Organization (2006) estimated that the world faces a shortage of almost 4.3 million doctors, midwives, nurses, and other health care professionals. As a result, the demand for outpatient care in homes has grown in recent years, leading migrant domestic workers to take on many care-related functions (Kofman and Raghuram 2013) such as administering drugs, bathing the elderly, and taking their blood pressure.

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), care functions fall under the category of domestic work when performed in private households. Convention No. 189 defines domestic work as work performed in or for a household or households, and may include tasks such as cleaning the house; cooking, washing, and ironing clothes; minding children, the elderly, or sick members of a family; gardening; guarding the house; driving; and taking care of household pets (ILO 2011).


Women are much more likely than men to migrate into domestic and home-based care work. The feminization of the sector is driven by the persistence of gendered stereotypes of women in a household. Despite some progress in achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls in some regions, significant gaps in the

quantity and quality of women's jobs persist, and women still bear significant responsibility for reproductive labor, which includes cleaning, cooking, child care, and other unpaid care work (ILO 2016b). On the supply side, a lack of decent work opportunities and increasing pressure on women to provide for the education, care, and livelihoods of their family act as powerful determinants for women to migrate. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa—two regions with high rates of female informal employment and decent work deficits—are among the top sending regions for domestic workers.

Poverty, limited or no access to education, gender discrimination, violence, land dispossession, and conflict are also determinants of mobility among women. For example, patriarchy, gender-based violence, and indigenous and tribal identities combine to make migration for domestic work an attractive option for Nepalese women. In Nepal, women have only 10% of land ownership rights and hold just 0.7% of public sector jobs. While decreasing, the literacy gender gap is still very high (i.e., 81% of men relative to 55% of women), and this gap is even higher among certain groups.<sup>1</sup> Thus, women are concentrated in low-paid jobs, often working on farms as nonremunerated workers. Evidence suggests that violence against women in Nepal is also common and can act as a driver of female migration. A study conducted with returning female migrant domestic workers showed that an overwhelming majority of the sample (88%) reported domestic violence against them before migrating (Bhadra 2013).


In 2013, 150.3 million international migrants (about 61.5%) were in the labor market in 2013, 66.6 million of whom were women. Of the 67.1 million domestic workers in the world in 2013, 11.5 million were international migrants. As such, migrants represented 17.2% of all domestic workers, and domestic workers represented 7.7% of migrant workers worldwide. Disaggregated by sex, this share is even higher, representing 12.7%, or 8.45 million, of female migrant workers worldwide. These are significant proportions, especially as domestic work in general represents almost 2% of total employment worldwide (ILO 2015a).

**Figure 4.1: Migrant Domestic Workers as a Share of All Domestic Workers**



Source: ILO (2015a).

**Figure 4.2: Migrant Domestic Workers as a Share of All Migrant Workers**



Source: ILO (2015a).

<sup>1</sup> Among the Madhesi, for example, men are three times as likely to be literate as women (72% versus 24%) (Sangroula n. d.).

Migration for domestic work is particularly significant in Asia and the Pacific. Of the 67.00 million domestic workers around the world, 23.70 million (35.4%) work in Asia and the Pacific. Among them, 3.34 million (14.1%) are migrant domestic workers, and over 80.0% are women (ILO 2015a).

Within Asia and the Pacific, many women from South and Southeast Asia find employment in the care economies of wealthier countries. Within the region, the four main destinations for migrant domestic and care workers are Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; Singapore; and Taipei, China. The key countries of origin are Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and, more recently, Viet Nam. Further, Thailand is increasingly hosting migrant domestic workers from neighboring countries (Tayah 2016). Aging, incentives to integrate women into the labor force, and the collapse of the extended family care model have combined to increase the demand for domestic workers in Asia and the Pacific (Peng 2016).

At the same time, thousands of women leave Asia and the Pacific to work as domestic and care workers outside of the region, mainly in the Middle East, a region that hosts the largest number of migrant domestic workers in the world (ILO 2015a).

## 4.2 Investing in the Care Economy

Care and domestic work can potentially generate much employment in a spectrum of jobs, including skilled health professionals, early childhood educators, and domestic workers. The workforce employed in long-term care in many countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for example, is expected to double by 2050 (Colombo et al. 2011).

Nonetheless, while the demand for workers increases, the conditions under which workers, especially migrants, provide care are far from ideal and often deteriorating, making such workers and their families vulnerable to exploitation and social exclusion. The migration of women for domestic and home-based care shifts the burden of care from one woman to another without recognizing the value of care as a public good, one that is worthy of being redistributed through public services. Hochschild (2000) coined the concept of “global care chains” to describe the process through which women in wealthier countries outsource their unpaid domestic and care tasks to women from poorer countries, who in turn rely on other women from even poorer households or even members of their family to care for children and the elderly left behind.

In fact, according to the International Trade Union Confederation (2016), if 2% of gross domestic product was invested in the care industry of OECD countries, 2.4%–6.1% increases in overall employment would be generated; that is, 13.0 million new jobs would be created in the United States, 3.5 million in Japan, 2.0 million in Germany, 1.5 million in the United Kingdom, 1.0 million in Italy, 600,000 in Australia, and nearly 120,000 in Denmark. Female employment would increase 3.3–8.2 percentage points, and that of males would increase 1.4%–4.0%.

Yeates (2009) took the concept of global care chains further by positing that the value ascribed to labor decreases and often becomes unpaid at the end of the care chain, which perpetuates traditional gender, class, and cultural inequalities as well as poverty, transmitting them across generations of women across countries and areas. In fact, the growth of female global migration continues to be associated with several protection gaps and vulnerabilities left unaddressed by public policies and services, severely limiting the contribution of such migration to development.

A clear example is the widespread exclusion of domestic workers from the protection of labor legislation. According to the ILO, minimum wage regulations were not applicable to 42.5% of all domestic workers (22.3 million persons), and 5.5% of domestic workers (2.9 million persons) collected a minimum wage below the general level (ILO 2013). Moreover, 56.6% of domestic workers (29.7 million) were not covered by provisions regulating their hours, and 3.6% (1.9 million) were covered by a higher weekly normal hour limit than other workers. Only 39.7% (20.9 million) enjoyed at least an equivalent weekly hour limit, and only 25.7 million were entitled to a weekly rest period of at least 24 consecutive hours (ILO 2013).

Regarding social protection benefits, the ILO has reported that less than two-thirds of all female domestic workers were entitled to maternity leave in 2013. Among them, 63.3% (27.6 million persons) were entitled to leave periods of at least the same duration as other workers, and a further 0.7% (0.3 million) had shorter maternity leaves. About 35.9% (15.6 million) had no legal entitlement to maternity leave. In addition, cash benefits—of particular importance to a predominantly female occupational category—were unavailable to 39.6% of female domestic workers (17.3 million) during their maternity leaves (ILO 2013).

Although disaggregated data are not available for migrants in this sector, evidence shows that migrants are among the least protected and face discrimination and abuse due to their gender, class, migration status, and national origin. The recent ILO *Global Wage Report* highlighted important wage differentials between migrants and nationals, indicating a stratification of the labor market along gender and migration grounds, with important implications for equality targets (ILO 2015b). Evidence from OECD countries also has suggested that foreign-born care workers often work with shorter contracts, more irregular contracts, lower pay, and longer hours in lower classified functions than nonmigrant care workers (Colombo et al. 2011).

Differences in treatment also exist between female migrant domestic workers of different nationalities. Surveys in Lebanon revealed significant differences in the number of days of work per week by nationality. Whereas 40% of domestic workers from the Philippines and Sri Lanka work 7 days a week, about 60% of domestic workers from Ethiopia and Nepal work only weekdays (Abdulrahim 2016). Also in Lebanon, migrant domestic workers earn an average monthly salary of around \$180, with significant inter-nationality discrepancies, although 40% of Filipinas earn an average of \$400 or more (ILO 2014b).

Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive policy response to the global care crisis. More opportunities for migrant domestic workers to access formal and better-paid jobs will be available if governments are willing to invest in quality care jobs in the public sector. This carries implications for both the working conditions of those employed along those chains as well as the quality of services available to beneficiaries in origin and destination countries.

## 4.3 International Governance Challenges in the Care Economy

Because migrants comprise a considerable portion of those providing domestic and home-based care services across the world, investment in the care economy should be coupled with improved migration governance in at least three policy areas: recruitment, skills, and social protection.

Migrant domestic workers stand at the crossroads of at least two sovereign countries with divergent interests, legal regimes, and policy objectives. Where significant legislative improvements have occurred at the national level, the absence of bilateral, regional, and interregional policy frameworks to govern the migration and work of domestic workers has produced weak compliance structures. ILO Convention No. 189 urged origin and destination countries to cooperate for the effective implementation of its provisions, as cooperation promotes coordination between different national and international legal systems, especially regarding international recruitment, the portability of social security entitlements, and recognition of skills.

### 4.3.1 International Recruitment

Labor recruiters are part of an increasingly powerful migration industry. In 2013, 60.9 million people gained access to the labor market through the services of labor recruiters (CIETT 2015). For domestic work, the most common recruitment model involves cooperation between labor recruiters in countries of origin and destination. Labor recruiters in origin countries and areas are generally family-owned enterprises with small staffs, limited financial capital, and local client bases (Jones 2015). These recruiters, many of whom are formal and subject to legal and industry standards, contract subagents in villages and rural areas, who may be unregistered and have limited accountability. In destination countries and areas, placement is performed via small and medium-size enterprises (i.e., private recruitment agencies or cleaning companies) as well as mega recruitment agencies (Ruhunage 2014). Where migration is intraregional or between neighboring countries, job matching and placement usually are facilitated by social and informal networks, or through direct recruitment by an employer (Tayah 2016).

The fragmented nature of recruitment, combined with the political power that labor recruiters wield in origin and destination countries, acts to the detriment of migrant domestic workers causing excessive fees, working conditions akin to forced labor, contract substitution, visa trading, and ineffective complaint and grievance procedures. Excessive recruitment fees are transferred to migrant domestic workers in the form of direct payments, large loans requiring repayment at high interest rates, or salary deduction schemes.

Countries of origin and destination are devising strategies to regulate and monitor labor recruiters, however. These strategies include licensing, registration schemes, fee-eliminating practices, establishment of syndicates or associations of labor recruiters, and development of industry-led codes of conduct.

Origin countries are also adopting a mix of policies and programs to increase the transparency of the recruitment process and to address the vulnerabilities of female migrants. For example, the Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment and the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training in Bangladesh have set up a



classification system within the bureau for the regular grading of recruitment agents, as well as a code of conduct for recruitment agents to promote compliance with the laws and rules of the Government of Bangladesh for the protection of migrant workers. The classification system and code were developed in cooperation with the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies and technical assistance from the ILO. Training was held in November 2014 for government officials on the implementation of the tools.<sup>2</sup>

In destination countries and areas, attempts at the self-regulation of the sector are emerging. In Lebanon, the overwhelming number of private employment agencies and inability of those more established to control the behavior of new entrants, who in the absence of an elaborate monitoring and inspection mechanism often operate with fake licenses, have ignited the sector's drive for self-regulation. Accordingly, the Syndicate of the Owners of Recruitment Agencies in Lebanon was established with five founding agencies in 2005. Today, the syndicate counts almost 280 members (Tayah 2012).

At a global level, the ILO organized a tripartite meeting of experts in September 2016 to adopt the Guidelines on Fair Recruitment to be considered by the ILO governing body during its November 2016 session. The guidelines emphasize that vulnerable segments of the population, including migrant domestic workers, should be provided with augmented protection against abuses (ILO 2016a).

### 4.3.2 Social Security Coverage

The ILO Domestic Workers Recommendation, 2011 (No. 201) emphasized the need for equality of treatment regarding social security and access to entitlements for migrant domestic workers (ILO 2011). It called for bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation among ILO member states to ensure the social security rights of migrant domestic workers. Nonetheless, 90% of domestic workers are still legally excluded from social security worldwide, and 14% of countries and areas with social security coverage for domestic workers do not extend it to migrant domestic workers (ILO 2016a).

There are a number of challenges to extending social security coverage to migrant domestic workers. In many countries and areas, domestic workers are explicitly excluded from social security. When covered, they are subject to restrictions, such as minimum salaries and/or minimum number of working hours for a single employer. The principle of territoriality also limits the application of social security legislation to the country or area in which it has been enacted. As a result, migrant workers may not only lose coverage under the national social security system in their country of origin, but also risk having limited or no coverage in their country or area of employment. The inadequacy of administrative transactions is often a deterrent to social security registration for migrant domestic workers and their employers as well. The difficulty in monitoring registrations is another constraint (Vazhynska 2016).

Nevertheless, bilateral or multilateral agreements have proven to be effective in recognizing, retaining, and administering migrant workers' rights to accumulated contributions or benefits in an origin country.

<sup>2</sup> ILO. ILO Good Practices Database. [www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.home](http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.home) (accessed October 2016).



Regional agreements are crucial to ensuring the portability of entitlements and benefits for migrants. As an example, Paraguay and Peru are party to the Multilateral Ibero-American Social Security Convention, which qualifies migrants, including domestic workers, who have worked in multiple countries, to old-age, survivors', disability, and work injury benefits based on their combined contributions across participating countries and areas either from their native or residence country (Van Ginneken 2013).

In several countries or areas that provide social protection for migrant domestic workers, access and coverage conditions differ and are generally less favorable compared with those for national domestic workers. For example, in Singapore, coverage by migrant domestic workers is on a voluntary basis, whereas that of national domestic workers is mandatory. In some destination countries, such as Chile and Italy, migrant domestic workers are eligible for medical coverage under a general social security regime, while in others, coverage is provided via special schemes.

Some origin countries also have specific programs for migrant workers. For example, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration of the Philippines provides a range of social services to the country's 3.8 million migrant workers, including domestic workers under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (Republic Act No. 8042). It provides life and personal accident insurance, as well as monetary benefits for members who suffer work-related injuries, illness, or disability during employment abroad. Sri Lanka has a similar voluntary social protection program administered by the Overseas Workers Welfare Fund.

### 4.3.3 Skills Development and Recognition

Indeed, domestic work is becoming increasingly complex. As mentioned earlier, the demand for outpatient care in homes has grown in recent years, which is leading migrant and national domestic workers to take on many care-related functions. Governments do not invest in the human capabilities of domestic workers, because the sector is perceived as women's natural, unskilled work (Tayah 2016). However, with domestic workers forced to take on more complicated responsibilities in households, such as administering medicine and injections to the sick and the elderly and providing early childhood education and care to children, they need to be properly trained and prepared.

These emerging trends should be accorded due importance in skills development programs, both pre-departure and on arrival, with the need to see skills for domestic work in the broader context of the care economy (Tayah 2016). This carries implications in terms of wages, the quality of care administered, and also workers' mental health (Tayah 2016). Caring for people with chronic ailments without proper training can lead to traumatic stress, a condition characterized by a gradual lessening of compassion over time (Österle and Bauer 2015). Argentina's vocational training for domestic workers, including migrant domestic workers, could be considered a good practice in this regard as it reflects the occupational profiles making up the sector. The program is structured according to three occupational fields: domestic work, elderly care, and child care. Training is nested within a broader legislative context where qualified domestic workers are entitled to wage increases above the general minimum wage based on the complexity of the occupational profile, with elderly care being the most complex (Tayah 2016).

The feminization of migration for domestic work is also triggering care deficits in origin countries. Female migrant workers often leave behind younger and older family members in the care of other family members who are almost entirely dependent on migrants' remittances; for example, the Philippine Statistics Authority indicated that nursing professionals, cleaners, and caregivers are on the domestic hard-to-fill lists for 2010–2020 (Mendoza 2015). At the same time, “the effects of care deficits in home countries are not limited to those left behind” (Gammage and Stevanovic 2016). Migrant domestic workers, nurses, and other care professionals must resolve their own care responsibilities in destination countries and areas without being covered by those social security arrangements to which they contribute through their work (Van Walsum 2016). To prevent a care drain from poor to rich countries in the nursing sector, the World Health Organization developed a global code of practice on the international recruitment of health personnel in 2010, and a similar code could be considered for the domestic work and home-based care sector (Tayah 2016).

The absence of skills recognition frameworks leads to information asymmetries between employers in one country or area and workers in another, often leading further to frustrations that ultimately transform into labor disputes. It can also lead to restrictions on the mobility of returning domestic workers within and outside of the sector, which will consist of professional de-skilling, a significant loss of income, and subsequently to remigration (Tayah 2016).

As a result, the ILO and relevant stakeholders from Bangladesh; Cambodia; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; the Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand developed the Regional Model Competency Standards for domestic workers for skills development initiatives. They are also seen as essential in protecting migrant workers, their rights, and their reintegration. The template is an adaptive tool, composed of six functional areas: core competencies, domestic cleaning and basic housekeeping, cooking and food handling, caring for infants and children, caring for elderly people, and caring for household pets and plants. Each functional area consists of competency standards identifying the key roles that the worker is expected to perform, which are then broken down into units of competence; these are then further subdivided into elements of competence. For each element, performance criteria are defined, which form the basis for assessment, with range statements provided for guidance (e.g., support requirements, cultural and religious needs, possible risks, and equipment and aids) (ILO 2014a). In addition to facilitating mobility, these standards capture and recognize workers' upward progression within the sector and contribute to their ability to find employment in higher-complexity occupations within and outside of the sector in their countries of origin (Tayah 2016).

## 4.4 Conclusions

Due to a combination of demographic and economic factors, domestic work and the home-based care sector are expected to become a significant source of employment for female migrants. With their work and skills, these women contribute significantly to maintaining the social protection systems of destination countries and enable women to enter the labor market. Yet the conditions under which they migrate, work, and live, including long working hours, restrictions on their mobility, deceptive recruitment practices, and unpaid wages, often prevent migrant women from adequately attending to their own care needs and to those of their families, hence

remaining the weakest link of global care chains. This carries significant implications for the attainment of the new Sustainable Development Goals, especially Goal 5 (achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls) and Goal 8 (promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all).

In addition, female migration for care and domestic work continues to be associated with protection gaps and vulnerabilities that are left unaddressed by public policies and services that fail to address the underlying societal causes of gender inequities and inequality. At the heart of these protection gaps lie the erosion of public care support in exchange for market dependence; traditionally low values attributed to women's work within the household; and discrimination, in law and practice, embedded in societies and labor markets of origin and destination countries and areas.

While ILO Convention No. 189 represents a historic step forward in setting minimum standards of protection for one of the most discriminated-against and vulnerable groups of workers, a sustainable solution to the global care crisis cannot be found unless significant investment is put into quality care jobs and improved migration governance systems as laid out in a number of international labor standards aimed at addressing discrimination, promoting social protection for all, and guaranteeing decent work for migrant workers. In particular, an integrated framework of work-family policies, cited in the ILO Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156) and its accompanying recommendation, is essential to realize sustainable development that leaves no one behind (ILO 2016a).

Much depends on the specific policy and legal framework in which migration for domestic and care work takes place and the socioeconomic and cultural context in which these frameworks are embedded. Yet promoting good, gender-sensitive governance of labor migration, including through fair recruitment policies and practices; expanding the coverage and enhancing the portability of social security across borders; and assessing, recognizing, and upgrading skills and competencies required for care and domestic work, contributing to its professionalization, are essential elements of a comprehensive policy response.

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ANNEX 1

## ECONOMY-SPECIFIC NOTES



## BANGLADESH

## KEY INDICATORS

				Labor Market Indicators (%)					
	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)						
2000	131.3	510	5.3	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014					67.8
2015	161.0	973	6.6	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014					4.3
Immigration in Bangladesh									
Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)				Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)					
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated		
2000	988	0.75	14	27.1	71.3				
2015	1,423	0.88	13	16.5	80.0				
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2010				Total					
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)									
% of Total Employment									
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
	0.9	0.7	1.0	1.6					
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
Emigration from Bangladesh to OECD Countries									
2000				2010/11					
Stocks of Persons Born in Bangladesh Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total			
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	161.9	123.6	285.5	306.3	226.6	532.9			
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	33.0	24.4	57.4	75.1	50.6	125.7			
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	17.2	23.1	19.7	12.9	14.7	13.7			
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	78.2	73.3	76.1	82.8	80.1	81.6			
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.5			
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	2.7	2.0	2.4	3.6	3.6	3.6			
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total	34.9	40.7	50.6	49.4	49.3	41.7	43.5	48.8	
United States	12.1	11.8	16.7	14.8	16.7	14.7	12.1	14.6	
Italy	5.2	9.3	8.9	9.7	10.3	10.1	10.5	12.7	
United Kingdom	6.0	6.0	13.0	9.0	9.0	2.0	3.0	5.0	
Australia	2.4	2.8	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.9	2.7	
Korea, Republic of	1.0	2.2	1.4	2.9	2.3	1.9	2.5	2.3	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total	11.4	12.0	13.8	15.3	16.6	16.8	17.9	20.3	
United Kingdom							4.2	4.9	
United States							3.7	4.8	
Australia							3.6	3.9	
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations									
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
Total						4,046.18			
Saudi Arabia				1,000.00		1,315.64			
United Arab Emirates				500.00		1,176.46			
Malaysia					307.36	453.75			
Oman						226.70			
Kuwait						214.88			
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Total	875.06	475.28	390.70	568.06	607.80	409.25	425.68	555.88	
Oman	52.90	41.70	42.64	135.27	170.33	134.03	105.75	129.86	
Qatar	25.55	11.67	12.09	13.11	28.80	57.58	87.58	123.97	
Saudi Arabia	132.12	14.67	7.07	15.04	21.23	12.65	10.66	58.27	
Singapore	56.58	39.58	39.05	48.67	58.66	60.06	54.75	55.52	
Malaysia	131.76	12.40	919.00	742.00	804.00	3.85	5.13	30.48	
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	–0.435	–1.643	–1.199	–2.904	–4.854	–2.62	–1.94	–1.842	
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e	
	8,941	10,521	10,850	12,071	14,120	13,867	14,983	15,359	

## CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2000	1,262.65	1,761.14	8.43	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014	68.0
2015	1,371.22	6,416.18	6.90	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014	4.7

## Immigration in the Peoples' Republic of China

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	508	0.04	50	16.2	74.0		
2015	978	0.07	39	17.2	72.4		

## Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2012

	Total							
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	246.4							
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
	141.1		195.5	223.5	238.2	265.1	292.6	328.3
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	

## Emigration from Peoples' Republic of China to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in the Peoples' Republic of China Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	976.30	1,089.80	2,066.10	1,650.09	1,981.78	3,631.87		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	217.00	250.70	467.70	352.31	439.17	791.48		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	12.30	11.40	11.80	18.81	18.14	18.44		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	73.10	73.40	73.30	68.71	69.71	69.25		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.29	0.37	0.33		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	1.50	2.30	1.80	1.39	2.15	1.71		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	519.0	523.7	455.9	503.8	525.7	503.7	547.3	555.9
Korea, Republic of	177.0	161.7	117.6	155.3	149.2	127.3	178.6	192.9
Japan	125.3	134.2	121.2	107.9	100.4	107.0	93.0	98.6
United States	76.7	80.3	64.2	70.9	87.0	81.8	71.8	76.1
United Kingdom	21.0	18.0	22.0	28.0	45.0	41.0	46.0	39.0
Australia	21.1	20.7	22.9	25.0	29.0	25.6	28.1	27.3
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	379.7	409.2	451.9	500.5	580.5	624.8	643.2	686.1
United States							225.5	263.8
Australia							88.0	90.2
United Kingdom							81.8	86.2

## Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	774.00	778.00	847.00	812.00	850.00	853.00	1,006.00	1,027.00
Singapore								
Algeria		35.00						
Macau, China								
Russian Federation								
Hong Kong, China								
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	427.0	395.0	411.0	452.0	512.0	527.0	562.0	530.0

Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	–0.042	–0.137	–0.096	–0.354	–0.281	–0.217	–0.212	–0.208
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e
	47,743	41,600	52,460	61,576	57,987	59,491	62,332	63,938

## CAMBODIA

## KEY INDICATORS

				Labor Market Indicators (%)					
	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)						
2000	12.20	426.90	8.77	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014					82.2
2015	15.58	1,020.91	7.04	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014					0.4
Immigration in Cambodia									
Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)				Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)					
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated		
2000	146	1.20	51	37.9	55.2				
2015	74	0.47	46	37.9	55.1				
				Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles					
				Accommodations and Food Service					
				Administrative and Support Services					
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2015	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	Manufacturing	Construction	Other				
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	49.2	18.7	2.6	5.5	12.5	2.4	1.2	6.2	
% of Total Employment	0.1								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
	0.1								
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Emigration from Cambodia to OECD Countries									
		2000			2010/11				
Stocks of Persons Born in Cambodia Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)			239.1		127.3	150.0	277.3		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)			15.2		6.4	11.9	18.4		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)			11.8		5.2	5.3	5.3		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)			81.1		84.2	82.7	83.3		
Total Emigration Rate (%)			3.2		2.6	2.9	2.8		
Emigration Rate of the Highly Educated (%)			52.7		13.0	17.5	14.7		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total	9.6	10.1	9.5	9.9	12.3	15.0	16.4	16.4	
Korea, Republic of	1.9	3.4	2.6	3.7	6.4	9.5	10.5	9.5	
United States	4.2	3.7	3.8	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.5	
Japan	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	2.3	
Australia	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	
France	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total							2.3	2.6	
Australia							0.6		
France							0.4		
United States							0.4		
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations									
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Total						133.3			
United Arab Emirates									
Oman									
Singapore									
Qatar									
Bahrain									
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Total	9.0	14.9	29.8	26.2	34.8	22.6	24.7	25.5	
Thailand	3.0	3.5	11.2	16.8	26.4	13.5	15.8	16.2	
Malaysia	3.4	9.7	16.4	4.4	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.8	
Singapore	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	–1.9	8.30		–0.6	–4.3	–2	–1.9	–1.7	
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e	
	188	142	153	160	172	176	377	397	

## INDIA

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2000	1,053.48	794.48	3.84	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014	52.2
2015	1,311.05	1,805.58	7.57	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014	3.6

## Immigration in India

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	6,411	0.61	48.47	8.0	62.1	73.1	3.0
2015	5,241	0.40	48.78	7.2	61.9		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2015	Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles							
	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	Manufacturing	Transport and Storage	Education	Public Administration and Defense, Social Security	Construction	Other
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)								
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
	12.4					27.5	28.3	34.4
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012

## Emigration from India to OECD Countries

	2000			2010/11				
Stocks of Persons Born in India Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total	
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	1,027.60	943.00	1,970.60		1,914.27	1,700.49	3,614.76	
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	264.20	226.60	490.80		487.58	398.96	886.54	
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	10.20	11.00	10.60		10.38	9.16	9.80	
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	80.00	77.70	78.90		78.61	78.70	78.65	
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.30	0.30	0.30		0.44	0.42	0.43	
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	2.90	3.80	3.20		3.08	4.11	3.47	
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	216.6	221.8	234.1	260.7	245.7	229.1	240.7	285.4
United States	65.4	63.4	57.3	69.2	69.0	66.4	68.5	77.9
United Kingdom	55.0	48.0	64.0	68.0	61.0	36.0	30.0	46.0
Australia	19.8	22.7	25.3	23.5	21.9	27.9	38.2	39.7
Canada	28.7	28.3	29.5	34.2	27.5	30.9	33.1	38.3
Germany	9.4	11.4	12.0	13.2	15.4	18.1	19.5	22.4
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	145.1	162.7	181.1	186.3	181.6	168.3	163.3	186.4
United States							92.6	102.4
Australia							16.2	25.6
United Kingdom							22.2	19.6

## Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total								
Saudi Arabia					1,500.00			
United Arab Emirates					1,300.00			
Kuwait					491.00			
Bahrain					105.00			
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	848.6	610.3	641.4	626.6	747.0	817.0	805.0	781.0
Saudi Arabia	228.4	281.1	275.2	289.3	357.5	354.2	329.9	306.0
United Arab Emirates	349.8	130.3	130.9	138.9	141.1	202.0	224.0	225.0
Oman	89.7	75.0	105.8	73.8	84.4	63.4	51.3	85.0
Kuwait	35.6	42.1	37.7	45.1	55.9	70.1	80.4	
Qatar	82.9	46.3	45.8	41.7	63.1	78.4	75.9	59.0
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	0.01	–0.028	–0.089	–0.355	–0.511	–0.369	–0.293	–0.18
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e
	49,977	49,204	53,480	62,499	68,821	69,970	70,389	68,910

## INDONESIA

## KEY INDICATORS

				Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)					
2000				211.54	2,143.39	4.92	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014			63.5		
2015				257.56	3,834.06	4.79	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014			6.2		
Immigration in Indonesia												
				Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)					
				Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated		
2000				292	0.14	48	29.2	65.2	33.0	46.0		
2015				329	0.13	42	27.0	66.1				
					Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles	Transport and Storage	Public Administration and Defense, Social Security					
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2015				Total			Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	Manufacturing	Education	Construction	Other	
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)				65.6	24.7	6.1	7.7	4.7	5.1	3.3	2.1	12.0
% of Total Employment				0.1								
Stocks of International Students ('000)				2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
				2.0	4.7	5.3	5.3		6.4		7.2	
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)				2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
									72.4	69.0	68.8	
Emigration from Indonesia to OECD Countries												
				2000			2010/11					
Stocks of Persons Born in Indonesia Living in OECD Countries				Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total			
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)				162.3	177.3	339.6	158.6	196.5	355.0			
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)				22.0	26.4	48.4	16.6	26.0	42.6			
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)				13.7	11.3	12.4	13.0	8.7	10.6			
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)				65.4	61.8	63.5	64.3	68.7	66.8			
Total Emigration Rates (%)				0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2			
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)				3.2	4.2	3.6	2.3	2.9	2.6			
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)				2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total				27.0	31.8	22.6	25.0	28.8	30.5	36.3	35.3	
Japan				10.1	10.1	7.5	8.3	8.4	9.3	9.6	11.8	
Korea, Republic of				5.2	9.7	3.3	5.3	8.1	8.3	11.8	10.5	
Germany				1.3	1.6	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.8	2.5	
Australia				3.2	3.2	2.9	2.4	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.4	
United States				3.7	3.6	3.7	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.1	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)				2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total				24.1	24.4	24.5	24.6	24.5	25.4	27.5	27.8	
Australia										9.5	9.5	
United States										7.3	7.2	
Japan										2.2	2.4	
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations												
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)				2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Total					2,700.00		4,300.00			3,256.00		
Saudi Arabia										1,500.00		
Malaysia					1,300.00					917.93		
Taipei,China										146.19		
Hong Kong, China										140.56		
Singapore										106.00		
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)				2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Total				636.2	629.6	567.1	594.2	459.9	468.7	429.9	275.7	
Malaysia				187.1	123.9	116.1	134.1	134.0	150.2	127.8	97.7	
Taipei,China				59.5	59.3	62.0	78.9	81.1	83.5	82.7	75.3	
Saudi Arabia				234.6	276.6	228.9	137.6	40.7	45.4	44.3	23.0	
Singapore				21.8	33.1	39.6	47.8	41.6	34.7	31.7	20.9	
Hong Kong, China				30.2	32.4	33.3	50.3	45.5	41.8	35.1	15.3	
Net Migration Rate (per '000)				1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
				–0.25	–0.37	–0.2	–0.49	–0.64	–0.564	–0.533	–0.508	
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)				2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e	
				6,794	6,793	6,916	6,924	7,212	7,614	8,551	9,631	



## MALAYSIA

## KEY INDICATORS

		Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)				
2000		23.42	6,939.23	8.86	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014				58.4
2015		30.33	10,876.73	4.95	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014				2.0
Immigration in Malaysia									
		Stock of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)				
		Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated	
2000		1,277.22	5.45	44.18	24.6	72.9	91.3	5.9	
2015		2,514.24	8.29	39.16	17.5	80.8			
					Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles	Accommodations and Food Services	Administrative and Support Services	Other	
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2014	Total		Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	Manufacturing	Construction				
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	1,782.30	517.00		355.30	251.20	176.70	152.90	105.70	223.50
% of Total Employment	14.65								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
	30.6	41.3	57.8	64.7	63.6	56.2	40.5	35.6	
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
	51.2	27.3	29.1	62.6	76.1	60.0	65.1	58.9	
Emigration from Malaysia to OECD Countries									
		2000			2010/11				
Stocks of Persons Born in Malaysia Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	98.6	115.7	214.3		131.9	161.3	293.2		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	16.9	18.8	35.7		28.0	32.9	60.9		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	23.9	19.0	21.2		18.6	14.8	16.5		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	71.2	75.3	73.5		72.8	76.4	74.8		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	1.2	1.5	1.4		1.3	1.5	1.4		
Emigration Rates of Highly Educated (%)	5.7	6.7	6.2		5.1	5.3	5.2		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total	21.0	24.9	20.7	22.5	17.7	20.8	23.3	19.8	
United Kingdom	8.0	11.0	7.0	9.0	4.0	6.0	9.0	6.0	
Australia	4.8	5.1	5.4	4.9	5.0	5.4	5.6	4.5	
United States	2.1	1.9	2.0	1.7	2.3	2.6	2.5	2.6	
Japan	2.3	2.6	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.1	2.2	
Korea, Republic of	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.2	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Total	37.9	40.8	43.3	46.6	46.7	46.1	44.1	45.8	
United Kingdom							13.3	15.6	
Australia							15.5	15.4	
United States							6.5	6.2	
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations									
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Total									
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
Total									
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	5.13	3.07	3.60	3.99	4.79	3.06	1.58	1.48	
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e	
	1,329	1,131	1,103	1,211	1,294	1,423	1,573	1,623	



## MONGOLIA

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2000	2.4	1,600.48	1.1	Employment-Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014	60.3
2015	3.0	3,943.90	2.3	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014	4.8

## Immigration in Mongolia

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	8	0.34	44	15.7	80.8		
2015	18	0.60	27	12.1	84.4		

## Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2015

	Total				Agriculture and Fishing	Manufacturing	Construction	Services
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	6.8					0.9	1.9	
% of Total Employment	0.6					1.2	2.1	
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015

## Emigration from Mongolia to OECD Countries

	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Stocks of Persons Born in Mongolia Living in OECD Countries								
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)								
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)								
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)								
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)								
Total Emigration Rates (%)								
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)								
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	15.4	15.4	9.8	9.9	8.8	10.5	8.9	9.3
Korea, Republic of	8.6	8.1	5.3	5.4	4.3	5.7	4.3	4.0
Japan	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.5	2.0
Germany	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.0
United States	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7
Sweden	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2012	2014
Total						6.6	6.6	7.2
Korea, Republic of							2.5	2.2
United States							1.3	1.3
Russian Federation								1.1

## Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total								

## Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total								

## Net Migration Rate (per '000)

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	0.00	–7.9	–4.5	–1.2	–1.1	–1.1	–1	–0.9
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e
	225	200	266	279	320	256	255	265

## KEY INDICATORS

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2011	Total	Agriculture and Fishing	Manufacturing	Construction	Services			
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)								
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
				0.1		0.1		
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013

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<b>Stocks of Workers Overseas</b> (5 main destinations, '000)	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
Total	12 025	12 275	12 300	12 275	12 300	12 300	12 300	12 300

Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	
Total	220.0	294.1	354.7	384.7	450.9	519.6	499.6	
Malaysia	29.3	111.4	106.0	96.3	158.7	210.0	196.5	
Qatar	54.7	25.6	35.9	44.9	103.9	128.6	124.1	
Saudi Arabia	45.0	59.5	62.5	68.1	96.9	86.6	96.9	
United Arab Emirates	24.1	17.8	24.0	34.5	58.6	55.4	53.1	
Kuwait	0.4	2.3	8.0	9.2	17.4	20.2	9.6	
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
	-2.4	0.80	-4.1	-7.5	-7.8	-2.7	-2.2	-2.1
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e
	2.727	2.983	3.464	4.217	4.793	5.589	5.770	6.976

## PAKISTAN

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2000	138.3	850.31	4.3	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014	51.7
2015	188.9	1,152.14	5.5	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014	5.2

## Immigration in Pakistan

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	4,181.91	3.02	46	18.3	60.5		
2015	3,628.96	1.92	49	17.5	60.5		

## Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2010

Number of Foreign Workers ('000)

% of Total Employment

Stocks of International Students	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
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## Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
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## Emigration from Pakistan to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in Pakistan Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	375.0	293.7	668.7	669.6	514.4	1,183.9		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	79.8	60.4	140.2	147.6	105.4	253.0		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	13.9	15.4	14.5	14.3	13.7	14.0		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	80.3	78.2	79.3	79.5	79.0	79.3		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.1	0.9	1.0		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	3.1	3.6	3.3	6.1	7.0	6.5		
<b>Legal Migration Flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000)</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
Total	75.4	72.8	73.7	95.9	101.9	83.9	73.2	80.0
United States	13.5	19.7	21.6	18.3	15.5	14.7	13.3	18.6
United Kingdom	27.0	17.0	17.0	30.0	43.0	19.0	10.0	11.0
Italy	3.5	5.7	7.9	10.8	7.5	8.8	7.8	9.6
Germany	1.7	2.2	2.8	3.3	5.4	6.5	8.0	9.5
Canada	10.1	9.0	7.2	6.8	7.5	11.2	12.6	9.1
<b>Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
Total	18.9	20.6	23.2	25.8	27.3	28.1	24.4	26.8
United Kingdom							7.2	6.6
Australia							4.8	6.3
United States							4.6	4.7

## Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

<b>Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
Total					3,290.5			
Saudi Arabia				1,200.0	1,500.0		1,700.0	
United Arab Emirates				738.0	1,014.1		1,200.0	
Oman				152.0	162.7		200.0	
Kuwait				150.0	149.1		150.0	
Qatar				83.0	85.0			
<b>Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
Total	424.75	396.26	358.21	453.35	634.66	620.12	752.47	946.57
United Arab Emirates	221.77	140.90	113.30	156.35	182.63	273.23	350.52	326.99
Saudi Arabia	138.28	201.82	189.90	222.25	358.56	270.50	312.49	522.75
Oman	37.44	34.09	37.88	53.53	69.41	47.79	39.79	47.79
Qatar	10.17	4.06	3.04	5.12	7.32	8.12	10.04	12,741.00
Bahrain	5.93	7.09	5.88	10.64	10.53	9.60	9.23	9.03
<b>Net Migration Rate (per '000)</b>	<b>1985–1990</b>	<b>1990–1995</b>	<b>1995–2000</b>	<b>2000–2005</b>	<b>2005–2010</b>	<b>2010–2015</b>	<b>2015–2020</b>	<b>2020–2025</b>
	0.27	–2.355	–0.277	–2.325	–2.231	–1.81	–1.152	–0.753
<b>Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015e</b>
	7,039	8,717	9,690	12,263	14,007	14,629	17,066	19,255

## PHILIPPINES

## Key Indicators

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2000	77.9	1,608.43	4.4	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014	60.6
2015	100.7	2,635.04	5.8	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014	7.1

## Immigration in the Philippines

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	318	0.41	49	18.5	65.0	54.8	11.9
2015	212	0.21	48	19.9	65.0		

## Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2014

	Total
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	91.4
% of Total Employment	0.1

## Flows of International Students ('000)

						4.3	3.3	
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
	13.6	12.6	12.2	14.3	17.1	21.0	22.7	24.3

## Emigration from the Philippines to OECD Countries

	2000			2010/11				
Stocks of Persons Born in the Philippines Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total	
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	745.80	1,192.10	1,938.00		1,141.41	1,872.28	3,013.69	
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	107.50	168.80	276.40		170.37	275.39	445.76	
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	13.90	9.60	11.30		12.61	7.98	9.73	
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	75.70	80.50	78.60		75.88	80.01	78.45	
Total Emigration Rates (%)	3.10	4.80	3.90		3.63	5.85	4.75	
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	5.30	8.10	6.80		6.22	9.65	8.05	
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	169.7	159.6	164.8	167.4	161.3	159.6	151.9	160.3
United States	72.6	54.0	60.0	58.2	57.0	57.3	54.4	50.0
Canada	19.8	24.9	28.6	38.6	36.8	34.3	29.5	40.0
Japan	25.3	21.0	15.8	13.3	13.6	15.4	16.4	19.9
Korea, Republic of	12.2	9.1	8.9	9.1	9.6	9.9	12.0	10.7
Australia	6.1	7.1	8.9	10.3	10.7	12.8	11.0	10.3
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	7.1	7.1	7.8	8.8	9.8	10.3	9.8	10.9
Australia							2.8	4.2
United States							3.1	2.9
United Kingdom							0.8	0.7

## Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total	2,476.19	2,812.48	2,965.32	3,198.85	3,624.81	3,850.90	3,237.99	3,974.50
Saudi Arabia	1,001.33	1,046.05	1,072.46	1,138.65	1,482.19	1,530.22	1,159.63	1,028.80
United Arab Emirates	291.36	493.41	541.67	576.00	606.44	658.35	722.62	822.41
Qatar	115.87	189.94	224.03	258.37	290.32	329.43	172.00	204.55
Hong Kong, China	121.64	116.07	125.81	140.04	141.24	156.60	176.88	201.09
Kuwait	133.36	129.71	136.02	145.24	160.61	180.09	207.14	198.29
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	870.42	991.12	1,123.70	1,318.70	1,435.20	1,469.20	1,430.90	1,437.90
Saudi Arabia	275.93	291.42	293.05	316.74	330.00	382.55	402.84	406.09
United Arab Emirates	193.81	196.82	201.21	235.78	259.60	261.12	246.23	227.08
Singapore	41.68	54.42	70.25	146.61	172.70	173.67	140.21	141.45
Hong Kong, China	78.35	100.14	101.34	129.58	131.70	130.69	114.51	85.70
Qatar	84.34	89.29	87.81	100.53	104.60	94.20	105.74	133.17
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	–1.028	–2.114	–2.108	–2.76	–2.752	–1.434	–1.131	–0.697
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e
	18,064.00	19,078.00	20,563.00	21,922.00	23,352.00	25,369.00	27,273.00	28,483.00

## SINGAPORE

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2000	4.0	33,390.06	8.9	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014	65.6
2015	5.5	51,855.08	2.0	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014	3.0

## Immigration in Singapore

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	1,351.69	34.50	55	15.0	73.4		
2015	2,543.64	45.39	56	12.5	78.3		

## Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2015

	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining	Construction	Manufacturing	Domestic Workers	Others
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	1,387.3	4.7	375.5	261.6	231.5	514.0
% of Total Employment	38.4					

Stocks of International Students	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
				40.4	48.6	47.9	53.0	48.9
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013

## Emigration from Singapore to OECD Countries

	2000				2010/11			
Stocks of Persons Born in Singapore Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total	
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	48.5	58.1	106.6		60.9	75.8	136.7	
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	9.1	10.8	19.9		11.2	13.9	25.1	
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	19.3	17.0	18.0		18.2	16.2	17.1	
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	76.2	78.0	77.2		75.2	76.1	75.7	
Total Emigration Rates (%)	3.0	3.6	3.3		2.9	3.4	3.2	
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	8.6	11.3	9.9		8.3	10.9	9.5	
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	6.2	6.1	5.1	5.9	8.8	9.4	7.8	8.7
United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	2.0	3.0
Australia	2.5	2.4	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.8	2.0	1.9
United States	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
Korea, Republic of	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6
Germany	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	17.9	17.5	17.7	18.8	19.2	20.0	21.3	21.8
Australia							9.1	8.8
United Kingdom							5.9	6.8
United States							4.4	4.3

## Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	181.9	180.7	184.4	192.2	200.0	207.0	212.2	212.5

## Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total								

Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	8.37	15.32	13.80	20.71	18.77	14.96	10.28	4.84
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e

## SRI LANKA

## KEY INDICATORS

		Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)						
2000		18.7	1,837.14	6.0	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014				52.4		
2015		21.0	3,637.54	4.8	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014				4.6		
Immigration in Sri Lanka											
					Stock of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
					Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000					40	0.21	45	11.2	64.2	41.8	13.4
2015					39	0.19	48	27.1	55.1		
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2010	Total	Professional	Middle Level	Clerical	Skilled Labor	Unskilled Labor	Housekeepers				
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	263.4	6.3	6.8	12.4	86.4	78.0	73.2				
% of Total Employment											
Stocks of International Students	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014			
	0.3	0.1			0.4	0.4	0.8	0.9			
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012			
Emigration from Sri Lanka to OECD Countries											

## TAIPEI, CHINA

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)
2000	22.2		6.4	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2013
2015	23.5		0.7	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2015 3.8

## Immigration in Taipei, China

	Stocks of Foreign Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	400	1.8	52				
2010	474	2.0	62				

## Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2014

	Total	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Others
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	551.6	10.3	316.4	224.9
% of Total Employment				

## Stocks of International Students ('000)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
		3.9	5.3	6.3	7.8	8.8	10.1	11.6

## Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012

## Emigration from Taipei, China to OECD Countries

	2000				2010/11			
Stocks of Persons Born in Taipei,China Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total		Men	Women	Total	
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	191.6	238.3	429.9		203.6	266.8	470.4	
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	42.5	54.0	96.4		42.9	58.9	101.8	
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	22.4	17.4	19.6		12.1	8.8	10.2	
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	73.7	78.5	76.4		79.4	83.7	81.8	
Total Emigration Rates (%)	2.2	2.7	2.4		2.2	2.6	2.4	
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	5.3	7.0	6.0		4.0	4.9	4.4	
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	20.5	22.5	24.2	20.7	18.3	17.5	22.2	18.3
Japan	4.9	5.5	5.4	6.6	5.6	6.6	6.6	7.7
United States	9.0	9.1	8.0	6.7	6.2	5.3	5.4	4.7
Korea, Republic of	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.0
Australia	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.9
Canada	2.8	3.0	2.5	2.6	1.7	1.0	0.8	0.7
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014

## Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)								

Total

## Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total								

## Net Migration Rate (per '000)

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025

## Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e



## THAILAND

## KEY INDICATORS

				Labor Market Indicators (%)				
	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)					
2000	62.7	3,472.69	4.5	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014				71.5
2015	68.0	5,774.65	2.8	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014				0.9
Immigration in Thailand								
				Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)		Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)		
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated	
2000	1,258	2.01	49	33.0		60.6	84.7	9.9
2015	3,913	5.76	50	17.7		77.5		
				Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles		Transport and Storage	Education	Other
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2014	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining	Manufacturing	Construction				
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	1,351.44	209.90	472.62	215.08	137.47	20.44	25.27	270.67
% of Total Employment	3.74							
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
	4.3	5.6	8.5	10.9	16.4	19.1	20.2	20.3
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	34.5	23.7	42.8	0.0	30.3	36.2	33.5	34.3
Emigration from Thailand to OECD Countries								
				2000		2010/11		
Stocks of Persons Born in Thailand Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total			Men	Women	Total
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	90.8	180.0	270.8			147.9	374.7	522.6
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	15.8	33.9	49.7			22.7	82.9	105.7
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	38.7	21.8	27.5			27.6	12.1	16.5
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	59.6	76.3	70.7			68.9	84.8	80.3
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.4	0.7	0.6			0.6	1.4	1.0
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	2.4	3.1	2.8			2.0	3.3	2.7
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	47.3	47.4	47.4	51.0	53.6	58.8	61.4	86.8
Korea, Republic of	10.5	8.6	5.8	6.9	10.3	13.8	18.3	48.3
Japan	9.0	10.5	9.9	10.9	13.6	15.4	15.4	14.3
United States	8.8	6.6	10.4	9.4	10.0	9.5	7.6	6.2
Germany	3.6	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.1
United Kingdom	3.0	4.0	4.0	6.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	3.0
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	22.3	22.9	22.7	23.1	23.8	23.2	21.2	21.5
United States							7.0	7.1
United Kingdom							6.0	6.2
Australia							3.2	2.9
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations								
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total			450.0				997.3	1039.0
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	161.9	147.7	143.8	147.6	134.1	130.5	119.5	117.3
Taipei, China	45.1	35.9	40.9	47.8	39.1	34.6	37.1	34.7
Singapore	14.9	14.0	12.7	11.5	11.9	10.7	8.2	7.3
United Arab Emirates	13.0	9.6	8.3	9.6	7.2	5.5	5.0	4.6
Malaysia	3.5	3.9	3.6	4.3	4.4	3.9	3.2	3.3
Indonesia	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.3	2.5	3.2	3.1	2.5
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	1.86	–3.833	1.96	3.45	–2.152	0.30	0.29	0.28
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e
	2,544	1,748	2,306	3,060	3,626	4,219	3,384	2,575

## VIET NAM

## KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2000	77.63	787.65	6.79	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2014	75.9
2015	91.70	1,684.87	6.68	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2014	2.3

## Immigration in Viet Nam

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	57	0.07	42	24.7	70.2		
2015	73	0.08	42	14.4	80.8		

## Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2011

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2012		Total						
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)		78.4						
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
	3.2	3.4	4.2	3.3	3.7	4.0	3.6	2.5
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	43.0	52.6	55.4	56.9	74.0	78.4	76.3	83.6

## Emigration from Viet Nam to OECD Countries

	2000			2010/11				
Stocks of Persons Born in Viet Nam Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	747.4	768.6	1,515.9	922.8	1,016.1	1,938.9		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	63.0	86.1	149.1	55.1	85.1	140.2		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	12.5	12.1	12.3	8.3	8.2	8.2		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	81.1	79.9	80.5	81.3	80.5	80.9		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.8		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	17.1	19.8	18.2	10.1	11.1	10.6		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	88.8	98.7	77.1	88.0	94.8	93.7	102.3	126.5
Japan	9.9	12.5	10.9	11.9	13.9	19.5	31.7	43.0
United States	28.7	31.5	29.2	30.6	34.2	28.3	27.1	30.3
Korea, Republic of	21.2	24.0	16.4	22.9	27.9	24.7	22.2	28.0
Australia	3.4	3.0	3.3	3.9	4.8	4.8	5.7	5.2
Germany	4.1	4.0	4.5	4.3	4.2	3.9	4.1	5.1
Stock of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	20.2	24.6	29.5	37.3	41.3	46.3	50.9	53.6
United States							15.4	15.0
Australia							12.4	12.9
Japan							4.2	6.1

## Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total		500.0						
Taipei, China		90.0						
Malaysia		75.0			74.8			
Russian Federation		72.0						
Lao People's Democratic Republic		14.5						
Saudi Arabia		11.5						
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	87.0	73.0	85.5	88.3	80.3	88.2	106.8	116.0
Taipei, China	31.6	21.7	28.5	38.8	30.5	46.4	62.1	67.1
Malaysia	7.8	2.8	11.7	10.0	9.3	7.6	5.1	7.4
Saudi Arabia	3.0	2.5	2.7	3.6	2.4	1.7	4.2	4.0
Algeria	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.5	2.0
Macau, China	3.0	3.3	3.1	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.5	0.5
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	–1.018	–1.088	–0.824	–1.863	–2.018	–0.439	–0.42	–0.406
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e
	6,805	6,020	8,260	8,600	10,000	11,000	12,000	13,200

## GENERAL NOTES

1. All tables with top destinations are ranked by decreasing order of frequency for the last year available.
2. Data on remittances for 2015 are estimates.
3. Educational attainment levels are defined according to the International Standard Classification of Education (1997):  
 “Low-educated” persons have completed at best lower secondary education (ISCED 0/1/2).  
 “Medium-educated” have completed at best postsecondary nontertiary education (ISCED 3/4).  
 “Highly educated” persons hold at least a first-stage tertiary degree (ISCED 5/6).
4. The definition of noncitizen students was only used for the countries for which no data on nonresident students were available.
5. Data on international students in Asian countries are only for degree programs (undergraduate and up) and do not include short-term language courses.
6. Stock of foreign workers in [country] by sector reports figures for the four largest employers of foreign workers.
7. Empty cells indicate no data available.

## DATA SOURCES

Data	Source
<b>Immigrant Population in [Country]</b>	
Total Immigrant Population Age 0+ ('000)	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2015. Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision. <a href="http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml">www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml</a> (accessed January 2017).
% of Total Population 0+	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2015. Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision. <a href="http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml">www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml</a> (accessed January 2017).
Age Structure (2000, %) (population age 15+ years):	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2015. Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision. <a href="http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml">www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml</a> (accessed January 2017).
Education (2000, %) (population age 15+ years):	OECD. Database on Immigrants in OECD and Non-OECD Countries: DIOC. <a href="http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm">www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm</a> (accessed January 2017).
<b>Emigrant Population: Persons Born in [Country] Living Abroad</b>	OECD. Database on Immigrants in OECD and Non-OECD Countries: DIOC. <a href="http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm">www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm</a> (accessed January 2017); Barro and Lee (2010); and Lutz et al. (2010).
<b>Stocks of International Students</b>	UNESCO. UIS.Stat. Education. <a href="http://data.uis.unesco.org/">http://data.uis.unesco.org/</a> (accessed January 2017), unless otherwise specified. Break in series in 2013.
<b>Legal Migrant Flows</b>	OECD. OECD.Stat. International Migration Database. <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG">https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG</a> (accessed January 2017).
<b>International Students from [Country] in OECD Countries</b>	OECD. OECD Skills. <a href="http://www.oecd.org/skills/">www.oecd.org/skills/</a> ; and OECD. OECD.Stat. International Migration Database. <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG">https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG</a> (accessed January 2017).
<b>Net Migration Rate</b>	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2015. World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. <a href="https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/</a> (accessed January 2017).
<b>Remittance Inflows</b>	World Bank Annual Remittances Data. <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data">www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data</a> (accessed September 2016).

## METADATA

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations	Comments	Source
<b>Bangladesh</b>		
Stocks of Workers Overseas in Non-OECD Countries		Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 2012. Population and Housing Census 2011. Dhaka; International Labour Organization and Department of Employment and Manpower. 2010. Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia. Phnom Penh (original source: community welfare attache of the respective Middle East country).
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries	All totals include the category “others.”	Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training
<b>China, People’s Republic of</b>		
Stocks of Foreign Workers		Country presentation at ADBI–OECD roundtable (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security).
International Students in OECD countries	Figures include those for Taipei, China.	
Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries		Y. Zhu, L. Lin, X. Qi, and J. Xia. 2008 Country Report—China. <i>Asian and Pacific Migration Journal</i> 17 (3–4): 419–428 (original source: Ministry of Commerce).
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		Ministry of Commerce
<b>India</b>		
Stocks of Workers Overseas in Non-OECD Countries		International Labour Organization and Department of Employment and Manpower. 2010. Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia. Phnom Penh (original source: community welfare attache of the respective Middle East country).
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		Ministry of External Affairs annual reports.
<b>Indonesia</b>		
Stocks of Foreign Workers	Trade includes wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants.	Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration
Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries		International Labour Organization. 2010. International Migrants Day 2010: A stronger commitment for the protection of Indonesian migrant workers. 17 December. Based on BNP2TKI. <a href="http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/info/public/pr/WCMS_150358/lang--en/index.htm">www.ilo.org/jakarta/info/public/pr/WCMS_150358/lang--en/index.htm</a> (accessed January 2017); Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, cited in International Organization for Migration. 2010. Labour Migration from Indonesia. Geneva; World Bank. n.d. Malaysia–Indonesia Remittance Corridor. <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMIGDEV/Resources/2838212-1160686302996/MalaysiaIndonesiaRemittCorridor111307.ppt">http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMIGDEV/Resources/2838212-1160686302996/MalaysiaIndonesiaRemittCorridor111307.ppt</a> (accessed January 2017); various news reports.
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries	All totals include the category “others.”	BNP2TKI (Placement and Protection Agency)

**Lao People's Democratic Republic**

Stocks of Foreign Workers		International Organization for Migration. Lao People's Democratic Republic Country Profile. <a href="http://www.iom.int/countries/lao-peoples-democratic-republic">www.iom.int/countries/lao-peoples-democratic-republic</a> (accessed January 2017).
Inflows of Foreign Workers	Number of work permits issued in 2011.	Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Department of Skills Development and Employment
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		International Labour Organization

**Malaysia**

Stocks of Foreign Workers	Figure for agriculture includes plantations.	International Labour Organization
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**Mongolia**

Stocks of Foreign Workers		National Statistics Office of Mongolia, Mongolian Statistical Information Service
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**Pakistan**

Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries	Figures are for stocks of Pakistanis overseas (including workers, students, and other categories). For Gulf countries, most of this figure represents migrant workers.	R. Amjad, G. M. Arif, and M. Irfan. 2012. Explaining the Ten-Fold Increase in Remittances to Pakistan 2001–2012. Working Paper. International Growth Centre: London. S-37023-PAK-1
Flows of Workers Deployed		Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment

**Philippines**

Inflows of Foreign Workers	New permits delivered to foreign workers.	International Labour Organization
Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries		Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		International Labour Organization

**Singapore**

Stocks of Foreign Workers		International Labour Organization
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**Sri Lanka**

Stocks of Workers  
in Non-OECD Countries

Institute of Policy Studies. 2008. *International Migration Outlook—Sri Lanka, 2008*. [www.ips.lk/index.php/35-pub-series/35-pub-series/522-international-migration-outlook-sri-lanka-2008](http://www.ips.lk/index.php/35-pub-series/35-pub-series/522-international-migration-outlook-sri-lanka-2008) (original source: Bureau of Foreign Employment) (accessed January 2017); J. Shaw. 2008. *Sri Lanka Country Study* (original source: SLBFE 2005); International Labour Organization and Department of Employment and Manpower. 2010. *Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia*. Phnom Penh.

Flows of Workers Deployed  
to Non-OECD Countries

Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 2016. *Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka*. [www.cbsl.gov.lk/pics\\_n\\_docs/10\\_pub/\\_docs/statistics/other/econ\\_&\\_ss\\_2016\\_e.pdf](http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/pics_n_docs/10_pub/_docs/statistics/other/econ_&_ss_2016_e.pdf) (accessed September 2016).

**Taipei, China**

Stocks of Foreign Workers

Bureau of Employment and Vocational Training

Stocks of International Students

Ministry of Education

International Students  
in OECD countries

Number of students  
obtaining visas from  
foreign nations.

Ministry of Education

**Thailand**

Stocks of Foreign Workers

Ministry of Labour, Department of Employment

Inflows of Foreign Workers

Migration Information System in Asia (original source: Office of Foreign Workers' Administration).

Stocks of Workers  
in Non-OECD Countries

Includes illegal workers.

Bank of Thailand. 2009. *Thailand's Experiences on Compilation of Compensation to Employee and Workers' Remittance Statistics*. <http://documentslide.com/documents/thailands-experiences-on-compilation-of-compensation-to-employee-and-workers.html> (accessed January 2017).

Flows of Workers Deployed  
to Non-OECD Countries

International Labour Organization

**Viet Nam**

Stocks of Foreign Workers

Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs

Stocks of Workers  
in Non-OECD Countries

Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs, country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable

Flows of Workers Deployed  
to Non-OECD Countries

International Labour Organization





**Table A2.1: Inflows from Asia to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development by Nationality ('000s)**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Afghanistan	17	20	15	13	13	16	15	11	13	18	24	29	35	34	45
Azerbaijan	1	2	5	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	6	4	4	4	5
Bangladesh	23	24	19	22	30	37	42	34	40	50	50	50	42	43	47
Bhutan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	9	14	13	11	9
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cambodia	4	5	5	5	6	7	11	9	10	9	10	12	15	16	16
PRC	282	334	335	322	367	438	503	518	530	460	508	531	504	547	555
Georgia	1	2	7	7	8	11	10	9	8	8	8	9	10	11	12
Hong Kong, China	10	12	13	12	10	8	10	8	8	6	9	7	6	9	7
India	113	151	161	145	192	213	206	213	215	227	253	243	229	241	263
Indonesia	29	32	33	31	27	35	30	27	31	22	25	29	31	36	35
Japan	34	38	39	35	36	42	34	32	29	34	32	34	37	37	34
Kazakhstan	5	4	17	15	12	9	8	7	7	7	8	9	7	9	11
Korea, Rep. of	59	69	62	54	57	66	68	72	79	78	76	71	71	75	70
Kyrgyz Republic	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	3
Lao PDR	2	2	2	1	2	2	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	2
Malaysia	11	14	12	13	16	11	12	20	24	20	22	17	21	23	19
Maldives	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mongolia	6	6	4	7	8	11	15	15	15	9	10	9	10	9	8
Myanmar	2	3	3	3	3	5	11	10	10	23	19	24	27	23	23
Nepal	4	3	5	6	8	9	14	17	19	23	25	30	33	39	42
Pakistan	54	59	49	47	73	74	83	74	76	77	100	106	84	73	78
Philippines	165	188	195	192	211	192	173	169	158	164	168	161	160	152	158
Singapore	6	6	6	5	6	7	7	7	7	5	7	9	9	8	9
Sri Lanka	23	21	22	24	23	28	28	21	33	33	41	36	35	30	29
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Taipei, China	16	21	21	15	20	17	32	33	22	24	20	18	17	22	18
Thailand	32	35	34	35	36	47	51	48	47	47	50	53	59	61	87
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	0
Uzbekistan	8	6	8	11	8	9	11	12	20	13	16	16	19	19	21
Viet Nam	52	60	64	55	66	78	82	88	98	76	87	95	94	102	125
<b>Total</b>	<b>959.76</b>	<b>1,117.07</b>	<b>1,139.17</b>	<b>1,083.16</b>	<b>1,244.86</b>	<b>1,378.62</b>	<b>1,470.22</b>	<b>1,464.99</b>	<b>1,510.79</b>	<b>1,448.96</b>	<b>1,592.60</b>	<b>1,620.83</b>	<b>1,577.93</b>	<b>1,644.98</b>	<b>1,733.73</b>

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD.Stat. International Migration Database. <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG> (accessed 23 September 2016).

**Table A2.2: General Characteristics of Emigrants from Asia in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010–2011**

Country of Origin	Emigrant Population Age 15+ ('000)	Women (%)	Low Educated (%)	Highly Educated (%)	Age 15–24 Years (%)	Age 65+ (%)	Recent (Less than Age 5 Years) (%)
Afghanistan	394.11	43.35	45.28	23.01	24.64	5.88	19.72
Azerbaijan	86.12	56.56	22.10	43.59	17.00	11.45	17.94
Bangladesh	532.89	42.52	36.95	37.87	13.70	4.67	23.31
Bhutan	6.65	45.93	58.03	18.17	22.57	4.35	67.92
Brunei Darussalam	12.75	50.60	9.25	52.44	29.65	3.88	31.25
Cambodia	277.27	54.09	46.22	19.21	5.26	11.39	7.06
PRC	3,632.16	54.57	27.31	43.80	18.44	12.30	21.28
Georgia	179.57	58.73	28.24	33.22	10.97	13.05	20.02
Hong Kong, China	296.20	52.65	12.75	56.80	12.43	8.90	9.23
India	3,614.90	47.04	17.78	62.70	9.80	11.54	24.31
Indonesia	355.08	55.34	19.75	44.37	10.62	22.61	12.70
Japan	654.19	63.32	8.29	55.93	11.09	12.06	23.69
Kazakhstan	1,007.44	53.34	34.16	16.08	16.36	10.74	2.79
Korea, Rep. of	1,773.30	57.27	13.75	48.02	13.50	13.25	14.17
Kyrgyz Republic	17.50	65.78	14.59	54.34	19.14	2.69	30.63
Lao PDR	262.70	51.30	41.18	19.92	3.18	9.63	3.36
Malaysia	293.15	55.01	12.88	59.38	16.50	8.70	22.11
Maldives	1.52	38.38	16.76	31.44	13.03	7.24	43.77
Mongolia	22.67	62.49	16.00	46.30	24.62	1.47	45.83
Myanmar	124.87	49.92	38.63	35.10	14.98	13.16	36.20
Nepal	152.71	43.63	21.73	45.82	25.92	1.55	60.72
Pakistan	1,184.02	43.45	37.44	38.77	14.02	6.66	21.67
Philippines	3,015.14	62.13	13.18	52.29	9.73	11.82	14.99
Singapore	136.79	55.43	13.39	55.80	17.09	7.20	19.62
Sri Lanka	578.81	47.56	31.72	35.27	10.39	7.94	18.95
Tajikistan	12.99	52.95	13.71	46.66	18.77	7.00	9.68
Taipei, China	470.42	56.71	6.94	71.54	10.23	7.94	21.41
Thailand	523.39	71.70	35.27	31.48	16.45	3.26	21.86
Turkmenistan	12.20	64.30	26.28	38.93	19.93	7.74	36.41
Uzbekistan	148.86	54.50	16.02	46.96	16.27	10.72	12.44
Viet Nam	1,939.46	52.41	33.51	28.52	8.21	10.93	8.05
<b>Total</b>	<b>21,719.79</b>	<b>53.66</b>	<b>23.64</b>	<b>45.29</b>	<b>12.84</b>	<b>10.84</b>	<b>18.01</b>

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD and Non-OECD Countries (DIOC) 2010/11. [www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm](http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm) (accessed 1 August 2016).

**Table A2.3: Emigration Rates to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development by Level of Education, 2000/01 and 2010/11**

	Total (%)		Highly Educated (%)	
	2010/11	2000/01	2010/11	2000/01
Afghanistan	2.0	1.1	5.7	3.2
Azerbaijan				
Bangladesh	0.5	0.4	3.5	2.6
Bhutan				
Brunei Darussalam	4.1	3.7	16.8	15.4
Cambodia	2.7	3.1	14.8	52.7
PRC	0.4	0.3	1.9	2.1
Georgia				
Hong Kong, China	4.4	6.6	12.9	16.5
India	0.4	0.3	3.5	3.0
Indonesia	0.2	0.2	2.6	3.6
Japan	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.9
Kazakhstan	8.0	3.8	7.0	4.8
Korea, Rep. of	4.2	3.8	4.5	4.4
Kyrgyz Republic	0.4	1.2	1.7	2.2
Lao PDR	6.1	8.0	14.9	25.3
Malaysia	1.5	1.4	5.2	6.3
Maldives	0.6	0.3	10.2	6.9
Mongolia	1.1	0.3	2.9	1.3
Myanmar	0.3	0.2	1.5	1.5
Nepal	0.8	0.2	8.9	2.2
Pakistan	1.0	0.8	6.5	3.3
Philippines	4.8	3.9	8.1	6.8
Singapore	3.4	3.3	9.6	9.9
Sri Lanka	3.4	2.1	6.7	4.1
Tajikistan	0.3	0.5	1.8	2.3
Taipei, China	2.4	2.4	4.4	6.0
Thailand	1.0	0.6	2.7	2.8
Turkmenistan	0.3		1.0	
Uzbekistan	0.7		2.1	
Viet Nam	2.8	2.8	10.6	18.3
<b>Average</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>8.0</b>

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD and Non-OECD Countries (DIOC) 2010/11. [www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm](http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm) (accessed 1 August 2016).

**Table A2.4: Outflows of Workers from Asia, by Destination**

	Bangladesh				India					Indonesia			
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2012	2013	2014	2015
Gulf Cooperation Council countries													
UAE	215,452	14,241	24,232	25,271	138,861	141,138	202,016	224,033	225,000	35,571	44,505	17,962	7,619
Saudi Arabia	21,232	12,654	10,657	58,270	289,297	357,503	354,169	329,937	306,000	40,655	45,394	44,325	23,000
Oman	170,326	134,028	105,748	129,859	73,819	84,384	63,398	51,318	85,000	8,836	10,719	19,141	6,766
Kuwait	2	6	3,094	17,472	45,149	55,868	70,072	80,419		2,518	2,534	1,714	310
Bahrain	21,777	25,155	23,378	20,720	14,323	20,150	17,269	14,220		6,328	5,384	5,472	2,570
Qatar	28,801	57,584	87,575	123,965	41,710	63,096	78,367	75,935	59,000	20,380	16,237	7,862	2,460
Other Middle East													
Jordan	11,726	21,383	20,338	22,093	1,413	1,819	1,462	2,133		106	0	0	103
Lebanon	14,864	15,098	16,640	19,113	534	288	281	313					
Israel													
Asia, OECD													
Japan	420	41	55	99						3,293	3,042	2,428	468
Korea, Rep. of	1,447	2,121	1,748	2,359						13,593	15,374	11,848	5,501
Asia, non-OECD													
Singapore	58,657	60,057	54,750	55,523						41,556	34,655	31,680	20,895
Malaysia	804	3,853	5,134	30,483	17,947	21,241	22,388	22,926	21,000	134,023	150,236	127,827	97,635
Taipei,China										81,071	83,544	82,665	75,303
Thailand					27	9	15	53		1,035	1,041	717	90
Hong Kong, China										45,478	41,769	35,050	15,322
Brunei Darussalam	5,038	5,971	6,633	6,354						13,146	11,269	11,616	9,993
Indonesia					22	11	38	29					
India										535	409	203	68
PRC										1,967	2,055	915	108

continued next page

**Table A2.4: Continued**

	Nepal				Pakistan				Philippines			
	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2012	2013	2014	2015	2011	2012	2013	2014
<b>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</b>												
UAE	34,503	58,586	55,426	53,094	182,630	273,234	350,522	326,986	235,775	259,546	261,119	246,231
Saudi Arabia	68,103	96,903	86,613	96,887	358,560	270,502	312,489	522,750	316,736	330,040	382,553	402,837
Oman	1,884	3,931	3,952	3,470	69,407	47,794	39,793	47,788	15,029	16,048	16,577	15,880
Kuwait	9,165	17,376	20,196	9,634	5	229	132	164	65,603	75,286	67,856	70,098
Bahrain	3,100	4,255	4,418	4,168	10,530	9,600	9,226	9,029	18,230	22,271	20,546	18,958
Qatar	44,883	103,932	128,550	124,050	7,320	8,119	10,042	12,741	100,530	104,622	94,195	114,511
<b>Other Middle East</b>												
Jordan					279	345	328	321	2,678	3,025	2,223	3,393
Lebanon					23	15	57	33	896	1,227	2,874	3,010
Israel									4,741	4,582	4,385	4,590
<b>Asia, OECD</b>												
Japan					62	44	69	82	9,285	9,947	10,936	12,815
Korea, Rep. of					7	12	46	13	10,943	8,979	11,664	11,958
<b>Asia, non-OECD</b>												
Singapore					47	42	76	68	146,613	172,690	173,666	140,205
Malaysia	96,272	158,663	210,009	196,497	1,309	2,031	20,577	20,216	16,797	38,407	34,088	31,451
Taipei, China									41,896	41,492	41,145	58,681
Thailand									6,445	9,204	8,659	6,653
Hong Kong, China					17	20	38	29	129,575	131,680	130,686	105,737
Brunei Darussalam					74	67	48	85	15,406	14,907	17,000	11,478
Indonesia									4,793	5,166	5,489	5,007
India												
PRC					220	155	254	355	9,670	9,969	9,829	6,229

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**Table A2.4: Continued**

	Sri Lanka				Thailand				Viet Nam			
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2012	2013	2014	2015	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</b>												
UAE	38,234	48,502	50,347	43,666	7,245	5,495	5,038	4,623	1,731	2,075	831	286
Saudi Arabia	97,993	80,887	80,480	74,894	517	509	446	36	2,360	1,703	4,191	3,975
Oman	4,889	5,317	5,759	7,082	298	280	260	245	154	25	57	86
Kuwait	44,229	42,740	43,552	38,473	1,792	1,729	1,626	2,448	440	31	30	54
Bahrain	4,533	4,547	3,979	3,722	1,106	969	888	853	11	16	9	
Qatar	57,478	80,724	84,622	65,139	2,623	2,392	2,449	2,273	105	206	850	455
<b>Other Middle East</b>												
Jordan	10,387	7,060	6,197	4,809					20	0	0	
Lebanon	3,945	3,537	3,058	2,604								
Israel	1,768				5,126	8,393	7,618	7,144	210	141	484	268
<b>Asia, OECD</b>												
Japan	112				8,596	6,904	7,614	7,705	8,775	9,686	19,766	27,010
Korea, Rep. of	5,629	5,402	6,686	6,967	10,393	11,758	9,835	189	9,228	5,446	7,242	6,019
<b>Asia, non-OECD</b>												
Singapore	980	1,265	1,470	1,461	11,864	10,728	8,191	7,265	107	149	92	31
Malaysia	2,691	3,297	3,312	3,239	4,441	3,852	3,237	3,318	9,298	7,564	5,139	7,354
Taipei, China					39,128	34,631	37,105	34,738	30,533	46,368	62,124	67,121
Thailand	2								0	0	0	0
Hong Kong, China	449	513	468	493	2,533	2,225	2,209	2,185	0	0	0	
Brunei Darussalam	11	15	12	9	2,697	2,489	1,944	1,846	74	18	0	0
Indonesia					2,480	3,210	3,103	2,538	0	0	0	0
India	97				2,480	3,210	3,103	1,860				
PRC	6				923	1,169	725	405	0	4	0	

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**Table A2.4: Continued**

	Myanmar				Cambodia			
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Gulf Cooperation Council countries</b>								
UAE	39	0	14	77				
Saudi Arabia								
Oman								
Kuwait	1	0	0	0				
Bahrain								
Qatar	10	77	15	0				
<b>Other Middle East</b>								
Jordan								
Lebanon								
Israel								
<b>Asia, OECD</b>								
Japan	0	36	518	1,678	102	111	518	1,399
Korea, Rep. of	3,669	4,003	4,482	4,475	8,132	8,820	7,671	7,073
<b>Asia, non-OECD</b>								
Singapore	452	791	501	431	0	111	190	99
Malaysia	26,921	25,905	25,892	35,022	180	90	470	807
Taipei, China								
Thailand	37,347	36,029	33,188	53,578	26,390	13,468	15,839	16,163
Hong Kong, China								
Brunei Darussalam								
Indonesia								
India								
PRC								

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China, UAE = United Arab Emirates.

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: National sources.



**Table A2.5: Migrant Remittance Inflows in Asia, 2000–2015 (\$ million)**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015e
Afghanistan									106	152	342	185	252	314	268	350
Azerbaijan	57	104	181	171	227	623	790	1,268	1,518	1,255	1,410	1,893	1,990	1,733	1,846	1,483
Bangladesh	1,969	2,100	2,860	3,192	3,582	4,642	5,428	6,562	8,941	10,521	10,850	12,071	14,120	13,867	14,983	15,359
Bhutan							2	3	4	5	8	10	18	12	14	20
Brunei Darussalam																
Cambodia	121	133	140	138	177	164	184	186	188	142	153	160	172	176	377	397
PRC	758	1,209	2,354	4,620	6,640	23,626	27,565	38,395	47,743	41,600	52,460	61,576	57,987	59,491	62,332	63,938
Georgia	210	222	231	236	303	446	627	883	1,065	1,112	1,184	1,547	1,770	1,945	1,986	1,555
Hong Kong, China	136	153	121	120	240	297	294	317	355	348	340	352	367	360	372	368
India	12,845	14,229	15,707	21,015	18,753	22,125	28,334	37,217	49,977	49,204	53,480	62,499	68,821	69,970	70,389	68,910
Indonesia	1,190	1,050	1,260	1,490	1,866	5,420	5,722	6,174	6,794	6,793	6,916	6,924	7,212	7,614	8,551	9,631
Japan	1,374	1,987	1,821	1,079	930	905	1,177	1,384	1,732	1,595	1,684	2,132	2,540	2,364	3,733	4,480
Kazakhstan	122	171	205	147	166	62	84	143	126	198	226	180	178	207	229	176
Korea, Rep. of	4,862	4,836	5,530	6,301	6,574	5,178	4,826	5,130	6,952	5,982	5,836	6,582	6,571	6,455	6,551	6,541
Kyrgyz Republic	9	11	37	78	189	313	473	704	1,223	982	1,266	1,709	2,031	2,278	2,243	1,689
Lao PDR	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	6	18	38	42	110	59	60	60	60
Malaysia	342	367	435	571	802	1,117	1,365	1,556	1,329	1,131	1,103	1,211	1,294	1,423	1,573	1,623
Maldives	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	8	6	5	3	3	3	3	3	3
Mongolia	12	25	56	129	202	180	181	178	225	200	266	279	320	256	255	265
Myanmar	102	116	105	84	117	129	115	81	55	54	115	127	275	1,644	3,103	3,468
Nepal	112	147	678	771	823	1,212	1,453	1,734	2,727	2,983	3,464	4,217	4,793	5,589	5,770	6,976
Pakistan	1,080	1,460	3,550	3,961	3,942	4,280	5,121	5,998	7,039	8,717	9,690	12,263	14,007	14,629	17,066	19,255
Philippines	6,957	8,769	9,740	10,244	11,473	13,733	14,988	15,853	18,064	19,078	20,563	21,922	23,352	25,369	27,273	28,483
Singapore																
Sri Lanka	1,163	1,190	1,312	1,434	1,586	1,976	2,167	2,507	2,925	3,337	4,123	5,153	6,000	6,422	7,036	6,999
Tajikistan			79	146	252	467	1,019	1,691	2,544	1,748	2,306	3,060	3,626	4,219	3,384	2,575
Taipei, China																
Thailand	1,700	1,250	1,380	1,610	1,620	1,187	1,333	1,635	1,898	2,776	3,580	4,554	4,713	5,690	5,655	5,217
Turkmenistan							14	30	50	34	35	35	37	40	30	16
Uzbekistan							898	1,693	3,007	2,071	2,858	4,276	5,693	6,689	5,828	3,104
Viet Nam	1,340	1,100	1,770	2,100	2,310	3,150	3,800	6,180	6,805	6,020	8,260	8,600	10,000	11,000	12,000	13,200
<b>Total</b>	<b>36,464</b>	<b>40,632</b>	<b>49,555</b>	<b>59,640</b>	<b>62,778</b>	<b>91,235</b>	<b>107,967</b>	<b>137,516</b>	<b>173,310</b>	<b>167,929</b>	<b>192,221</b>	<b>223,445</b>	<b>237,949</b>	<b>249,505</b>	<b>262,642</b>	<b>265,791</b>

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Notes: All numbers are in current US dollars. Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: World Bank. Migration and Remittances Data. [www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data](http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data) (accessed 1 August 2016).

**Table A2.6: Net Migration Rate (per 1,000 population)**

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
Afghanistan	-25.1	30.9	-4.2	7.3	-5.2	3.1	-1.2	-1.4
Azerbaijan	-3.4	-2.8	-3.0	0.3	-2.2	-0.3	-0.7	-0.7
Bangladesh	-0.4	-1.5	-1.2	-2.5	-4.8	-2.8	-1.9	-1.8
Bhutan	0.6	-32.9	0.1	11.5	4.9	2.7	0.0	0.0
Brunei Darussalam	0.2	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.0	0.8	0.8
Cambodia	-1.9	8.3	6.1	-0.6	-4.3	-2.0	-1.9	-1.7
PRC	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2
Georgia	-2.3	-20.7	-15.9	-13.4	-13.3	-14.4	-2.5	-2.5
Hong Kong, China	5.7	5.2	17.0	-1.2	1.3	4.2	4.0	3.9
India	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.4	-0.5	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3
Indonesia	-0.2	-0.4	-0.3	-0.8	-1.0	-0.6	-0.5	-0.5
Japan	-1.0	0.7	0.0	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.4
Kazakhstan	-8.1	-18.6	-17.2	0.6	-0.4	1.9	0.0	0.0
Korea, Rep. of	2.1	-2.9	-1.3	1.0	1.7	1.2	0.8	0.8
Kyrgyz Republic	-5.7	-12.1	-1.4	-6.9	-2.9	-4.0	-3.2	-3.0
Lao PDR	0.0	-2.0	-5.1	-6.3	-3.9	-3.6	-2.1	-2.0
Malaysia	5.1	3.1	3.6	4.0	4.8	3.1	1.6	1.5
Maldives	-2.5	-2.6	-0.8	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mongolia	0.0	-7.9	-4.5	-1.2	-1.1	-1.1	-1.0	-0.9
Myanmar	-1.0	-3.2	-2.3	-5.6	-5.8	-1.8	-0.2	-0.2
Nepal	-2.4	0.8	-4.1	-7.5	-7.8	-2.7	-2.2	-2.1
Pakistan	0.3	-2.0	-1.1	-1.2	-1.6	-1.2	-0.7	-0.7
Philippines	-1.0	-1.5	-2.1	-2.7	-4.1	-1.4	-1.1	-0.7
Singapore	8.4	15.3	13.8	20.7	18.8	14.9	10.3	4.9
Sri Lanka	-1.6	-2.9	-5.0	-4.7	-5.2	-4.7	-3.6	-3.5
Tajikistan	-1.5	-10.4	-10.9	-3.0	-1.8	-2.9	-2.2	-2.0
Taipei, China								
Thailand	1.9	-2.8	2.3	3.4	-2.6	0.3	0.3	0.3
Turkmenistan	-2.0	2.2	-2.8	-5.0	-2.3	-1.0	-0.9	-0.9
Uzbekistan	-4.0	-3.7	-2.5	-3.6	-2.2	-1.4	-1.6	-1.5
Viet Nam	-1.0	-1.1	-0.6	-1.9	-2.0	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: United Nations. World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/> (accessed 1 August 2016).

**Table A2.7: International Students in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries and Areas by Nationality**

	Number of International Tertiary Students Enrolled			At Master's and Doctoral Level	As a Percentage of Total Tertiary	Number of Graduates at Master's and Doctoral Level
	2013	2014	% change	2014	2014	2014
Afghanistan	3,950	4,050	3	1,740	43	240
Azerbaijan	9,740	10,100	4	3,160	31	550
Bangladesh	18,000	20,330	13	12,110	60	2,230
Bhutan	690	830	20	490	59	130
Brunei Darussalam	2,830	2,630	(7)	550	21	360
Cambodia	2,310	2,650	15	1,280	48	170
PRC	643,580	686,120	7	302,820	44	61,480
Georgia	7,780	7,480	(4)	1,940	26	310
Hong Kong, China	31,670	32,870	4	4,150	13	2,060
India	163,030	186,370	14	116,450	62	16,540
Indonesia	26,850	27,810	4	11,190	40	2,670
Japan	31,240	30,490	(2)	10,010	33	1,980
Kazakhstan	8,940	9,250	3	2,980	32	810
Korea, Rep. of	105,940	100,600	(5)	31,240	31	2,260
Kyrgyz Republic	2,920	2,910	(0)	1,040	36	130
Lao PDR	750	770	3	440	57	60
Malaysia	44,070	45,820	4	11,330	25	3,640
Maldives	2,120	1,780	(16)	210	12	80
Mongolia	7,420	7,200	(3)	2,730	38	210
Myanmar	3,190	3,720	17	1,060	28	190
Nepal	23,880	26,200	10	10,410	40	1,500
Pakistan	25,030	26,800	7	15,820	59	4,390
Philippines	9,590	10,930	14	3,660	33	680
Singapore	21,280	21,810	2	5,220	24	2,160
Sri Lanka	12,200	12,370	1	4,970	40	1,120
Tajikistan	1,120	1,110	(1)	340	31	50
Taipei, China						
Thailand	21,200	21,450	1	12,600	59	3,950
Turkmenistan	7,390	7,470	1	460	6	50
Uzbekistan	3,390	3,740	10	1,620	43	190
Viet Nam	50,890	53,610	5	18,360	34	4,070
<b>Total from Asia</b>	<b>1,292,990</b>	<b>1,369,270</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>590,360</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>114,250</b>
Rest of the world	1,621,590	1,688,530	4	766,930	45	163,980
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,914,580</b>	<b>3,057,800</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1,357,290</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>278,230</b>
<b>Share of Asia (%)</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>45</b>		<b>43</b>		<b>41</b>

( ) = decrease, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: OECD Education Database. <http://stats.oecd.org> (accessed 30 September 2016).

# Safeguarding the Rights of Asian Migrant Workers from Home to the Workplace

This report points to the growing number of labor migrants in Asia and examines the policy question of how to best safeguard their rights. Governments and stakeholders in both origin and destination countries have largely recognized their mutual interest in safeguarding labor migrants. Multilateral frameworks have also put this in focus, with safe and orderly migration seen as important. This report examines some of the key policy questions in protecting migrant workers, including how to promote fair recruitment of less-skilled workers, and how to address vulnerable groups such as irregular migrants and domestic workers.

The four chapters in this report draw on issues raised and discussed during the Sixth Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia: Safeguarding Labor Migrants from Home to Workplace that was held in Tokyo from 3 to 5 February 2016. The event brought together regional experts and policy makers and was co-organized by the Asian Development Bank Institute, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Labour Organization.

The report's introductory chapter reviews recent regional migration trends. Two statistical annexes provide an overview of migration flows within Asia and between Asia and other regions.

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## **Asian Development Bank Institute**

The Asian Development Bank Institute, located in Tokyo, is the think tank of the Asian Development Bank. The institute aims to identify effective strategies to improve policy and development management in Asia and the Pacific. We work with an extensive network of partners in the region and globally to influence policies on poverty reduction, inclusive growth, the environment, regional cooperation, infrastructure development, middle-income countries, and private sector development.

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## **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development**

The OECD provides a forum in which governments work together to seek solutions to common problems, share experiences, and identify best practices to promote better policies for better lives. The OECD supports policy makers in identifying challenges and addressing them through appropriate policies. It is also one of the world's largest sources of comparable statistical data on economics, trade, employment, education, health, social issues, migration, the environment, and many other fields. The OECD includes 34 member countries and collaborates with more than 100 other economies.

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## **International Labour Organization**

The ILO is devoted to promoting social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights. The ILO helps advance the creation of decent work for all women and men. Its main aims are to promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection and strengthen dialogue on work-related issues. Its tripartite structure provides a unique platform for promoting decent work. Making fair migration a reality is high on the ILO agenda, at the global level and in the Asia-Pacific region.

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