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# A Baseline Survey of Sub-national Government: Towards a Better Understanding of Decentralisation and Deconcentration in Cambodia



CHHEAT Sreang, LUN Pide, KIM Sedara, HENG Seiha, SOK Sethea  
and CHHOUN Nareth

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Phnom Penh, December 2011

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*Responsibility for ideas, facts and opinions presented in this research paper rests solely with the authors. Their opinions and interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views of CDRI.*

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## ACRONYMS

BoG	Board of Governors
CC	Commune Council
CDRI	Cambodia Development Resource Institute
CPP	Cambodia People's Party
D&D	Decentralisation and Deconcentration
DBG	District Board of Governors
DC	District Council
DGPSR	Democratic Governance and Public Sector Reform Programme
DIS	District
FUNCINPEC	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
LAMC	Law on Administration and Management of Communes
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NP-SNDD	National Programme for Sub-national Democratic Development
NRP	Norodom Ranariddh Party
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
SRP	Sam Rainsy Party

### **Khmer Words**

<i>Khanak neiya-pheap</i>	គណនេយ្យភាព (Accountability)
<i>Khan</i>	ខ័ណ្ឌ (District level in the capital)
<i>Sangkat</i>	សង្កាត់ (The local administrative level in urban areas)



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Any deficiencies in this report, however, remain ours.



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As Cambodia's decentralisation and deconcentration reform moves into its second stage, it is attracting close scrutiny from policy makers, donors and academics. Adoption of the Organic Law in 2008, in line with the reform strategy of 2005, paved the way for the first election in May 2009 of district<sup>1</sup> and provincial councils which are to improve service delivery and facilitate local government. The establishment of these two administrative layers offers communes<sup>2</sup> the opportunity to choose the councillors from whom they demand accountability, and introduces a new relationship between commune councillors and higher councils.

District and provincial councillors took office more than a year ago, yet there is no available study of their relations with their voters, the commune councillors. With long-term funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, CDRI – through its Democratic Governance and Public Sector Reform programme – has undertaken a survey of relations between commune and district authorities in the new arrangement. The main goal was to gauge the view of commune councillors, district councillors and district boards of governors on decentralisation and deconcentration, specifically on accountability, fiscal assignment, service delivery, division of labour between the commune and district, gender issues, unified administration and the reform generally. Three objectives were set, to:

1. Explore commune councillors' perception of the district in terms of their relations and roles and responsibilities;
2. Look at district government's progress in functional assignments and unified administration, capacity to fulfil roles and responsibilities expected of them, and financial problems, if any; and,
3. Examine relations between the district councils and board of governors.

Two questionnaires were designed, one for commune councillors and the other for district/councillors and boards of governors, to gather information so as to deepen understanding of local governments' perception of the relation between decentralisation and deconcentration i.e. between the commune and district governments. Some 954 councillors and members of boards of governors were surveyed from December 2010 to February 2011 in seven provinces and Phnom Penh. Data were entered into SPSS and transferred to STATA for analysis. The key findings are:

- Both commune and district councillors are knowledgeable about their accountability—they are expected to be accountable to people. However, district authorities tend to heed higher authorities more and the people less than commune councils do.
- Both commune and district still perceive the Ministry of Interior or central government as their “boss”, though the district has a clearer understanding of relations between the commune and district than the commune does.

---

1 “District level” is the administrative level immediately above the commune/*sangkat*, which refers to district in rural areas, municipality in urban areas, and *Khan* in the capital unless stated otherwise.

2 “Commune” is the local administrative level, referred to as commune in rural areas and *sangkat* in urban areas.

- Communes differ with districts as to whom the latter are primarily accountable. The communes believe that the district should be primarily accountable to them, but the districts see themselves as primarily accountable to the people. However, both believe that the commune can hold the district accountable, at least electorally.
- Communication between commune and district authorities has been narrowly restricted to security issues.
- The communes and the districts believe that the district council has adequate capacity to perform its functions and has suffered from lack of resources and authority. Neither yet fully understands the concept of “unified administration”.
- Female commune and district councillors are perceived as equally influential and capable as their male counterparts.
- Relations between district councils and boards of governors are not yet clear to the districts and are even less clear to the communes.
- While it is widely agreed that relations between district councils and line offices have improved since May 2009, there is a lack of formal regular and open information sharing between them. The commune, unlike the district, does not comprehend who the district line offices are accountable to.
- There is strong consensus that decentralisation and deconcentration have contributed to local democracy, improving local livelihoods and strengthening local leadership of both sexes. Also, the reforms have changed the way local and sub-national public business is conducted, altering relations between the commune and district authorities, especially the district council, and the way the district board of governors runs its business.

# Chapter 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Overview of Decentralisation and Deconcentration

Liberal democracy was first introduced into Cambodia in the 1993 United Nations-supervised election, as part of the resolution to the prolonged civil war. Decentralisation was introduced as part of post-conflict reconstruction and officially initiated in 2001 with the enactment of the Law on the Administration and Management of Communes and the Law on Commune Elections. These two laws provide the legal framework for decentralisation. The first commune/*sangkat* council elections were held in 2002 and 2007. Commune council elections aim to provide substantial autonomy to local governments so that councils can represent the interests of local people and be more responsive to their needs.

Decentralisation became “a global trend” in the 1990s (Öjendal 2002) by which time developing and transitional countries particularly, with support from international development agencies and bilateral donors, had begun decentralising. Decentralisation is known as a means to transfer power, authority, responsibility and resources – through deconcentration, delegation or devolution – from the centre to subordinate or quasi-independent governments or organisations (Rondinelli 1981, 1999; Rondinelli *et al.* 1983; Litvack *et al.* 1998; Crook & Manor 1998; Cheema 2005; Cheema & Rondinelli 2007). Rondinelli (1999: 2-3) identified three forms of decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation and devolution. He comments:

*Deconcentration is the ‘weakest form of decentralization’ that involves the redistribution of decision making power and public management responsibilities to various levels of government. Delegation entails the transfer of ‘responsibility for decision making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it.’ Devolution is a bigger step in the decentralisation process. It entails ‘the transfer of authority for decision-making, finance and management to quasi-autonomous units of local government with cooperate status. Devolution usually transfers responsibilities for services to municipalities that elect their own major and councils, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to make investment decision decisions’.*

Economic, social and political benefits are expected from decentralisation. “Economically, decentralization is said to improve the efficiency with which demands for locally provided services are expressed and public goods provided ... Socially, [it] contributes to realization of individual values and collective welfare. Politically, decentralization is to strengthen accountability, political skills and national integration [—] it brings government closer to people ...” (Smith 1985: 4).

A range of literature also suggests that decentralisation enhances democracy (Smith 1985; Souza 1996; Manor 1999; Brillantes 2004; Olowu 1997, cited in Kulipossa 2004; Diamond 2004; Cheema 2005). Cheema (2005: 119) argues that decentralisation is necessary for upholding political pluralism and strengthening democracy, particularly at the grass roots. In a similar vein, Brian Smith (1985) claimed that it is seen as paving the way for or creating good conditions for national democracy and local development (cited in Souza 1996: 534).

In Cambodia, there is strong evidence that decentralisation to the commune level has contributed to opening local democratic space, bringing government closer to the people by improving accountability, responsiveness and citizen participation in development planning, and promoting gender equity (Heng & So, forthcoming).

Building on these initial achievements, the government is embarking on further reforms. It has scaled up the sub-national reform by adopting the Strategic Framework for Decentralisation and Deconcentration (D&D) in 2005. By design, the Strategic Framework paved the way for the Law on the Administrative Management of the Capital, Provinces, Municipalities, Districts and *Khans* (the Organic Law) in April 2008. The Organic Law created two additional layers of sub-national government higher up in the administrative hierarchy: the district/municipal and provincial councils. These are chosen through indirect elections in which the commune/*sangkat* councillors are voters. The first such election was held in May 2009. Within this reform, significant functions, authority and resources are to be delegated from the centre to the municipality/district and province with the aims of improving sub-national democracy and improving basic service delivery under a unified administration. Further, mechanisms for accountability, public participation, representation, effectiveness, democratisation (local democracy) and local development are mandated (RGC 2005).

Recent development has proven the government's commitment to deepening sub-national reform. The 10-year National Programme for Sub-National Democratic Development (NP-SNDD), 2010-19, a detailed policy document, was completed in June 2010. Its main objective is:

*...to develop management systems of provincial/municipal, district/khan and commune/sangkat levels based on the principles of democratic participation that will operate with transparency and accountability in order to promote local development and delivery of public services to meet the needs of citizens and contribute to poverty reduction within the respective territories (RGC 2010a: 13).*

After the adoption of the 10-year<sup>3</sup> NP-SNDD, the government outlined the first three-year (2011-13) Implementation Plan of the NP-SNDD. Its aim is (1) to define the scope of the first phase of the NP-SNDD, and (2) to identify programme components and implementing agencies for subsequent formulation of time- and resources-bound projects and other activities (RGC 2010b: 14). The first Implementation Plan clearly states that the district or municipality is prioritised as “a strategic entry point to initiate the required transformation of the whole system of sub-national governance and public administration”. Further, the Plan is divided into the five NP-SNDD areas: organisation, human resources, functions, administrative resources and national support. Thus, districts and municipalities would become more structural entities, equipped with clear functions and adequate resources and personnel (RGC 2010b).

Recent policy development is moving closer to the realisation of the reform's original twofold aims: strengthening and expanding local democracy, and contributing to local development and poverty reduction. To achieve these aims, the government pointed out that decentralisation should be guided and developed based upon the following principles (RGC 2005):

---

3 The 10-year programme is organised into three platforms: the first two span three years and the third spans four years.



1. **Democratic Representation:** Strengthen democratically elected local councils and expand their powers, responsibilities and resources.
2. **Popular Participation:** Introduce systems and procedures for people's participation in decision making at all levels of sub-national government.
3. **Public Sector Accountability:** Strengthen the accountability of public administration and facilitate popular oversight of administrative and financial performance.
4. **Effectiveness:** Bring service providers closer to the users and allow users to participate in the planning and monitoring of delivery in order to make public services responsive to local needs and priorities.
5. **Efficiency:** Improve the administrative system, coordination and management capacity of sub-national governance to improve the quality of and access to services.
6. **Poverty Focus:** Enhance the capacity of integrated territorial authorities to target public expenditure to eradicate poverty by focusing on vulnerable groups and to achieve Cambodia's Millennium Development Goals.

For all its enormous efforts, Cambodia is widely praised for its institutional reforms, the ultimate aim of which is to fight poverty. Over a decade after the implementation of D&D, improvements and achievements such as opened democratic space, political and institutional development and reconnected local and central state apparatus have been observed. However, challenges and constraints still exist – blurred lines of accountability, limited responsiveness, poor citizen participation, lack of meaningful representation and limited gender equality (Öjendal 2005; Öjendal & Kim 2006; Manor 2008; Kim & Öjendal 2009; Öjendal & Kim 2011a; Kim 2011; RGC 2010a; Heng & So forthcoming). With regard to the Organic Law, many also voice concern over and question the nature of this Law when it seems not to help solve the existing challenges and constraints. Instead, it is found to have created an additional set of difficulties and constraints to the reform. For example, with respect to accountability, the Organic Law gives an unclear account of the relationship between district and commune councils. As Hughes and Devas (2008:9) note,

*...the requirement that the district should be accountable to the commune is problematic because the district is also awarded a supervisory role vis-à-vis the commune. The relationship between district and commune authorities has historically been a steeply hierarchical one, in which the district exercised authority over the commune.*

That said, a question arises as to what the future of D&D reform in Cambodia will be as the reform becomes more complicated, and critical issues and constraints have not been resolved. Without doubt, this challenging question and ongoing constraints are what inspired this study.

## 1.2. Rationale of the Study

CDRI has been engaged in research on the public sector and local government reforms for the last decade. However, no specific quantitative study has been conducted, though a few scholars, such as Kim (2011), use a quantitative approach as part of their research. Nor has a quantitative survey ever been done to understand the relationship between commune councils and district government within the new framework.

Literature on the commune is meagre, but even fewer focuses on contemporary sub-national government. Among them, Öjendal and Kim (2006, 2011, 2011a), Öjendal (2002,

2005) and, Kim (2011) offer quite a collection of analyses, mainly from a qualitative perspective, of Cambodia's local administration from the early stage of the reform. In a similar way, Manor (2008) provides an analysis of the reform's progress with more attention given to issues and options for intervention and support from the development community. Rusten *et al.* (2004) highlight the establishment of commune councils and some of the challenges, such as legal framework, institutional design and mechanisms for sub-national government to coordinate and supervise commune councils. A study by the Asia Foundation and Centre for Advanced Studies (2005) is informative about citizens' and councillors' perceptions of commune councils' functions and roles in conflict resolution.

A few recent studies focus on the commune councils, some from a programme perspective and others from a broader viewpoint. Pact Cambodia (2010), the Economic Institute of Cambodia (2010), and Meerkerk *et al.* (2008) evaluate the Local Administration and Reform programme implemented by Pact Cambodia. The studies reveal the effectiveness of the programme objectives with regards to interaction between citizens and commune councillors: access and responsiveness, service delivery, accountability and transparency. Even more broadly than these, the report by the National League for Commune and *Sangkat* (2010), "*Capable Councils: National Survey of Commune/Sangkat Council Responsibilities, Capacities and Training*", provides insights into commune councillors's perception of their responsibilities, capacities and capacity building training. These studies focus primarily on the commune council.

Specifically on district administration, a limited number of academic works is available. As debate about the Organic Law has been somewhat heated, Öjendal and Kim (2008) examined the history of the district and analysed the potential challenges for the Law soon to be adopted. Based on a version of the draft law available at the time, they argue that the Organic Law contains "major contradictions" between commitment to democratic governance in the long term and political benefits in the short and medium terms. They call for an evaluation of the district's initiatives, of how the commune's views are respected at the district, of the division of power between the district council and board of governors, and of the level at which a unified administration can be viable.

This survey is another modest initiative by CDRI to fill the literature gap on local administration in Cambodia. It focuses on the relations between the commune and district authorities as the immediate administrative and political interface. Even though it is acknowledged that provincial government is intrinsically related with the district administration, the scope of this survey does not allow us to look at the provincial administration. The survey objectives are described in detail in the following section.

### **1.3. Objectives of the Survey**

The survey was initiated in an attempt to understand relations between the commune council, as the electorate, and district government, which have both upward and downward accountability prescribed by law. The research objectives are to:

1. Explore commune councillors' perceptions of district government's roles and responsibilities;
2. Look at district government's progress in functional assignments and unified administration, capacity, responsibilities and financial problems, if any; and
3. Examine the relations between district council and board of governors.

## Chapter 2

### METHODOLOGY

#### 2.1. Sampling Design

The study population includes all commune and district councillors and district boards of governors in the country. With a complete list of the whole population (Table 1), we originally attempted to use simple random sampling, which is relatively easy and produces minimum bias. However, given limited time and resources, access to a selected sample from a population dispersed across a wide area proved challenging. Hence, the most viable option was multistage cluster sampling in which the whole population was divided into different groups and a sample selected from each group. One major disadvantage of this technique is that the sampling error is large compared to simple random sampling, but it allows us to take a bigger sample which helps diminish the loss in precision.

Table 1: Population of Sampling Frame

Region	Province	Commune	Commune councillors	District	District Councilors & DBG
Plain	Kompong Cham	173	1353	17	389
	Phnom Penh	76	664	8	186
	Svay Rieng	80	518	8	157
Tonle Sap Lake	Kompong Thom	81	577	8	169
	Pailin	8	52	2	34
	Siem Reap	100	668	12	231
Coastal	Kampot	92	548	8	165
Plateau Mountainous	Ratanakkiri	46	253	9	106
<b>Total</b>		<b>656</b>	<b>4633</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>1437</b>

In the first stage, eight provinces (including a municipality) were selected to capture the four geographical regions suggested in the government's statistical reports (NIS 2008). In the sample, the Plain region includes Phnom Penh, Svay Rieng and Kompong Cham provinces; the Tonle Sap Lake region includes Kompong Thom, Siem Reap and Pailin provinces; the Coastal region is Kampot province; and the Plateau and Mountain region is Ratanakkiri province. Demographic factors were also taken into account so as to maximise the sample's representativeness of the whole population. Accessibility and security were also considered.

Next, samples of communes and districts were drawn using simple random sampling, and finally samples of commune and district councillors and district boards of governors were randomly selected using probability proportionate to size sampling. There was a limitation in how we selected a sample of communes: given time and resource constraints, we had to drop those communes where road access to commune offices was difficult. The rejected communes (around 10 percent of the sample, most of them in remote areas) were replaced with ones with better road access; selection of the replacements was random. We did not encounter

the same problem for districts because the sample size is small and most district offices are easily accessible.

The list of communes and districts with geographical information is available in “Province/Municipality, District/*Khan* Commune/*Sangkat*, and Village by Zone” published by the General Secretariat of the Senate (2005). The 2009 database of all commune and district councillors was compiled by the National Election Committee, and the list of district boards of governors was retrieved from royal decrees, sub-decrees, and *prakas* of councils and governing boards compiled by the Ministry of the Interior (MoI).

## 2.2. Sample Size and Sampling Weights

We took the commune or district as the primary sampling unit. The sample size of commune or district and commune or district councillors and district boards of governors was computed using the following formula with known finite target population (Kalton 1983: 15). Confidence level is set at 95 percent with the confidence interval at 4 percent.

$$\text{Sample Size}^4 (n) = \frac{A \times N}{N + A - 1}, \text{ where } A = \frac{z^2 p(1 - p)}{\phi^2}, \text{ and}$$

$z$  is the value corresponding to the confidence level,

$p$  is the sample proportion estimate,

$\phi$  is the confidence interval, and

$N$  denotes population.

The commune and district sample size in each province was calculated to make it proportional to the population of commune councillors, district councillors and district boards of governors (DBG). Hence,

$$n_p = \left( \frac{n}{\sum M_p} \right) \times M_p, \text{ where}$$

$n_p$  is the sample size of commune or district to be drawn from province  $p$ ,

$M_p$  is the total population of commune councilors/district councilors and DBGs in province  $p$ , and

$n$  is the total sample size of commune or district (all provinces).

Also taken into account was a representative sample of commune councillors and district councillors and boards of governors by gender and political affiliation, which we believed would be beneficial to a more in-depth analysis. The sub-sample of each category was simply computed in proportion to its population.

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4 See Annex 1 for more detailed calculations.

Sampling weights of each primary sampling unit were computed to correct for imperfections from unequal probabilities of selection. The base weights were calculated based on the probabilities of selection at each stage; in our case there are two stages: commune or district, and commune or district councillors and boards of governors. Then, sampling weights for  $i$  commune or district, and  $j$  commune or district councillors and boards of governors are:

$$w_i = \frac{1}{P_i \times P_{j(i)}}$$

Tables 1 and 2 show the detailed breakdown of the sampling frame population and sample size in each study province.

Table 2: Sample Size

Region	Province	Commune	Commune Councillors	District	District Councillors & DBG
Plain	Kompong Cham	91	154	17	113
	Phnom Penh	45	76	8	53
	Svay Rieng	35	60	7	46
Tonle Sap Lake	Kompong Thom	39	66	8	53
	Pailin	4	7	2	13
	Siem Reap	45	76	10	66
Coastal	Kampot	37	63	7	46
Plateau Mountainous	Ratanakkiri	17	29	5	33
<b>Total</b>		<b>313</b>	<b>531</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>423</b>

### 2.3. Questionnaire Design and Pre-Test

Two questionnaires were designed – one for commune councillors and the other for district councillors and boards of governors. The questionnaires cover themes such as accountability, financial aspects, service delivery, gender, unified administration and strategic vision about the reform (Annex 2). CDRI's research adviser reviewed the questionnaires before they were pre-tested in Battambang province and Phnom Penh by CDRI's researchers and an enumerator. After the pre-test, several questions were revised to improve clarity or suitability and consistency. The finalised questionnaires were translated into Khmer for use in the interviews.

### 2.4. Training and Field Data Collection

Eleven experienced enumerators were recruited for data collection. Training was conducted at CDRI to ensure the interviewers had a clear understanding of the survey objectives, methodology, their roles and the concepts behind the questions. The training included simulated interviews. Data collection took seven weeks, from 21 December 2010 to 10 February 2011.

Enumerators were divided into two groups, each supervised by a leader who had previous experience leading interviewing. CDRI researchers also spent a few days in each province to monitor and provide support to the field teams, especially during the early phase. To ensure the quality of the data, a meeting chaired by the team leaders was held every evening among enumerators to report progress and discuss issues from the field. Field team leaders were also responsible for verifying the quality of the questionnaires filled in by their team members.

## **2.5. Data Entry and Analysis**

Data from the questionnaires were coded and cleaned using SPSS version 15 to ensure consistency and accuracy. Seven well-trained data entry operators were hired for two weeks to complete the assignment. CDRI's data management officer oversaw data entry and quality control.

After entry, the raw data were transferred to STATA version 11 for analysis. The work included cross-tabulation of variables for each question.

## Chapter 3

### BASELINE STUDY FINDINGS

#### 3.1. Demographic Characteristics

The survey was conducted in 337 communes and 64 districts in seven provinces and one municipality across Cambodia (Table 3). Altogether, there were 932 respondents: 531 commune councillors and 412 district councillors and governors and deputy governors. The commune response rate was 100 percent, while the district rate was 97 percent.

Table 3: Sampled Districts and Communes and Number of Councillors and Governors

Province/city	No. of communes	No. of councillors	No. of DC & BoG	No. of District Councillors & BoG
Kompong Cham	97	155	17	129
Kompong Thom	44	67	8	49
Kampot	39	65	7	46
Phnom Penh	48	77	8	49
Ratanakkiri	16	27	5	18
Siem Reap	48	75	10	64
Svay Rieng	39	58	7	46
Pailin	6	7	2	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>531</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>412</b>

#### *Gender*

The researchers were conscious of including female respondents in the survey. As shown in Table 4, female respondents made up 16 percent of the total.

Table 4: Respondents by Sex and Province

Province/city	Male	Female	Total
Kompong Cham	262	41	303
Kompong Thom	106	17	122
Kampot	87	16	103
Phnom Penh	106	30	137
Ratanakkiri	18	5	23
Siem Reap	108	22	130
Svay Rieng	87	19	105
Pailin	8	1	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>782</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>932</b>

## Age

The minimum age of the commune councillors was 30 years, while the maximum was 79. The average age was 56 years. The average age of district respondents was 54. The majority of respondents were in the age group 47-61 (Table 6).

Table 5: Commune and District Respondents' Age

	<b>N</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
Commune Respondents	531	30	79	55.9	8.72455
District Respondents	411	27	78	54.1	9.61045

Table 6: Respondents by Age and Sex

<b>Age</b>	<b>Male</b>		<b>Female</b>		<b>Total</b>	
	<b>No.</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>Percent</b>
27-31	6	1	7	5	13	1
32-36	20	3	6	4	25	3
37-41	43	5	6	4	48	5
42-46	42	5	15	10	57	6
47-61	437	56	105	70	541	58
62 or older	234	30	13	8	246	26
Total	781	100	150	100	931	100

## Marital Status

Table 7 shows the marital status of commune councillors and district councillors and board of governors. There is a higher proportion of divorcees and widows among the female councillors and boards of governors among the sampled population.

Table 7: Marital Status of Respondents (%)

<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Commune councillors</b>		<b>District councillors &amp; board of governors</b>	
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
Married	97	48	96	46
Single	0	3	2	21
Divorced	0	11	1	4
Widow/widower	3	35	1	30
Abandoned/separated	0	3	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100



## *Political Affiliation*

Respondents were distributed among four political parties (Table 8).

Table 8: Political Party Affiliation of Respondents

Affiliation	Male		Female		Total	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Cambodian People's Party	540	69	127	84	667	72
Sam Rainsy Party	200	26	23	16	223	24
Funcinpec	21	3	0	0	21	2
Norodom Ranariddh Party	21	3	0	0	21	2
Total	782	100	150	100	932	100

## *Positions*

Respondents were spread across commune and district positions (Table 9). The largest group in the sample were members of district councils, followed closely by commune councillors.

Table 9: Respondents' Positions

Commune and district	Male		Female		Total	
	No.	percent	No.	percent	No.	percent
Chief of CC	79	10	11	7	90	10
First deputy of CC	83	11	9	6	92	10
Second deputy of CC	90	12	5	3	95	10
Member of CC	208	27	61	41	270	29
Chief of DC	22	3	0	0	22	2
Member of DC	234	30	41	27	275	30
Governor	14	2	0	0	14	2
Deputy governor	49	6	24	16	72	8
Not known	2	0	0	0	2	0
Total	782	100	150	100	932	100

## *Education*

Figure 1 and Tables 10 and 11 show the respondents' educational levels: 37.38 percent have between one to six years of education, 29.62 percent have between seven to nine years, and only 8.22 percent have 13 years or more. When separated into local authority groups, the average years of education for commune councillors is 6.7 and that for district councillors and boards of governors is 10.

Figure 1: Respondents' Education




Table 10: Respondents' Years of Education (% , n=932)


Number of years	Male	Female	Total
1-6	36.63	41.28	37.38
7-9	28.67	34.56	29.62
10-12	26.16	17.63	24.78
13 or more	8.55	6.53	8.22
Total	100	100	100

Table 11: Years of Education of Commune Councillors, District Councillors and Boards of Governors

Years of Education	N	Min	Max	Mean	Standard deviation
Commune councillors	530	1	20	6.7	2.82460
District councillors and boards of governors	410	2	20	10.0	3.73933

Figure 2 shows the education of the surveyed commune councillors and district councillors and boards of governors. While the majority of the commune respondents have between one to six years of education, almost two thirds of the district respondents have between seven to 12 years.

Figure 2: Respondents' Years of Education



### 3.2. Accountability


#### *Commune and District Accountability*

“Accountability” needs serious explanation in the context of Cambodia’s decentralisation. As a “relational concept”, accountability carries various meaning, and two types of accountability have been identified: vertical and horizontal (Kim 2011). We use *khanak neiya-pheap* in this report as the Khmer equivalent of the English word “accountability”. It is worth noting that *khanak neiya-pheap* is a new term in the Khmer lexicon<sup>5</sup> and can easily be confused with other terminology or misunderstood altogether. A 2008 survey of 1086 people about accountability in Cambodia found that 79.3 percent did not know the word (SBK Research and Development 2008). Moreover, in his study, which is based on data from 2002 to 2007, Kim (2011) found that only 5 percent of 583 voters had heard of the phrase compared to 81 percent of commune councillors. Among those who had heard the phrase, 27 percent thought it referred to “responsibility”, 25 percent said it meant “honesty” or “trustworthiness”, and 23 percent believed it meant “transparency” (Kim 2011: 162-164). The novelty of the term, even though its usage may be increasing, causes different groups of people to understand it differently.

Despite the lack of consensus on the definition of accountability”, the underlying meaning is definitely understood to refer to the concept of responsibility of one party for their use of authority to another party. Commune accountability has been an issue in debate on D&D. Commune councillors are the main subject of this debate. Figure 3 shows that the majority of district councillors and commune councillors say that the Ministry of the Interior or the government is their boss.

5 It does not occur in the classical Khmer dictionary, Chhuon Nath (1965)

Figure 3: Commune and District Councillors' Perception of Who Their "Boss" is (%)



It is understandable that the district council is accountable to the ministry, even though it is elected by commune councillors. Next in importance, the district board of governors is in charge of local politics and decision making. As successor to the traditional executive branch of district government, the board of governors remains influential in local decision making, as shown in Figure 3. Both district and provincial boards of governors are appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. They are agents of the government.

Table 12: Respondents' View of Who they are Accountable to

Who are you primarily accountable to?	First		Second		Third	
	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist
Political party	31	11	38	7	20	8
People	372	268	47	41	27	31
Provincial council	7	2	21	21	45	24
Provincial board of governors	12	8	56	31	85	68
District or commune council	25	43	115	116	80	60
District board of governors	51	58	158	118	106	79
MoI/Phnom Penh	30	20	74	62	67	57
Others	2	0	7	5	19	8
Total	531	410	515	399	451	334

Accountability of the district and provincial councils has been uncertain, which complicates the debate on D&D. The expectation is that district councils are directly accountable to the people for their immediate decisions and to the government for their application of the law.<sup>6</sup> Table 12 confirms that the councils have a clear understanding of their accountability: they are primarily accountable to the people, followed by district boards of governors.

6 Law on Administrative Management of the Capital, Provinces, Municipalities, Districts and *Khans*, May 2008 (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Interior)

Decentralisation and deconcentration aim to empower local government to be accountable and responsive to local people. In case of conflict between local people and higher authorities, the commune councillors clearly see the demands of local people as primary while working out a compromise is secondary. The district however views working out a compromise as primary while respect for the demands of local people is secondary (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Response to Conflicting Development Demands from Local People and Higher Authorities (%)






Figure 5: Response to the Statement that Commune is Subordinate to District (%)



Most commune councillors do not agree that the commune is subordinate to the district (Figure 5). This finding makes it highly likely that commune councillors expect the district council to be accountable and deliver services to the commune and local people. The roles and responsibilities of the commune and the district are clear at least to the commune councillors.

District respondents also disagreed with the statement that the commune council is subordinate to the district. The district and the commune are both aware that they have different functions and responsibilities.


Figure 6: Views of Who the District Boards of Governors Report to



The ambiguity about whether the district boards of governors are accountable to the district council and the provincial board of governors or the Ministry of Interior is problematic in the legal framework as well as in practice, and will likely delay the creation of a unified sub-national administration. Almost half of district respondents and just over half of commune councillors perceived the district board of governors as regularly reporting primarily to the provincial board of governors (Figure 6). District respondents' second most common view was that the board reports to the district council.

Majority of commune councillors understood that the district council reports to the provincial council. There was little expectation of the district council reporting to the commune councillors, who vote them into office (Figure 7). This poses a challenge for the commune in terms of holding the district councillors accountable.

Figure 7: Views of Who the District Council Reports to (%)



With the commune councillors electing the district and provincial councillors, it is expected to give the former bargaining power to hold the latter accountable. The survey confirmed that commune councillors perceive the district council as primarily accountable to the commune council (Table 13).

The majority of commune councillors ranked the commune council as the body to which the district council owes first accountability, and considered the people as receiving second accountability. District respondents saw it differently. For them, the district council was primarily accountable to the people and the district board of governors was ranked second.

Table 13: Views on Who the District Council is Accountable to

	First		Second		Third	
	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist
Political party	27	8	21	10	32	11
People	126	201	94	55	66	45
Provincial council	48	42	81	65	74	60
Provincial board of governors	24	8	63	43	56	41
Commune council	167	26	118	64	57	61
District board of governors	108	94	90	90	89	68
Mol/Phnom Penh	24	30	44	82	70	65
Others	5	3	20	3	86	61
Total	531	412	531	412	531	412

### Consultation

In preparing development plans, district and provincial councils are recommended to consult the people, commune councils in their jurisdiction and other concerned bodies (Organic

Law, Article 38). Security issues are the top priority in district councils' consultations with the commune (Table 14). District council monthly meetings were the second most frequent issue on which they consulted.

Table 14: Views on Frequency of Topics Discussed between District and Commune

Topic	First		Second		Third		Fourth		Fifth		Sixth	
	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist
Political party issues	59	51	32	24	42	21	37	27	88	39	272	250
Annual planning and budgeting	90	43	94	63	78	78	98	70	108	101	64	57
District council monthly meeting	102	117	87	68	102	70	88	79	94	55	58	23
Information sharing	37	23	61	71	94	87	97	95	136	96	107	40
Security	175	162	140	109	97	54	74	50	33	28	10	9
Women's and children's affairs	67	15	118	78	118	102	136	90	72	93	20	33
Total	531	412	531	412	531	412	531	412	531	412	531	412

As shown in Figure 8, a large majority of district respondents say they regularly inform the commune council about district council meetings or consultations. The smaller “yes” response from commune respondents may indicate different perceptions of the definition of “regular”.

Similar percentages of commune councillors and district respondents hold the view that communes can influence district decisions through participating in joint meetings. Commune and district interviewees also agreed that informal discussion was the second most important way to influence policy (Figure 9).



Figure 8: View on Whether Commune Is Regularly Informed about District Council Meetings or Consultations (%)






Figure 9: Views on How Communes Can Influence District Decisions (%)



The commune councillors are aware of their right to hold district and provincial councils accountable with their vote at election time, if not between. A large majority of the commune councillors believed that poorly performing district and provincial councillors would be voted out of office. This finding could be challenged by the proportional party list voting system, but

analysis of the electoral system is beyond the scope of this study. District respondents were also aware of what could happen if they are seen as not performing well (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Views on District/Provincial Councillors' Re-election if they Perform Poorly (%)



### 3.3. Unified Administration

#### *District Council Capacity and Authority*

The second stage of decentralisation aims to strengthen the capacity of district and provincial governments. A capable unified administration requires enough resources to carry out its functions. In the Organic Law, “unified administration” refers to the organisation of sub-national councils with ownership of management, functions, financial and human resources and property so that they are capable of coordinating service delivery and development projects, including those implemented by ministries and other government institutions.

A large majority of commune councillors strongly or partially agreed that district councils had the capacity to handle their functions (Table 15). A solid majority also thought that these councils had ownership of staff management. (This perception is based mainly on the councillors’ knowledge of the unified administration and the fact that they see the council as being in charge of the district administration. However, that the district council cannot recruit, promote, dismiss or offer incentives to staff does not conform to the principle of staff management as stipulated in the Organic Law.)

Most commune councillors and district respondents strongly or partially agreed that the district council has insufficient funding to perform its functions. The district is supposed to have a budget of its own<sup>7</sup>, but this has yet to be implemented.

7 Law on Administrative Management of the Capital, Provinces, Municipalities, Districts and *Khans*, May 2008 (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Interior)

Commune and district respondents strongly or partly agreed that the district council lacks the authority to use its property for its administrative functions. In the decentralisation framework, the ability to use local government property such as land, buildings and public space is crucial for revenue generation and administrative and development support. This property remains under the control of the government until the law on the financial regime and property management for sub-national government is adopted and comes into effect.

Table 15: Views on District Council Capacity (%)

	Strongly agree		Somewhat agree		Neutral		Somewhat disagree		Strongly disagree	
	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist
Adequate capacity to perform its functions	24.07	32.8	64.39	62.32	1.18	0	9.91	4.72	0.44	0.16
Lacks ownership of staff management	3.58	4.13	17.06	12.44	8.52	1.04	53.57	56.54	17.27	25.85
Lacks budget to perform its function	20.00	39.05	36.65	45.22	13.57	0.29	21.39	8.65	8.39	6.79
Not enough authority to utilise its property	33.49	30.19	43.53	44.88	5.07	0.68	14.44	19.22	3.47	5.02

Councillors' capacity is critical to the functioning of a unified district administration. The district councillors were confident that they are capable of fulfilling their mandates and functions. Overall, they disagreed that the district council has no ownership of staff management (Table 15). This finding should be treated with caution. Within a unified administration, the council's ownership of staff recruitment, dismissal, incentives and disciplinary procedure is key to service delivery. The districts do not have a clear understanding of what "unified administration" entails and how it is linked to their day-to-day operation.

### ***Relationship Change and Technical Offices***

Following the election of commune councils, the election of district and provincial councils in May 2009 was another turning point for decentralisation. For the first time, district and provincial councils were legally established as sub-national government. The new arrangements can bring about fresh relations between councils, boards of governors, the traditional powerful executive body and line offices.

Relations between the district council and line offices determine the success of the council's functions and its role in local development. The commune councillors were convinced that relations between district councils and technical and line offices had improved since the election in May 2009 (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Views of Relations between District Council and District Technical Offices since May 2009





Figure 12: Commune Perception of District Technical Offices' Level of Activity



The commune councillors named health, women affairs and education, in that order, as the three most active sectoral offices in local development (Figure 12). District respondents considered education the most active sector within the district, followed by health, women affairs and agriculture (Figure 13). The least active was commerce, followed by industry, mines and energy.

Figure 13: District Perception of District Technical Offices' Level of Activity






Figure 14: How Respondents Interact with Technical Offices (%)



Interaction between commune councillors and district technical offices is rare. Interaction through formal mechanisms such as joint meetings or district integration workshops is even rarer. They come into contact at sporadic meetings or by request only. The lack of regular and open information sharing has broadened the gap between them (Figure 14).

As shown in Figure 15, the most common view held by commune councillors was that district line offices are accountable to the commune council. It is hard to be certain of the reason for this assessment, but it may tell us that commune councillors think that these offices should be accountable to the commune. A similar proportion of commune councillors thought that the district office accountability is to provincial line departments or ministries. The majority of district respondents responded that the district offices are accountable to the district board of governors; the next most common view was that they are accountable to provincial line departments or ministries.

Figure 15: Views of Whom the District Offices are Accountable to (%)



### 3.4. Fiscal Assignments


Own sources of revenue are critical for decentralised governments. However, creating these is no less difficult than the reform itself. Communes have so far received a small share of the national budget for local development. They do not collect any tax except for local contributions for development projects (Rusten *et al.* 2004: 147).

The districts lag behind. They remain politically and financially under the patronage of provincial government. Throughout Cambodia’s modern history of administration, the district has never been equipped with power and resources, nor even a clear mandate except during the 1980s; it has merely been a link between provincial authorities and commune and village administration. During the 1980s civil war, the district was carefully scrutinised by the provincial administration while also assigned enough power and resources to maintain security. This has changed since the attainment of peace. The 1994 reform reduced district administration to a minimal administrative role (Öjendal & Kim 2008: 14-15) which remained

unchanged until the indirect elections in May 2009. A few ministries that have resources to run district offices require the latter to be accountable to them, bypassing the district administration, specifically the district governor (Öjendal & Kim 2008: 15). Despite the decentralisation reform in 2002, district administration only has a minor role in development planning or coordinating local councils. The district facilitation task force is the only team that has a direct role with local councils.

There is no regulation authorising the district to collect taxes. In practice, taxes and fees are paid to the district administration even though this is not seen as legitimate and the money does not necessarily go into the state coffers (Öjendal & Kim 2008: 31). Even before the Organic Law was passed, the district authorities expected to have a new formal role as tax collectors. In a recent study of district administrations, 49 percent of 77 respondents wanted this new role to be enshrined in law (Öjendal & Kim 2008:31). This observation is confirmed by the survey; 83 percent of district respondents strongly favoured the district having a role in tax collection (Figure 16).

Figure 16: Views on District Authority' Role in Tax Collection



Three quarters of the commune councillors said that the district had been helpful with commune financial issues. This included help with various aspects of finance, but not the disbursement of funds from the district. Local councillors, whose financial knowledge is minimal, may well have needed assistance. The district respondents held a very similar view.

Figure 17: Views on Whether District Authority has Helped Commune on Financial Issues (%)





Figure 18 illustrates the type of financial assistance provided, according to those who said the district was helpful. District and commune respondents held similar points of view.


Figure 18: Type of Support Received by Commune, According to Respondents Who Said District is Helpful with Financial Issues (%)



Surprisingly, 88 percent of commune councillors and almost 90 percent of district respondents concurred that they had financial power as stipulated by law (Figure 19). This view should be put into context. The commune has autonomy in the use of the commune/*sangkat* fund. However, its right to collect taxes and non-tax revenue, as stipulated in Article 74 of the 2001 Law on Commune/Sangkat Administration, is yet to be realised.



Figure 19: Views on Whether Commune and District Councils have Financial Power Stipulated in Law



### 3.5. Service Delivery and Division of Labour

Public services are currently delivered by both local government and national government. National government delegates service delivery to specialised ministries, which entrust the function to provincial line departments. In the districts, the line offices serve as agents of the provincial departments to provide services. The district administration is confined to activities such as maintaining security and order, collecting data on rice production and related agricultural activities and facilitating commune development projects (Rusten *et al.* 2004: 133). The practice has not yet changed.

The commune, by law, is responsible for duties relating to people’s livelihoods, including maintenance of security and public order, protection of the environment and natural resources, promotion of social and economic development, general affairs and other necessary service delivery.<sup>8</sup> Communes currently deliver some services, including physical infrastructure development, awareness raising and education, security and public order, and civil registration (Rusten *et al.* 2004: 135-36). It remains to be true until the time this report is written. At the district/municipality level, considered to be another level of local administration that will play a crucial role in delivering public services, several projects have been initiated and piloted to enable the district/municipal administration to start delivering services (Pak *et al.* 2011) even though the extent of success of each project is yet to be assessed.

Almost identical proportions of commune councillors and district respondents view that the division of roles in service delivery between the commune and district is clear (Figure 20). The commune’s role in service delivery remains mainly limited to civil registration, infrastructure development, and awareness raising on social issues. As mentioned earlier, the

<sup>8</sup> Law on the Administration and Management of Communes (LAMC), 2001 (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Interior)

district’s role in service delivery is almost non-existent because most of the jobs have been deconcentrated to line offices.

Figure 20: Views on Whether Division of Service Delivery Roles between Commune and District is Clear






Figure 21: Views on Types of District Service Delivery Support Provided to Communes (%)



Almost similar numbers of commune councillors and district respondents view “advice and guidance” as the top service delivered from the district to the commune. The district’s helpfulness with respect to providing “technical staff” to the commune was ranked second (Figure 21).

Training for commune councillors, provided by non-government organisations and the district facilitation team, has been considered essential to the success of decentralisation. Training and information on topics such as democratic leadership, decentralisation, reporting, management, conflict resolution, planning and budgeting are crucial for commune councillors, most of whom have little education. The training approach taken in the early years of the reform was considered by trainers and councillors as too intensive. It was also observed that the training programme for commune councillors so far has not been coordinated well enough to maximise its impact (Rusten *et al.* 2004: 102-07). Capacity building remains a priority for the reform and there was agreement that capacity building has improved since the election of district and provincial councils (Figure 22).

Figure 22: Views on Change in Commune Capacity-building since May 2009 (%)



### 3.6. Gender


A call for more women to work in the council is highly profiled in the debate on decentralisation design. A study by Kim and Öjendal (2011) reveals that decentralisation has strengthened the role of women in local leadership. Their representation in local politics has increased from 954 (8 percent) in 2002 to 1717 (14.6 percent) in 2007 (Agustiana 2011: 22).<sup>9</sup> Moreover, women make up 10.1 percent of municipal and provincial councils and 12.6 percent of district and *khan* councils (Agustiana 2011: 22-23). However, their roles and responsibilities lag behind the increase in number. Even as some commentators see women's council roles as stereotyped and confined to dealing mainly with women's and children's issues, Manor (2008) sees the existence of a women's affairs committee in local councils as a good start to promoting women's leadership in local politics and development. He suggests that the political party lists have a quota for women candidates of between 30 and 50 percent.

<sup>9</sup> According to a National Election Commission source, the 2002 election instated 1065 women commune councillors (Kim & Öjendal 2011)

While the commune is a main player in promoting gender issues in the locality through awareness raising and advising people to send both girls and boys to school (Rusten *et al.* 2004: 53), gender is also mainstreamed in its management structure. Women are encouraged to run in the local election, while many of them participate in local development (Rusten *et al.* 2004: 126). However, women councillors encounter inherent challenges in the patron-client funding system, which partly limits them to women’s and children’s issues (Rusten *et al.* 2004: 149-50).


A large majority of commune councillors saw women district councillors as somewhat or strongly influential. There was no significant difference between the perception of male and female respondents (Figure 23).

Figure 23: Views of Female Councillors’ Influence on Commune and District Decision-making (district to commune and vice versa) (%)



Two-thirds of the commune respondents saw their relations with district female councillors as not different from those with male councillors; one fifth observed their relations with female district councillors as better. District respondents reported similar relations with female commune councillors (Figure 24).

Figure 24: Views on Relations with Female Councillors Compared to Male Councillors (district to commune and *vice versa*) (%)



The survey found that the commune’s perception of female district councillors and the district’s perception of female commune councillors were both very positive (Figure 25).

Figure 25: View of Whether Female Councillors Articulate Their Roles and Responsibilities (district to commune and *vice versa*)




Figure 26 illustrates the view of the whole sample on female district councillors’ ability to articulate their roles and responsibilities. There were only marginal differences between the views of male and female respondents (Figure 27).

Figure 26: View of Whether Female District Councillors Articulate Roles and Responsibilities (%)





Figure 27: View of Whether Female District Councillors Articulate Roles and Responsibilities, by Sex (%)



### 3.7. Strategic Learning and Vision

Decentralisation in Cambodia aims to enhance local democracy, promote economic development and ultimately reduce poverty (Rusten *et al.* 2004: 15). It is almost impossible to evaluate the success of the reform, even after nearly a decade. Kim and Öjendal, based on a qualitative review of the reform, applaud its immediate success even though in the long

run, they warn, local democratisation may need re-working (Kim & Öjendal 2009; Öjendal & Kim 2011).

Perceptions of local councillors, who are the real players, are important for deepening insight into the reform and where it could possibly lead. Although it is impossible to evaluate the reform's impact in value terms, the survey tried to capture the view held by councillors on some of these development issues (Table 16).

Table 16: Views on Changes Since Decentralisation and Deconcentration (%; CC, *n*=531 and Dist, *n*=412 )

<b>Reform has:</b>		<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Somewhat agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Somewhat disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>
Empowered local citizens	CC	43.29	50.63	-	5.64	0.44
	Dist	44.33	50.33	0.24	4.24	0.86
Enhanced local democracy	CC	41.98	50.27	0.82	5.33	1.60
	Dist	46.51	50.36	0.24	2.44	0.45
Not changed the authority of board of governors	CC	6.33	22.89	1.70	52.82	16.27
	Dist	3.66	17.90	1.08	55.58	21.77
Required district council to be accountable to commune council	CC	35.34	55.14	2.29	6.79	0.44
	Dist	30.83	57.64	1.04	9.44	1.04
Strengthened capacity of sub-national male officials more than female officials	CC	8.78	15.06	0.77	53.36	22.03
	Dist	5.17	14.86	1.03	57.22	21.72
Improved the livelihoods of local people	CC	40.66	49.47	1.60	7.03	1.24
	Dist	42.82	49.79	1.11	5.55	0.73
Not empowered local female leadership	CC	2.04	7.38	0.72	49.59	40.27
	Dist	1.23	6.12	0.29	52.59	39.77

Overall, commune councillors and district authorities are positive about the reform. They agree that D&D has empowered local citizens. There is similar agreement that D&D contributes to local democracy.

The rearrangement of district and provincial administration is part of an attempt to improve sub-national governance. The traditional executive body has been turned into a board of governors, which in the new legal framework must be overseen by the council. As shown in Table 16, respondents considered the reform a blow to the traditional authority of boards of governors and as district councils are required to be accountable to commune councils. They did not think that it had weakened the position of female officials relative to males or that it had failed to empower female local leadership. They also believed the reform had contributed to improved local livelihoods.

For the commune councillors, lack of support for travel placed as the primary challenge to their relations with the district authority; political affiliation ranked very close to the first primary challenge. Old working attitude is considered as the least challenge. For the district authority, an equal proportion of respondents ranked different political affiliation and lack of

training and technical support as the primary challenges. Lack of support for travel ranked third. Lack of information flow is regarded as the least challenge (Table 17).

Table 17: Views of Challenges in Relations

	First		Second		Third		Fourth		Fifth		Sixth	
	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist
Lack of information flow	66	43	81	64	99	71	100	89	101	85	84	59
Different political party	121	92	65	38	56	37	54	38	78	65	154	144
Lack of training and technical support	111	92	115	97	75	73	91	67	66	51	74	30
Lack of support for travel	122	91	127	102	105	63	81	52	56	55	41	48
Unclear roles and responsibilities	68	39	100	60	110	103	105	85	85	65	63	60
Old working attitude	43	54	43	51	86	65	100	81	144	91	114	70
Total	531	412	531	412	531	412	531	412	531	412	531	412

Commune councillors saw more capacity building as the primary approach to improving relations, followed by facilitation of the province which is ranked as the secondary primary approach. District respondents saw clarifying roles and responsibilities as the primary approach to improving the relationship, followed by more capacity building.

Table 18: Views on Challenges to Approaches to Improving Relations

	First		Second		Third		Fourth		Fifth		Sixth	
	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist	CC	Dist
Facilitation by province	129	86	81	68	64	64	91	74	121	86	53	36
Through party office	29	12	40	27	33	16	53	29	91	82	284	241
Changing legal framework	71	57	85	61	93	60	116	78	93	90	74	66
Clarifying roles and responsibilities	112	109	131	90	121	83	70	68	59	44	35	20
Changing working attitude	48	44	92	85	117	91	121	108	98	57	54	27
More capacity building	142	104	102	81	103	98	81	55	69	53	31	22
Total	531	412	531	412	531	412	531	412	531	412	531	412



## Chapter 4

### SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

The goal of the survey was to provide a better understanding of decentralisation and deconcentration through the opinions of local councillors and district councillors and boards of governors. Relations between the commune and district authorities were the central concern of this survey. Commune perceptions of the district authority – councillors, board of governors and line officials – and vice versa, focus on various aspects of decentralisation and deconcentration including accountability, fiscal assignment, unified administration, gender and impact of the reform. Relations between the district council, board of governors and line offices were also touched upon so as to understand changes since the new administrative arrangement from May 2009 onwards.

Commune and district authorities were well aware of the public's expectations of them; that they are accountable primarily to the people even though their comprehension of "accountability" may be questionable. The district board of governors is another institution that both the commune and district are believed to be accountable to.

Perception of relations between the commune and district varied. While the majority of both commune and district respondents disagreed that the commune is subordinate to the district, more commune councillors than district respondents agreed.

The commune and district had different perceptions of the reporting line of the district board of governors. Commune and district respondents both held the view that the district council reports primarily to the provincial council and then to the provincial board of governors. However, the communes saw district councils as being accountable primarily to them while the districts saw themselves as being primarily accountable to the people.

Commune councillors and district respondents agreed that communes can influence district decisions by participating in joint meetings and informal discussions with district authorities.

The concept of "unified administration" may be too novel for local councillors and district authorities. While there is consensus that the district council has the capacity to perform its functions, the two groups of respondents also agreed that the district council lacks funds for development, partly because it does not have enough authority to utilise its property. Responses to the survey question may indicate that their definition of "ownership in staff management" differs from that given in the unified administration framework.

Local support for districts having their own revenue sources should serve as a strong basis for policy development. That the district should have a role in tax collection was encouraged by both commune councillors and district authorities, though the commune was less supportive. There was consensus that the district role in commune financial issues has been limited to advice and comment and "resource mobilisation facilitation". Similarly, the district role in supporting commune service delivery is almost confined to advice and guidance and providing technical staff.

While relations between district councils and line offices are getting better, communication between them remains to be improved, and commune councillors need more explanation

concerning the accountability of line offices. Commune relations with district line offices are limited to those who are most active in their localities – the most active ones being education, health and women’s affairs. Communes and districts mainly meet with technical officers at requested and “sporadic” meetings. It is worth noting that district integration workshops are not an important meeting occasion. There was considerable disagreement or confusion as to the accountability of line offices.

The reform deserves praise for integrating gender into real practice. It is widely agreed that female commune and district councillors are influential in local decision making and able to articulate their roles and responsibilities. Decentralisation has strengthened the capacity of both male and female local leaders.

Local councillors and district authorities had a strongly positive view of decentralisation and deconcentration. It was widely agreed that the reform has enhanced local democracy, improved livelihoods, increased the capacity of male and female councillors and female leadership and changed the accountability of sub-national boards of governors. Both commune and district councillors believed that there is high public expectation of them and that failure to fulfil this expectation will cost them support and possibly their positions.

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## ANNEXES

### Annex 1: Sample Size and Sampling Weights Calculations

#### *Sample size*

Confidence level ( $\gamma$ ) has a corresponding value  $z$ , for instance, if  $\gamma = 95\%$ , the value of  $z = 1.96$ . Hence, confidence interval  $\varphi$  around mean of attribute is:

$\varphi = \pm zSE$ , where  $SE$  is the standard error of the population mean (1), and

$$SE = \sqrt{\left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right) \frac{Np(1-p)}{(N-1)n}}, \text{ where } n \text{ denotes sample size with } N \text{ population, and}$$

population proportion  $p$ .

From equation (1) we can write:

$$\varphi = zSE = z \sqrt{\left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right) \frac{Np(1-p)}{(N-1)n}}$$

$$\varphi^2 = z^2 \left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right) \frac{Np(1-p)}{(N-1)n}$$

$$\text{Let } A = \frac{z^2}{\varphi^2} p(1-p)$$

$$\left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right) \frac{N}{(N-1)n} = \frac{1}{A}$$

$$\frac{N}{(N-1)n} - \frac{1}{N-1} = \frac{1}{A}$$

$$\frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{N}{N-1}\right) = \frac{1}{A} + \frac{1}{N-1}$$

$$\frac{1}{n} = \frac{\frac{1}{A} + \frac{1}{N-1}}{\frac{N}{N-1}} = \frac{(N-1+A)(N-1)}{A(N-1)N} = \frac{N-1+A}{AN}$$

$$n = \frac{AN}{N-1+A}$$

Confidence level tells the preciseness of the answer. Here, we choose 95 percent confidence level (most researchers choose this level, and the higher the level, the more certainty one can infer), which means one is 95 percent sure that an answer lies within the confidence interval. We choose a confidence interval of 4 percent, which means the percentage of an answer stretches between  $\pm 4$  percent. We assume  $p=0.5$  (with  $p$  unknown).  $Z$  value corresponds to 95 percent confidence level which is set at 1.96. The sample size can now be calculated:

*Commune:*

$$A = \frac{z^2 p(1-p)}{\phi^2} = \frac{(1.96)^2 \times 0.5 \times 0.5}{(0.04)^2} = 600$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = \frac{A \times N}{N + A - 1} = \frac{600 \times 656}{656 + 600 - 1} = 313$$

*Commune Councillor:*

$$A = \frac{z^2 p(1-p)}{\phi^2} = \frac{(1.96)^2 \times 0.5 \times 0.5}{(0.04)^2} = 600$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = \frac{A \times N}{N + A - 1} = \frac{600 \times 4633}{4633 + 600 - 1} = 531$$

*District:*

$$A = \frac{z^2 p(1-p)}{\phi^2} = \frac{(1.96)^2 \times 0.5 \times 0.5}{(0.04)^2} = 600$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = \frac{A \times N}{N + A - 1} = \frac{600 \times 72}{72 + 600 - 1} = 64$$

*District Councillors and Boards of Governors:*

$$A = \frac{z^2 p(1-p)}{\phi^2} = \frac{(1.96)^2 \times 0.5 \times 0.5}{(0.04)^2} = 600$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = \frac{A \times N}{N + A - 1} = \frac{600 \times 1437}{1437 + 600 - 1} = 423$$

### ***Sampling Weights for Unequal Probabilities of Selection***

*Commune/Sangkat*

Three hundred and thirteen communes/*sangkats* are selected from the 656 communes/*sangkats* in the eight provinces; 531/313 commune/*sangkat* councillors are selected from each sampled commune. Let  $G_i$  be the number of commune councillors in commune/*sangkat*  $i$ . The probability of selection of a sampled commune/*sangkat* councillor is:

$$p_{ij}(c) = p_i(c) \times p_{j(i)}(c) = \frac{313}{656} \times \frac{531}{313 \times G_i}$$

The weight now can be calculated as

$$w_i(c) = \frac{1}{P_{ij}} = \frac{656 \times G_i}{531}$$

#### *District/Khan*

Sixty four districts/*khans* are selected from the 72 districts/*khans* in the eight provinces; 423/64 district/*khan* councillors and boards of governors are selected from each sampled district/*khan*. Let  $H_i$  be the number of district/*khan* councillors and boards of governors in district/*khan*  $i$ . The probability of selection of a sampled district/*khan* councillor and board of governors is:

$$p_{ij}(d) = p_i(d) \times p_{j(i)}(d) = \frac{64}{72} \times \frac{423}{64 \times H_i}$$

The weight now can be calculated as

$$w_i(d) = \frac{1}{P_{ij}} = \frac{72 \times H_i}{423}$$



## Annex 2: Questionnaire for Commune/Sangkat Councillors

Questionnaire code: ..... (XXX)

### 1. General

1.1. Location: 1.1.1. Province:.....(code) 1.1.3. Commune:.....	1.1.2. District: ..... 1.1.4. Village: .....
---	---

1.2. Interview 1.2.1. Interviewer's name:..... 1.2.3. Started: ..... (hh:mm; am or pm) 1.2.5. Signature: .....	1.2.2. Interview date: ..... (dd/mm/yyyy) 1.2.4. Ended: ..... (hh:mm; am or pm) 1.2.6. Comments:.....
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1.3. Quality control 1.3.1. Checked by: ..... (full name) 1.3.3. Questions re-interview: ..... 1.3.5. Signature: .....	1.3.2. Check date: ..... (dd/mm/yyyy) 1.3.4. Date of re-interview: ..... (dd/mm/yyyy) 1.3.6. Comments:.....
---	---

1.4. Data entry 1.4.1. Data entry person's name: ..... 1.4.3. Checked by: ..... 1.4.5. Signature: .....	1.4.2. Date of entry: ..... (dd/mm/yyyy) 1.4.4. Date of check: ..... (dd/mm/yyyy) 1.4.6. Comments: .....
--	--

1.5. About the respondent 1.5.1. Position in the council: ..... 1.5.3. Years of education: ..... (exact number) 1.5.5. Years living in the commune: .....	1.5.2. Marital status: ..... 1.5.4. Age: ..... (exact years) 1.5.6. Number of family members: ..... 1.5.8. (do not ask) Sex: male <input type="checkbox"/> female <input type="checkbox"/>
--	---

\*For Q.1.5.1: 1= chief of the council; 2=first deputy; 3=second deputy; 4= member; 5=do not know

\*For Q.1.5.2: 1=married; 2=single; 3=divorced; 4=widowed; 5=abandoned/separate; 6=living together

\*For Q.1.5.7: 1=CPP; 2=SRP; 3=FUNCINPEC; 4=NRP; 5=others

**2. Commune’s Relation with District**

*Theme 1: Commune Accountability*

Q2.1. Who do you consider as your boss? (Tick one answer)

- 1. Political party
- 2. People
- 3. Provincial council
- 4. Provincial board of governors
- 5. District council
- 6. District board of governors
- 7. MoI/Phnom Penh
- 8. Others.....

Q2.2: Who are you primarily accountable to? (Put the first on top, and then second and third)

	Rank
1. Political party	_____
2. People	_____
3. Provincial council	_____
4. Provincial board of governors	_____
5. District council	_____
6. District board of governors	_____
7. MoI/Phnom Penh	_____
8. Others, specify.....	_____

Q2.3. When there is a conflict of demands for development project between local people and higher authority, what is your decision? (Please tick the most correct answer below)

- 1. Respect demands of higher authority
- 2. Respect demands of local people
- 3. Compromise demands of local people and those of higher authority
- 4. Respect neither
- 5. Do not know

*Theme 2: Unified Administration*

Q2.4. Please select the number to show your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement below, and put the number on the right of each statement.

**(1. Strongly agree, 2. Somewhat agree, 3. Neutral, 4. Somewhat disagree and 5. Strongly disagree)**

- 2.4.1. The district council has adequate capacity to perform its functions \_\_\_\_\_
- 2.4.2. The district council does not have ownership of staff management \_\_\_\_\_
- 2.4.3. The district council does not have funds to perform its functions \_\_\_\_\_
- 2.4.4. The district council does not have authority to utilise its property \_\_\_\_\_

Q2.5. How would you rate the relations between district council and district technical offices since the election of district and provincial councils in May 2009?

- 1. Much better
- 2. Better

- 3. The same
- 4. Worse
- 5. Much worse

Why? Please explain:.....  
 .....  
 .....

Q2.6. Please use the scale below to rate the activeness of each district technical office working in the commune, and put the number on the right side of each technical office.

<b>Least active</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>most active</b>
1. Health				_____
2. Education, youth and sports				_____
3. Rural development				_____
4. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries				_____
5. Land management and construction				_____
6. Women's affairs				_____
7. Public works and transport				_____
8. Water resource management				_____
9. Culture and fine arts				_____
10. Commerce				_____
11. Industry, mines and energy				_____
12. Planning				_____
13. Cults and religion				_____
14. Social work				_____
15. Others.....				_____

Q2.7. How do you interact with these technical offices? (More than one answer)

- 1. Indirect interaction only
- 2. Sporadic meetings
- 3. Regular and open information sharing
- 4. Advice and support
- 5. Joint projects
- 6. District integration workshop
- 7. Making request
- 8. Others.....

Q2.8. To your knowledge, who are the district line offices accountable to?

- 1. District council
- 2. District BoG
- 3. Line departments/ministry
- 4. Commune council
- 5. Political party
- 6. Others.....

Q2.9. What is the main difficulty in interacting with the technical offices? (Tick only the most correct one)

1. No joint interests
2. No formal influence/power
3. Not legally regulated
4. Technical offices are accountable vertically
5. Not enough technical capacity
6. Others.....

*Theme 3: District Accountability*

Q2.10. Do you agree with the statement that the commune is subordinate to the district? (Please explain)

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

If you answered 1 or 2, please explain: .....

.....

.....

Q2.11. To your knowledge, who does the district BoG regularly report to? (Please select the most correct answer(s))

1. Political party
2. General people
3. Provincial council
4. Provincial board of governors
5. District council
6. MoI/Phnom Penh
7. Commune council
8. Others.....

Q2.12. To your knowledge, who does the district council regularly report to? (Please select the most correct answer(s))

1. Political party
2. General people
3. Provincial council
4. Provincial board of governors
5. District board of governors
6. MoI/Phnom Penh
7. Commune council
8. Others.....

Q2.13. Among matters listed below, on what matter did the district consult or invite you to the most often? (Please rank these issues from 1st rank=the most often to 6th =the least often)

- |   | Rank  |
|---|-------|
| 1. Political party issues                                 | _____ |
| 2. Annual planning and budgeting                          | _____ |
| 3. District/provincial council monthly meeting            | _____ |
| 4. Information sharing such as report from national level | _____ |
| 5. Security issues  | _____ |
| 6. Discussion on women's and children's issues            | _____ |

Q2.14. In your understanding, who is the district council accountable to? (Please select three answers from the list below putting the primary one first, followed by 2nd and 3rd)

- |                                  | Rank  |
|----------------------------------|-------|
| 1. Political Party               | _____ |
| 2. People                        | _____ |
| 3. Provincial council            | _____ |
| 4. Provincial board of governors | _____ |
| 5. Commune council               | _____ |
| 6. District board of governors   | _____ |
| 7. MoI/Phnom Penh                | _____ |
| 8. Other, specify                | _____ |

Q2.15. Were you regularly informed about district council meetings or consultation meetings?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

Q2.16. How do you think you can influence district decisions? (Please choose the correct answer(s) from the list below)

1. Participating in joint meeting
2. Informal discussions with district authority
3. Through party office
4. Provincial authorities
5. MoI/Phnom Penh
6. District unified unit meeting
7. Others, specify.....

*Theme 4: Fiscal Assignments*

Q2.17. Do you think the district authority should have a role in tax collection?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

Q2.18. Has the district authority been helpful with the commune's financial issues?

(If no, jump to Q2.20)

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Do not know

Q2.19. With regard to financial issues, what kind of support have you received from the district? (Please choose the correct answer(s))

- 1. Preparation of annual budget
- 2. Accounting
- 3. Resource mobilisation
- 4. Inter-commune development projects
- 5. Local contributions
- 6. Advice and comments
- 7. Others, please specify.....

Q2.20. Do you have financial power as stipulated in the law?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Do not know

*Theme 5: Service Delivery and Division of Labour*

Q2.21. Is the division of roles in service delivery between commune and district clear?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Do not know

If you answered 1 or 2, please explain:.....  
.....  
.....

Q2.22. What kind of support has the district provided to the commune with regard to service delivery? (Please choose the correct answer(s) from the list below)

- 1. Technical staff
- 2. Financial support
- 3. Resource mobilisation/facilitation with stakeholders
- 4. Advice and guidance
- 5. Others, please specify.....

Q2.23. How would you rate capacity building for the commune since the district council election in May 2009?

- 1. Much better
- 2. Better
- 3. The same
- 4. Worse
- 5. Much worse

*Theme 6: Gender Issues*

Q2.24. How do you rate female councillors' influence in district decision making?

1. Strongly influential
2. Somewhat influential
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat powerless
5. Almost powerless

Q2.25. How would you rate your relations with district female councillors compared with male councillors?

1. Much better
2. Better
3. The same
4. Worse
5. Much worse

Q2.26. In your opinion, are district female councillors able to articulate their roles and responsibilities?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

*Theme 7: Strategic Learning & Vision*

Q2.27. Please choose the correct number to show your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements in the list below and put the number on the right side of each statement.

**(1. Strongly agree, 2. Somewhat agree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Somewhat disagree and 5. Strongly disagree)**

- |  |       |
|--|-------|
| 2.27.1. D&D has empowered local citizens   | _____ |
| 2.27.2. D&D has enhanced local democracy   | _____ |
| 2.27.3. D&D has not changed the authority of<br>board of governors                                 | _____ |
| 2.27.4. D&D requires the district council to be accountable to<br>the commune council              | _____ |
| 2.27.5. D&D has strengthened capacity of sub-national<br>male officials more than female officials | _____ |
| 2.27.6. D&D has improved the livelihoods of local people   | _____ |
| 2.27.7. D&D has not empowered local female leadership  | _____ |

Q2.28. Below are the challenges in your relations with the district authority. Please rank them from the 1st=the most challenging to 6th=the least challenging.

- |   | Rank  |
|---|-------|
| 1. Lack of information flow               | _____ |
| 2. Different political party              | _____ |
| 3. Lack of training and technical support | _____ |
| 4. Lack of support for travel             | _____ |
| 5. Unclear role and responsibilities      | _____ |
| 6. Old working attitudes                  | _____ |

Q2.29. Below are some approaches to strengthen the relation between the commune council and district authority. Please rank them in order of importance: 1st= the most effective, 6th=the least effective)

- |   | Rank  |
|---|-------|
| 1. Through facilitation of the province         | _____ |
| 2. Through party office                         | _____ |
| 3. Through changing current legal framework     | _____ |
| 4. Through clarifying role and responsibilities | _____ |
| 5. Through changing working attitude            | _____ |
| 6. Through more capacity building               | _____ |

Q2.30. What would happen to the district/provincial councils in the next election if they are not performing well?

- 1, Will be voted out of position
2. Will be re-elected anyway
3. Do not know
4. Others.....

If you answered 1, 2 or 3, please explain:.....  
 .....  
 .....

Q2.31. What are your final comments about D&D reform in Cambodia?.....  
 .....  
 .....

Thank you very much for your time and information



**3. Questions for Interviewer (to be completed after the interview)**

Q3.1. Were any other people who might have been listening present during the interview?

1. No one
2. Spouse of respondent only
3. Children only
4. A few others
5. A small crowd
6. An official
7. Others, please specify.....

Q3.2. Did the respondent check with others for information to answer any question?

Statement	1=yes, 2=no, 3=do not know
3.2.1. Do you think anyone influenced the respondent's answers during the interview?	
3.2.2. Were you approached by any community or political party representatives?	
3.2.3. Did you feel threatened during or after the interview?	
3.2.4. Other problems encountered (please list them)	

Q3.3. Housing type (if relevant)

Statement	1=yes, 2=no, 3=do not know
3.3.1. Thatched	
3.3.2. Tiled	
3.3.3. Concrete	
3.3.4. Fibrocement/galvanised iron/aluminium	
3.3.5. Wooden	
3.3.6. Salvaged materials	
3.3.7. Tent	
3.3.8. Others	

Q3.4. Office type (if relevant)

	1=yes, 2=no, 3=do not know
3.4.1. Standard building (for commune)	
3.4.2. Old building	
3.4.3. New building for district	
3.4.4. Others, please record..... .....	

END

**Annex 3: Questionnaire for District/*Khan*/Krong Councillors/Boards of Governors**

Questionnaire code: ..... (XXX)

**1. General**

1.1. Location:	
1.1.1. Province: ..... (code)	1.1.2. District: .....
1.1.3. Commune: .....	1.1.4. Village: .....

1.2. Interview	
1.2.1. Interviewer's name:.....	1.2.2. Interview date:..... (dd/mm/yyyy)
1.2.3. Start time:..... (hh:mm; am or pm)	1.2.4. End time:..... (hh:mm; am or pm)
1.2.5. Signature:.....	1.2.6. Comments:.....

1.3. Quality control	
1.3.1. Checked by:..... (full name)	1.3.2. Check date:..... (dd/mm/yyyy)
1.3.3. Questions re-interview: .....	1.3.4. Date of re-interview:..... (dd/mm/yyyy)
1.3.5. Signature:.....	1.3.6. Comments:.....

1.4. Data Entry	
1.4.1. Data entry person's name:.....	1.4.2. Date of entry:..... (dd/mm/yyyy)
1.4.3. Checked by:.....	1.4.4. Date of check:..... (dd/mm/yyyy)
1.4.5. Signature:.....	1.4.6. Comments:.....

1.5. About the Respondent	
1.5.1. Position in the council:.....	1.5.2. Marital status:.....
1.5.3. Years of education:..... (exact number)	1.5.4. Age:..... (exact years)
1.5.5. Years living in the commune:.....	1.5.6. Number of family members:.....
1.5.7. (do not ask) Political affiliation:.....	1.5.8. (do not ask) Sex: male <input type="checkbox"/> female <input type="checkbox"/>

\*For Q.1.5.1 (district council): 1= chief of the council; 2 = member; 5=do not know

\*For Q.5.1 (district BoG): 3=governor; 4=deputy governor; 5=do not know

\*For Q.1.5.2: 1=married; 2=single; 3=divorced; 4=widowed; 5=abandoned/separate; 6=living together

\*For Q.1.5.7: 1=CPP; 2=SRP; 3=FUNCINPEC; 4=NRP; 5=others

**2. Commune's Relation with District**

*Theme 1: Commune Accountability*

Q2.1. Who do you consider as your boss? (tick one answer)

- 1. Political party
- 2. People
- 3. Provincial council
- 4. Provincial board of governors
- 5. Commune council
- 6. District board of governors
- 7. MoI/Phnom Penh
- 8. Others.....

Q2.2. Who are you primarily accountable to? (Put the first on top, and then second and third)

- |                                  | Rank  |
|----------------------------------|-------|
| 1. Political party               | _____ |
| 2. People                        | _____ |
| 3. Provincial council            | _____ |
| 4. Provincial board of governors | _____ |
| 5. Commune council               | _____ |
| 6. District board of governor    | _____ |
| 7. MoI/Phnom Penh                | _____ |
| 8. Others, please specify        | _____ |

Q2.3. When there is a conflict of demands for development between local people and higher authority, what is your decision? (Please tick the most correct answer.)

- 1. Respect demands of higher authority
- 2. Respect demands of local people
- 3. Compromise demands of local people and those of higher authority
- 4. Respect neither
- 5. Do not know

*Theme 2: Unified Administration*

Q2.4. Please select the number to show your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement below, and put the number on the right of each statement.

**(1. Strongly agree, 2. Somewhat agree, 3. Neutral, 4. Somewhat disagree and 5. Strongly disagree)**

- 2.4.1. The district council has adequate capacity to perform its functions \_\_\_\_\_
- 2.4.2. The district council does not have ownership of staff management \_\_\_\_\_
- 2.4.3. The district council does not have funds to perform its functions \_\_\_\_\_
- 2.4.4. The district council does not have authority to utilise its property \_\_\_\_\_

Q2.5. How would you rate relations between district council and district technical offices since the election of district and provincial councils in May 2009?

1. Much better
2. Better
3. The same
4. Worse
5. Much worse

Why? Explain.....  
 .....  
 .....

Q2.6: Please use the scale below to rate the activeness of each district technical office working in the commune, and put the number on the right side of each technical office.

<b>Least active</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>most active</b>
1. Health				_____
2. Education, youth and sports				_____
3. Rural development				_____
4. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries				_____
5. Land management and construction				_____
6. Women's affairs				_____
7. Public works and transport				_____
8. Water resource management				_____
9. Culture and fine arts				_____
10. Commerce				_____
11. Industry, mining and energy				_____
12. Planning				_____
13. Cults and religion				_____
14. Social work				_____
15. Others.....				_____

Q2.7. How do you interact with these technical offices? (More than one answer)

1. Indirect interaction only
2. Sporadic meetings
3. Regular and open information sharing
4. Advice and support
5. Joint projects
6. District integration workshop
7. Making requests
8. Others.....

Q2.8. To your knowledge, who are the district line offices accountable to?

1. District council
2. District BoG
3. Line departments/ministry
4. Commune council
5. Political party
6. Others.....

Q2.9: What is the main difficulty in interacting with the technical offices?

(Tick only the most correct one)

1. No joint interests
2. No formal influence/power
3. Not legally regulated
4. Technical offices are accountable vertically
5. Not enough technical capacity
6. Others.....

*Theme 3: District Line of Accountability*

Q2.10. Do you agree with the statement that the commune is subordinate to the district?

(Please explain)

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

If you answered 1 or 2, please explain: .....

.....

.....

Q2.11. To your knowledge, who does the district BoG regularly report to? (Please select the most correct answer(s))

1. Political party
2. General people
3. Provincial council
4. Provincial board of governors
5. District council
6. MoI/Phnom Penh
7. Commune council
8. Others.....

Q2.12. To your knowledge, who does the district council regularly report to? (Please select the most correct answer(s))

1. Political party
2. General people
3. Provincial council
4. Provincial board of governors
5. District BoG
6. MoI/Phnom Penh
7. Commune council
8. Others.....

Q2.13. Among matters listed below, on what matter did the district consult or invite you the most often?  
 (Please rank these issues from 1st rank=the most often to 6th =the least often)

- |   | Rank  |
|---|-------|
| 1. Political party issues                                 | _____ |
| 2. Annual planning and budgeting                          | _____ |
| 3. District/provincial council monthly meeting            | _____ |
| 4. Information sharing such as report from national level | _____ |
| 5. Security issues  | _____ |
| 6. Discussion on women's and children's issues            | _____ |

Q2.14. In your understanding, who is the district council accountable to? (Please select three answers from the list below putting the primary one first, followed by the 2nd and 3rd)

- |                                  | Rank  |
|----------------------------------|-------|
| 1. Political party               | _____ |
| 2. People                        | _____ |
| 3. Provincial council            | _____ |
| 4. Provincial board of governors | _____ |
| 5. Commune council               | _____ |
| 6. District board of governors   | _____ |
| 7. MoI/Phnom Penh                | _____ |
| 8. Others, please specify        | _____ |

Q2.15. Does the district council regularly inform the commune council about district council meetings or consultation meetings?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

Q2.16. How do you think the commune council can influence district decisions? (Please choose the correct answer(s) from the list below)

1. Participating in joint meetings
2. Informal discussion with district authority
3. Through party office
4. Provincial authorities
5. MoI/Phnom Penh
6. District unified unit meeting
7. Others, please specify.....

*Theme 4: Fiscal Assignments*

Q2.17. Do you think the district authority should have a role in tax collection?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

Q2.18. Has the district authority been helpful with financial issues of the commune?

(If no, jump to Q2.20)

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

Q2.19. With regard to financial issues, what kind of support has the district authority provided to the commune council? (Please choose the correct answer(s))

1. Preparation of annual budget
2. Accounting
3. Resource mobilisation facilitation
4. Inter-commune development projects
5. Local contributions
6. Advice and comments
7. Others, please specify.....

Q2.20. Do you have financial power as stipulated in the law?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

*Theme 5: Service Delivery and Division of Labour*

Q2.21. Is the division of roles in service delivery between commune and district clear?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

If you answered 1 or 2, please explain: .....

.....

.....

Q2.22. What kind of support has the district provided to the commune with regard to service delivery? (Please choose the correct answer(s) from the list below)

1. Technical staff
2. Financial support
3. Resource mobilisation/facilitation with stakeholders
4. Advice and guidance
5. Others, please specify.....

Q2.23. How would you rate capacity building for the commune since the district council election in May 2009?

1. Much better
2. Better
3. The same
4. Worse
5. Even worse

*Theme 6: Gender Issues*

Q2.24. How do you rate female councillors' influence in commune decision making?

1. Strongly influential
2. Somewhat influential
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat powerless
5. Almost powerless

Q2.25. How would you rate your relations with commune female councillors compared with commune male councillors?

1. Much better
2. Better
3. The same
4. Worse
5. Much worse

Q2.26. In your opinion, are district female councillors able to articulate their roles and responsibilities?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Do not know

*Theme 7: Strategic Learning and Vision*

Q2.27. Please choose the correct number to show your level of agreement or disagreement with the statements in the list below and put the number on the right side of each statement.

**(1. Strongly agree, 2. Somewhat agree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Somewhat disagree and 5. Strongly disagree)**

- |  |       |
|--|-------|
| 2.27.1. D&D has empowered local citizens   | _____ |
| 2.27.2. D&D has enhanced local democracy   | _____ |
| 2.27.3. D&D has not changed the authority of board of governors                                    | _____ |
| 2.27.4. D&D requires the district council to be accountable<br>to the commune council              | _____ |
| 2.27.5. D&D has strengthened capacity of sub-national male officials<br>more than female officials | _____ |
| 2.27.6. D&D has improved the livelihoods of local people   | _____ |
| 2.27.7. D&D has not empowered local female leadership  | _____ |

Q2.28. Below are challenges in the relations between the commune and the district authority. Please rank them from 1st=the most challenging to 6th=the least challenging.

- |   | Rank  |
|---|-------|
| 1. Lack of information flow                       | _____ |
| 2. Different political party                      | _____ |
| 3. Lack of training support and technical support | _____ |
| 4. Lack of support for travel                     | _____ |
| 5. Unclear role and responsibilities              | _____ |
| 6. Old working attitudes                          | _____ |



Q2.29. Below are some approaches to strengthen the relations between the commune council and district authority. Please rank them in order of importance, from 1st= the most effective to 6th=the least effective)

- |  | Rank  |
|--|-------|
| 1. Through facilitation of the province          | _____ |
| 2. Through party office                          | _____ |
| 3. Through changing current legal framework      | _____ |
| 4. Through clarifying roles and responsibilities | _____ |
| 5. Through changing working attitude             | _____ |
| 6. Through more capacity building                | _____ |

Q2.30. What would happen to the district/provincial councils in the next election if they are not performing well?

1. Will be voted out of position
2. Will be re-elected anyway
3. Do not know
4. Others.....

If you answered 1, 2 or 3, please explain: .....

.....

.....

Q2.31. What are your final comments about D&D reform in Cambodia?

.....

.....

.....

Thank you very much for your time and information

**3. Questions for Interviewer (to be completed after the interview)**

Q3.1. Were any other people who might have been listening present during the interview?

1. No one
2. Spouse of respondent only
3. Children only
4. A few others
5. A small crowd
6. An official
7. Others, please specify.....

Q3.2. Did the respondent check with others for information to answer any question?

Statement	1=yes, 2=no, 3=do not know
3.2.1. Do you think anyone influenced the respondent's answers during the interview?	
3.2.2. Were you approached by any community or political party representatives?	
3.2.3. Did you feel threatened during or after the interview?	
3.2.4. Other problems encountered (please list them)	

Q3.3. Housing type (if relevant)

Statement	1=yes, 2=no, 3=do not know
3.3.1. Thatched	
3.3.2. Tiled	
3.3.3. Concrete	
3.3.4. Fibrocement/galvanised iron/aluminium	
3.3.5. Wooden	
3.3.6. Salvaged materials	
3.3.7. Tent	
3.3.8. Others	

Q3.4. Office type (if relevant)

	1=yes, 2=no, 3=do not know
3.4.1. Standard building (for commune)	
3.4.2. Old building	
3.4.3. New building for district	
3.4.4. Others, please record .....	
.....	

END

#### Annex 4: List of Survey Target Provinces, Districts and Communes

ProvGIS	Province	DistGIS	District	CommGIS	Commune
3	Kompong Cham	301	Batheay	30101	Batheay
3	Kompong Cham	301	Batheay	30102	Chbar Ampov
3	Kompong Cham	301	Batheay	30104	Cheung Prey
3	Kompong Cham	301	Batheay	30105	Me Pring
3	Kompong Cham	301	Batheay	30106	Ph'av
3	Kompong Cham	301	Cheung Prey	30301	Khnor Dambang
3	Kompong Cham	301	Cheung Prey	30302	Kouk Rovieng
3	Kompong Cham	301	Cheung Prey	30303	Phdau Chum
3	Kompong Cham	301	Cheung Prey	30307	Sdaeung Chey
3	Kompong Cham	301	Cheung Prey	30308	Soutip
3	Kompong Cham	301	Cheung Prey	30309	Srama
3	Kompong Cham	301	Dambae	30401	Chong Cheach
3	Kompong Cham	301	Dambae	30402	Dambae
3	Kompong Cham	301	Dambae	30403	Kork Srok
3	Kompong Cham	301	Dambae	30404	Neang Teut
3	Kompong Cham	305	Krong Kompong Cham	30502	Kompong Cham
3	Kompong Cham	305	Krong Kompong Cham	30503	Sambuor Meas
3	Kompong Cham	305	Krong Kompong Cham	30504	Veal Vong
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30601	Ampil
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30602	Han Cheay
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30603	Kien Chrey
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30605	Koh Mitt
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30606	Koh Roka
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30608	Koh Tontuem
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30609	Krala
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30610	Ou Svay
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30611	Ro'ang
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30612	Rumchek
3	Kompong Cham	306	Kompong Siem	30615	Vihear Thom
3	Kompong Cham	307	Kang Meas	30701	Angkor Ban
3	Kompong Cham	307	Kang Meas	30703	Khchau
3	Kompong Cham	307	Kang Meas	30704	Peam Chi Kang
3	Kompong Cham	307	Kang Meas	30706	Prek Krabau
3	Kompong Cham	307	Kang Meas	30708	Roka Ar
3	Kompong Cham	307	Kang Meas	30709	Roka Koy
3	Kompong Cham	307	Kang Meas	30710	Sdau
3	Kompong Cham	307	Kang Meas	30711	Sour Kong
3	Kompong Cham	308	Koh Soutin	30801	Kompong Reab
3	Kompong Cham	308	Koh Soutin	30802	Koh Sotin
3	Kompong Cham	308	Koh Soutin	30804	Moha Leaph
3	Kompong Cham	308	Koh Soutin	30806	Peam Prathnuoh
3	Kompong Cham	308	Koh Soutin	30807	Pongro
3	Kompong Cham	309	Krouch Chhmar	30902	Chumnik
3	Kompong Cham	309	Krouch Chhmar	30903	Kompong Treas
3	Kompong Cham	309	Krouch Chhmar	30905	Krouch Chhmar
3	Kompong Cham	309	Krouch Chhmar	30906	Peus Muoy
3	Kompong Cham	309	Krouch Chhmar	30907	Peus Pir

<b>ProvGIS</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>DistGIS</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>CommGIS</b>	<b>Commune</b>
3	Kompong Cham	309	Krouch Chhmar	30908	Prek A Chi
3	Kompong Cham	309	Krouch Chhmar	30911	Trea
3	Kompong Cham	310	Memot	31007	Memong
3	Kompong Cham	310	Memot	31008	Memut
3	Kompong Cham	310	Memot	31010	Rung
3	Kompong Cham	310	Memot	31013	Tramung
3	Kompong Cham	310	Memot	31015	Treak
3	Kompong Cham	311	Ou Reang Ov	31101	Ampil Ta Pok
3	Kompong Cham	311	Ou Reang Ov	31103	Damril
3	Kompong Cham	311	Ou Reang Ov	31104	Kong Chey
3	Kompong Cham	311	Ou Reang Ov	31105	Mien
3	Kompong Cham	311	Ou Reang Ov	31107	Preah Theat
3	Kompong Cham	312	Ponhea Kraek	31204	Kandaol Chrum
3	Kompong Cham	312	Ponhea Kraek	31205	Kaong Kang
3	Kompong Cham	312	Ponhea Kraek	31208	Trapeang Phlong
3	Kompong Cham	312	Ponhea Kraek	31209	Veal Mlu
3	Kompong Cham	313	Prey Chhor	31301	Baray
3	Kompong Cham	313	Prey Chhor	31303	Chrey Vien
3	Kompong Cham	313	Prey Chhor	31304	Khvet Thom
3	Kompong Cham	313	Prey Chhor	31308	Mien
3	Kompong Cham	313	Prey Chhor	31309	Prey Chhor
3	Kompong Cham	313	Prey Chhor	31310	Sour Saen
3	Kompong Cham	313	Prey Chhor	31312	Srangae
3	Kompong Cham	313	Prey Chhor	31314	Tong Rong
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31401	Baray
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31404	Koh Andaet
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31405	Meanchey
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31406	Phteah Kandal
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31408	Prek Dambouk
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31409	Prek Pou
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31410	Prek Rumdeng
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31411	Russey Srok
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31413	Svay Sach Phnom
3	Kompong Cham	314	Srei Santhor	31414	Tong Tralach
3	Kompong Cham	315	Stueng Trang	31505	Me Sar Chrey
3	Kompong Cham	315	Stueng Trang	31510	Preak Kak
3	Kompong Cham	315	Stueng Trang	31512	Soupeas
3	Kompong Cham	315	Stueng Trang	31513	Tuol Preah Khleang
3	Kompong Cham	316	Tboung Khmum	31601	Anhchaeum
3	Kompong Cham	316	Tboung Khmum	31602	Boeng Pruol
3	Kompong Cham	316	Tboung Khmum	31604	Chikor
3	Kompong Cham	316	Tboung Khmum	31605	Chirou Ti Muoy
3	Kompong Cham	316	Tboung Khmum	31606	Chirou Ti Pir
3	Kompong Cham	316	Tboung Khmum	31608	Chob
3	Kompong Cham	316	Tboung Khmum	31613	Lngieng
3	Kompong Cham	316	Tboung Khmum	31614	Mong Riev
3	Kompong Cham	316	Tboung Khmum	31622	Tonle Bet
3	Kompong Cham	317	Krong Suong	31701	Suong

<b>ProvGIS</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>DistGIS</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>CommGIS</b>	<b>Commune</b>
3	Kompong Cham	317	Krong Suong	31702	Vihear Luong
6	Kompong Thom	601	Baray	60102	Ballangk
6	Kompong Thom	601	Baray	60103	Baray
6	Kompong Thom	601	Baray	60105	Chaeung Daeung
6	Kompong Thom	601	Baray	60108	Chong Doung
6	Kompong Thom	601	Baray	60109	Chrolong
6	Kompong Thom	601	Baray	60113	Pongro
6	Kompong Thom	601	Baray	60115	Sralau
6	Kompong Thom	601	Baray	60117	Tnaot Chum
6	Kompong Thom	601	Baray	60118	Tiel
6	Kompong Thom	602	Kompong Svay	60201	Chey
6	Kompong Thom	602	Kompong Svay	60202	Damrei Slab
6	Kompong Thom	602	Kompong Svay	60204	Kompong Svay
6	Kompong Thom	602	Kompong Svay	60208	Tbaeng
6	Kompong Thom	602	Kompong Svay	60209	Trapeang Ruessei
6	Kompong Thom	603	Krong Stueng Saen	60301	Damrei Choan Khla
6	Kompong Thom	603	Krong Stueng Saen	60302	Kompong Thom
6	Kompong Thom	603	Krong Stueng Saen	60303	Kompong Roteh
6	Kompong Thom	603	Krong Stueng Saen	60304	Ou Kanthor
6	Kompong Thom	603	Krong Stueng Saen	60308	Prey Ta Hu
6	Kompong Thom	603	Krong Stueng Saen	60309	Achar Leak
6	Kompong Thom	603	Krong Stueng Saen	60310	Srayov
6	Kompong Thom	604	Prasat Ballangk	60403	Phan Nheum
6	Kompong Thom	604	Prasat Ballangk	60405	Sala Visai
6	Kompong Thom	604	Prasat Ballangk	60406	Sameakki
6	Kompong Thom	606	Sandan	60603	Klaeng
6	Kompong Thom	606	Sandan	60605	Meanchey
6	Kompong Thom	606	Sandan	60606	Ngan
6	Kompong Thom	606	Sandan	60607	Sandan
6	Kompong Thom	606	Sandan	60608	Sochet
6	Kompong Thom	607	Santuk	60701	Boeng Lvea
6	Kompong Thom	607	Santuk	60702	Chroab
6	Kompong Thom	607	Santuk	60704	Kakaoh
6	Kompong Thom	607	Santuk	60705	Kraya
6	Kompong Thom	607	Santuk	60706	Pnov
6	Kompong Thom	607	Santuk	60707	Prasat
6	Kompong Thom	607	Santuk	60708	Tang Krasang
6	Kompong Thom	608	Stoung	60802	Chamnar Kraom
6	Kompong Thom	608	Stoung	60803	Chamnar Leu
6	Kompong Thom	608	Stoung	60805	Kompong Chen Tboundg
6	Kompong Thom	608	Stoung	60810	Preah Damrei
6	Kompong Thom	608	Stoung	60811	Rung Roeang
6	Kompong Thom	608	Stoung	60812	Samprouch
6	Kompong Thom	608	Stoung	60813	Trea
7	Kampot	701	Angkor Chey	70101	Angk Phnom Touch
7	Kampot	701	Angkor Chey	70102	Angkor Chey

<b>ProvGIS</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>DistGIS</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>CommGIS</b>	<b>Commune</b>
7	Kampot	701	Angkor Chey	70103	Champeï
7	Kampot	701	Angkor Chey	70106	Dacum Doung
7	Kampot	701	Angkor Chey	70108	Phnom Kong
7	Kampot	701	Angkor Chey	70110	Samlanh
7	Kampot	701	Angkor Chey	70111	Tani
7	Kampot	702	Banteay Meas	70202	Banteay Meas Khang Lech
7	Kampot	702	Banteay Meas	70204	Samraong Kraom
7	Kampot	702	Banteay Meas	70205	Samraong Leu
7	Kampot	702	Banteay Meas	70207	Sdach Kong Khang Lech
7	Kampot	702	Banteay Meas	70210	Trapeang Sala Khang Kaeut
7	Kampot	702	Banteay Meas	70212	Tuk Meas Khang Kaeut
7	Kampot	702	Banteay Meas	70213	Tuk Meas Khang Lech
7	Kampot	702	Banteay Meas	70215	Wat Angk Khang Tboung
7	Kampot	703	Chhuk	70301	Baniev
7	Kampot	703	Chhuk	70303	Boeng Nimol
7	Kampot	703	Chhuk	70304	Chhuk
7	Kampot	703	Chhuk	70306	Krang Sbov
7	Kampot	703	Chhuk	70310	Meanchey
7	Kampot	703	Chhuk	70314	Tramaeng
7	Kampot	704	Chum Kiri	70402	Chumpu Voan
7	Kampot	704	Chum Kiri	70406	Srae Samraong
7	Kampot	704	Chum Kiri	70407	Trapeang Reang
7	Kampot	705	Dang Tong	70502	Dang Tong
7	Kampot	705	Dang Tong	70505	Mean Ritth
7	Kampot	705	Dang Tong	70507	Srae Chea Khang Tboung
7	Kampot	707	Tuek Chhou	70702	Chum Kriel
7	Kampot	707	Tuek Chhou	70703	Kompong Kraeng
7	Kampot	707	Tuek Chhou	70708	Koun Satv
7	Kampot	707	Tuek Chhou	70712	Prey Khmum
7	Kampot	707	Tuek Chhou	70713	Prey Thnang
7	Kampot	707	Tuek Chhou	70716	Thmei
7	Kampot	707	Tuek Chhou	70718	Trapeang Sangkae
7	Kampot	707	Tuek Chhou	70719	Trapeang Thum
7	Kampot	708	Krong Kampot	70801	Kompong Kandal
7	Kampot	708	Krong Kampot	70802	Krang Ampil
7	Kampot	708	Krong Kampot	70803	Kompong Bay
7	Kampot	708	Krong Kampot	70805	Traey Koh
12	Phnom Penh	1201	Chamkar Mon	120101	Tonle Basak

<b>ProvGIS</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>DistGIS</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>CommGIS</b>	<b>Commune</b>
12	Phnom Penh	1201	Chamkar Mon	120102	Boeng Keng Kang Muoy
12	Phnom Penh	1201	Chamkar Mon	120104	Beung Keng Kang Bei
12	Phnom Penh	1201	Chamkar Mon	120105	Oulampik
12	Phnom Penh	1201	Chamkar Mon	120106	Tuol Svay Prey Ti Muoy
12	Phnom Penh	1201	Chamkar Mon	120108	Tumnob Tuek
12	Phnom Penh	1201	Chamkar Mon	120110	Tuol Tumpung Muoy
12	Phnom Penh	1202	Doun Penh	120206	Phsar Kandal Ti Pir
12	Phnom Penh	1202	Doun Penh	120207	Chakto Mukh
12	Phnom Penh	1202	Doun Penh	120208	Chey Chumneah
12	Phnom Penh	1202	Doun Penh	120209	Phsar Chas
12	Phnom Penh	1202	Doun Penh	120211	Voat Phnom
12	Phnom Penh	1203	Prampir Meakkakra	120301	Ou Russey Muoy
12	Phnom Penh	1203	Prampir Meakkakra	120305	Monourom
12	Phnom Penh	1203	Prampir Meakkakra	120306	Mittakpheap
12	Phnom Penh	1203	Prampir Meakkakra	120307	Veal Vong
12	Phnom Penh	1203	Prampir Meakkakra	120308	Boeng Prohit
12	Phnom Penh	1204	Tuol Kork	120401	Phsar Depou Ti Muoy
12	Phnom Penh	1204	Tuol Kork	120403	Phsar Depou Ti Bei
12	Phnom Penh	1204	Tuol Kork	120406	Tuek L'ak Ti Bei
12	Phnom Penh	1204	Tuol Kork	120408	Boeng Kak Ti Pir
12	Phnom Penh	1204	Tuol Kork	120409	Phsar Daeum Kor
12	Phnom Penh	1204	Tuol Kork	120410	Boeng Salang
12	Phnom Penh	1205	Dangkao	120501	Dangkao
12	Phnom Penh	1205	Dangkao	120503	Kork Roka
12	Phnom Penh	1205	Dangkao	120504	Phleung Chheh Roteh
12	Phnom Penh	1205	Dangkao	120505	Chaom Chau
12	Phnom Penh	1205	Dangkao	120506	Kakab
12	Phnom Penh	1205	Dangkao	120507	Pong Tuek
12	Phnom Penh	1205	Dangkao	120508	Prey Veang
12	Phnom Penh	1205	Dangkao	120510	Prey Sa
12	Phnom Penh	1206	Meanchey	120601	Stung Meanchey
12	Phnom Penh	1206	Meanchey	120602	Boeng Tumpun
12	Phnom Penh	1206	Meanchey	120603	Preaek Pra
12	Phnom Penh	1206	Meanchey	120605	Chhbar Ampov Ti Pir
12	Phnom Penh	1206	Meanchey	120606	Chak Angrae Leu
12	Phnom Penh	1207	Ruessei Kaev	120702	Toul Sangkae
12	Phnom Penh	1207	Ruessei Kaev	120703	Svay Pak

<b>ProvGIS</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>DistGIS</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>CommGIS</b>	<b>Commune</b>
12	Phnom Penh	1207	Ruessei Kaev	120704	Kilomaetr Lekh Prammuoy
12	Phnom Penh	1207	Ruessei Kaev	120706	Ruessei Kaev
12	Phnom Penh	1207	Ruessei Kaev	120708	Prek Lieb
12	Phnom Penh	1207	Ruessei Kaev	120709	Prek Ta Sek
12	Phnom Penh	1207	Ruessei Kaev	120710	Chroy Chongva
12	Phnom Penh	1207	Ruessei Kaev	120712	Chrang Chamreh Pir
12	Phnom Penh	1208	Sen Sok	120801	Phnom Penh Thmei
12	Phnom Penh	1208	Sen Sok	120802	Tuek Thla
12	Phnom Penh	1208	Sen Sok	120803	Khmuonh
16	Ratanakkiri	1602	Krong Ban Lung	160201	Kachanh
16	Ratanakkiri	1602	Krong Ban Lung	160202	Labansiek
16	Ratanakkiri	1603	Bar Kaev	160301	Kak
16	Ratanakkiri	1603	Bar Kaev	160303	Laminh
16	Ratanakkiri	1603	Bar Kaev	160306	Ting Chak
16	Ratanakkiri	1604	Koun Mom	160403	Ta Ang
16	Ratanakkiri	1604	Koun Mom	160406	Trapeang Kraham
16	Ratanakkiri	1605	Lumphat	160501	Chey Otdam
16	Ratanakkiri	1605	Lumphat	160505	Ba Tang
16	Ratanakkiri	1606	Ou Chum	160601	Cha Ung
16	Ratanakkiri	1606	Ou Chum	160603	Aekakpheap
16	Ratanakkiri	1606	Ou Chum	160604	Kalai
16	Ratanakkiri	1606	Ou Chum	160605	Ou Chum
16	Ratanakkiri	1607	Ou Ya Dav	160701	Bar Kham
16	Ratanakkiri	1607	Ou Ya Dav	160702	Lum Choar
16	Ratanakkiri	1607	Ou Ya Dav	160703	Pak Nhai
16	Ratanakkiri	1607	Ou Ya Dav	160704	Pate
16	Ratanakkiri	1607	Ou Ya Dav	160707	Ya Tung
16	Ratanakkiri	1609	Veun Sai	160901	Pong
16	Ratanakkiri	1609	Veun Sai	160904	Ka Choun
16	Ratanakkiri	1609	Veun Sai	160907	Kok Lak
16	Ratanakkiri	1609	Veun Sai	160910	Veun Sai
17	Siem Reap	1701	Angkor Chum	170101	Char Chhuk
17	Siem Reap	1701	Angkor Chum	170102	Daun Peng
17	Siem Reap	1701	Angkor Chum	170103	Kouk Doung
17	Siem Reap	1701	Angkor Chum	170105	Norkor Pheas
17	Siem Reap	1701	Angkor Chum	170107	Ta Saom
17	Siem Reap	1702	Angkor Thom	170202	Leang Dai
17	Siem Reap	1702	Angkor Thom	170204	Svay Chek
17	Siem Reap	1703	Banteay Srei	170301	Khmar Sanday
17	Siem Reap	1703	Banteay Srei	170303	Preah Dak
17	Siem Reap	1703	Banteay Srei	170304	Rumchek
17	Siem Reap	1703	Banteay Srei	170306	Tbaeng
17	Siem Reap	1704	Chi Kraeng	170401	Anlong Samnar
17	Siem Reap	1704	Chi Kraeng	170402	Chi Kraeng
17	Siem Reap	1704	Chi Kraeng	170403	Kompong Kdei



<b>ProvGIS</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>DistGIS</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>CommGIS</b>	<b>Commune</b>
17	Siem Reap	1704	Chi Kraeng	170405	Kouk Thlok Kraom
17	Siem Reap	1704	Chi Kraeng	170407	Lveaeng Ruessei
17	Siem Reap	1704	Chi Kraeng	170408	Pongro Kraom
17	Siem Reap	1704	Chi Kraeng	170410	Ruessei Lok
17	Siem Reap	1704	Chi Kraeng	170411	Sangvaeuy
17	Siem Reap	1704	Chi Kraeng	170412	Spean Tnaot
17	Siem Reap	1706	Kralanh	170601	Chanleas Dai
17	Siem Reap	1706	Kralanh	170602	Kompong Thkov
17	Siem Reap	1706	Kralanh	170603	Kralanh
17	Siem Reap	1706	Kralanh	170607	Saen Sokh
17	Siem Reap	1706	Kralanh	170608	Snuol
17	Siem Reap	1706	Kralanh	170609	Sranal
17	Siem Reap	1707	Puok	170704	Kaev Poar
17	Siem Reap	1707	Puok	170705	Khnat
17	Siem Reap	1707	Puok	170708	Mukh Paen
17	Siem Reap	1707	Puok	170710	Puok
17	Siem Reap	1707	Puok	170711	Prey Chruk
17	Siem Reap	1709	Prasat Bakong	170902	Bakong
17	Siem Reap	1709	Prasat Bakong	170907	Meanchey
17	Siem Reap	1709	Prasat Bakong	170908	Roluos
17	Siem Reap	1709	Prasat Bakong	170909	Trapeang Thom
17	Siem Reap	1710	Krong Siem Reap	171001	Sla Kram
17	Siem Reap	1710	Krong Siem Reap	171002	Svay Dangkum
17	Siem Reap	1710	Krong Siem Reap	171003	Kouk Chak
17	Siem Reap	1710	Krong Siem Reap	171004	Sala Kamraeuk
17	Siem Reap	1710	Krong Siem Reap	171009	Siem Reap
17	Siem Reap	1710	Krong Siem Reap	171010	Srangae
17	Siem Reap	1710	Krong Siem Reap	171011	Sangkat Ampil
17	Siem Reap	1710	Krong Siem Reap	171012	Sangkat Krabei Riel
17	Siem Reap	1711	Soutr Nikom	171102	Dam Daek
17	Siem Reap	1711	Soutr Nikom	171103	Dan Run
17	Siem Reap	1711	Soutr Nikom	171107	Khnar Pou
17	Siem Reap	1711	Soutr Nikom	171108	Popel
17	Siem Reap	1711	Soutr Nikom	171109	Samraong
20	Svay Rieng	2001	Chantrea	200104	Chres
20	Svay Rieng	2001	Chantrea	200108	Prey Kokir
20	Svay Rieng	2001	Chantrea	200109	Samraong
20	Svay Rieng	2001	Chantrea	200110	Tuol Sdei
20	Svay Rieng	2002	Kompong Rou	200201	Banteay Krang
20	Svay Rieng	2002	Kompong Rou	200202	Nhor
20	Svay Rieng	2002	Kompong Rou	200203	Ksetr
20	Svay Rieng	2002	Kompong Rou	200204	Preah Ponlea
20	Svay Rieng	2002	Kompong Rou	200205	Prey Thom
20	Svay Rieng	2002	Kompong Rou	200208	Samyaong
20	Svay Rieng	2002	Kompong Rou	200209	Svay Ta Yean
20	Svay Rieng	2002	Kompong Rou	200211	Thmei
20	Svay Rieng	2003	Rumduol	200302	Thmea
20	Svay Rieng	2003	Rumduol	200303	Kompong Chak

<b>ProvGIS</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>DistGIS</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>CommGIS</b>	<b>Commune</b>
20	Svay Rieng	2003	Rumduol	200307	Pong Tuek
20	Svay Rieng	2003	Rumduol	200308	Sangkae
20	Svay Rieng	2003	Rumduol	200309	Svay Chek
20	Svay Rieng	2003	Rumduol	200310	Thna Thnong
20	Svay Rieng	2005	Svay Chrum	200503	Chambak
20	Svay Rieng	2005	Svay Chrum	200505	Ta Suos
20	Svay Rieng	2005	Svay Chrum	200508	Daun Sa
20	Svay Rieng	2005	Svay Chrum	200509	Kork Pring
20	Svay Rieng	2005	Svay Chrum	200510	Kraol Kou
20	Svay Rieng	2005	Svay Chrum	200512	Pouthi Reach
20	Svay Rieng	2005	Svay Chrum	200514	Svay Chhrum
20	Svay Rieng	2005	Svay Chrum	200515	Svay Thom
20	Svay Rieng	2005	Svay Chrum	200516	Svay Yea
20	Svay Rieng	2006	Krong Svay Rieng	200601	Svay Rieng
20	Svay Rieng	2006	Krong Svay Rieng	200603	Koy Trabaek
20	Svay Rieng	2006	Krong Svay Rieng	200604	Pou Ta Hao
20	Svay Rieng	2006	Krong Svay Rieng	200607	Sangkat Sangkhoar
20	Svay Rieng	2007	Svay Teab	200702	Kokir Saom
20	Svay Rieng	2007	Svay Teab	200703	Kandieng Reay
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20	Svay Rieng	2007	Svay Teab	200708	Romeang Thkaol
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20	Svay Rieng	2008	Krong Bavet	200802	Sangkat Bavet
24	Pailin	2401	Krong Pailin	240102	Ou Ta Vau
24	Pailin	2401	Krong Pailin	240104	Bar Yakha
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
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