

Eliminating Exploitative Child Labour through Education and Livelihoods

Child Domestic Labour



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Acronyms & Abbreviations

CCWC	Commune Council for Women and Children
CDW	Child Domestic Work
CL	Child Labour
CCWC	Commune Council for Women and Children
EXCEL	Eliminating Exploitative Child Labour through Education and Livelihoods
FGD	Focus group discussion
KII	Key informant interview
IDEA	Independent Democracy of Informal Economy Association
ILO	International Labour Organization
NGO	Non Government Organization
NIS	National Institute of Statistics

Executive Summary

Child domestic work (CDW) is one four projects of Child Labour Research. The research is part of the Eliminating eXploitative Child Labour through Education and Livelihoods (EXCEL) project led by World Vision and funded by the US Department of Labor. “Child domestic work” is a general reference to children’s domestic work in the home of a third party or employer. This general concept encompasses both permissible and non-permissible situations. “Employer,” in ILO (2011a) Domestic Worker Convention No. 189, is defined as “a member of the household d, for which the work is performed, or an agency or enterprise that employs domestic workers and makes them available to households”.

Child domestic work is one of the most widespread, exploitative forms and is difficult to tackle (2004). In the world there are about 15.5 million child domestic workers: 60 percent in Asia and 90 percent girls (HRW 2013). In Cambodia there are about 28,000 domestic workers aged 7 to 17; about 10 percent are in Phnom Penh (NIS 2003). The Cambodian MDGs and National Plan of Action on Worst Forms of Child Labour 2008-2012 (Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training 2008) aim to reduce the percentage of children who work aged 5 to 17 from 13 percent in 2005 to 8 percent by 2015. Cambodia also aims to eradicate the worst forms of child labour (hazardous child labour) by 2016.

The study analyses the risks and benefits experienced by child domestic workers; parents and employers to understand the recruiting of CDW in order to assist policy makers and relevant stakeholders to improve the working condition of CDW. The specific objectives of the study are: to analyse the risks experienced by CDW; to analyse the benefits of CDW for parents and employers; to explore challenges associated with CDW recruitment; and to develop evidence-based policy.

The study applied both quantitative and qualitative methods to a wide range of respondents. The data collection used household surveys, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and observation. The study also used literature and document reviews to develop tools and for discussion of the data.

The key findings are:

- About 10 per cent of studied households have family members working as CDWs and about 22 per cent would be willing to hire CDWs.
- Community and media have been effective in raising awareness of CDW issues among the public.
- Almost 80 per cent of interviewees believe that there are some benefits to CDW, mainly preparing CDWs to become housewives, better housing and the opportunity to go to school.
- CDWs receive monthly salaries of USD25-60, which goes to their parents to support their families. Employers also benefit from CDW as it is a cheap and simple way to find workers.

- CDWs are recruited through hidden private networks involving various stakeholders, ranging from their own family members and friends to people they don't know.
- Brokers have many roles in the recruitment process. With and without fees involved, brokers can be negotiators, guarantors, transporters and facilitators.
- There is no written contract for this type of employment, which puts CDWs at greater risk of physical and sexual abuse, lower pay and poor working conditions.
- Poverty and its related consequences, lack of knowledge and understanding of CDW, and cultural beliefs lead to more CDW. Though some respondents agreed that cultural beliefs play a role, they believe that poverty is the main driver for parents to send their children to work.
- There are insufficient inspectors to support and monitor CDW and the risks associated with it.
- There is a lack of resources and an inadequate legal framework to deal with CDW. Inspections take place only in formal employment.

Policy implications from this study are:

- **Awareness:** There is a need to promote awareness and educate households about the risks associated with CDW. Local media and awareness campaigns were found to be effective ways to raise awareness.
- **CDW statistics:** There is a need for reliable CDW statistics that are updated every six months. The number of child labour inspectors should be increased and they should be provided with adequate resources to ensure regular enforcement.
- **Specific regulations on CDW:** The regulations should institute a compulsory education age and provide adequate legal protections for CDWs, including in recruitment.
- **CDW response programme:** There is a need for a wide programme to respond effectively to CDWs' complaints. There should be an interactive hotline created especially for CDWs and widely publicised.

1. Introduction

Background and Rationale for the Study

Eliminating eXploitative Child Labour through Education and Livelihoods (EXCEL) is a four-year partnership between CDRI, World Vision, Wathnakpheap, Farmer Livelihood Development and Vulnerable Children Assistance Organisation led by World Vision. The project is funded by the US Department of Labor. CDRI is responsible for conducting child labour research that consists of four projects, including one on child domestic work.

Domestic work is one of the most widespread, exploitative forms of child work and one of the most difficult to tackle because “it happens behind closed doors of a private home and no one can really know what is happening” (ILO 2004, 2), and because society often sees CDW as normal. There are at least 15.5 million child domestic workers worldwide (ILO 2013a), and 90 per cent of them are girls (Human Rights Watch 2013). Of the 15.5 million, 60 per cent are in Asia (Anti-Slavery International, 2013a), of whom 1 million are in the Philippines and 688,000 in Indonesia (ILO 2006). In Cambodia, the National Institute of Statistic (NIS) conducted a quantitative study on working conditions of CDWs in seven districts of Phnom Penh in 2003. It found that about 28,000 children between the ages of 7 and 17 years were engaged in domestic labour, representing almost 10 per cent of all children.

Contemporary studies of CDW provide evidence on physical, psychological, and sexual abuses that can impact children’s overall development. Literature consulted revealed that employers, parents and children themselves refer to child domestic labour with terms such as “live with”, “stand by”, or “stay with”, which suggest the invisibility of these children’s vulnerability and reveal something about the way employers view their child workers. A more recent study (Brown 2007) on child domestic workers and patterns of trafficking in Cambodia offers useful information on how CDWs’ lives often link to trafficking patterns, but it lacked mention of the process by which those children become CDWs. ILO (2013b) suggested research to build on the existing knowledge on CDW and highlighted the need to focus on the trends in working and living conditions of CDWs. Anti-Slavery International (2013a) argues that while the abuse and maltreatment of CDWs is believed to be ongoing, more information on CDW is needed in order to advocate for improvement of CDWs’ working conditions and to ensure that they are able fully to understand and realise their rights.

The National Institute of Statistics (2003) offers extensive useful information on the lives of CDWs and the nature of the work they perform. ILO (2013b) showed child domestic work is associated with the cultural and social myths of a country. CDW may be viewed negatively in some countries but positively in others. It is viewed especially positively for girls in many places, as it is seen to help prepare them for adulthood and marriage (ILO 2014). These positive views contribute to the continued recruiting of children as domestic workers. However, there is no specific study to capture the flow and process of CDW, especially the recruiting of CDWs and whether there is any institutional monitoring of CDW.

Child domestic labour may be considered one of the worst forms of child labour due to its exploitation and different forms of abuse. As reported by ILO (2004), the precise situation of child domestic workers remains unclear because of the isolated nature of their employment. Child domestic workers may not have a contract of employment and are very often forced to work long hours and exposed to hazardous cleaning chemicals or are at risk of sexual harassment and abuse. Additionally, due to the Cambodian cultural view of children as inferior to adults, CDWs may have very little voice to negotiate terms, insist on medical insurance or assistance or set the conditions under which they work. These child workers miss out on a range of regular childhood opportunities, such as schooling and the chance to prepare for a future that is safe, healthy and in which they will be able to find a decent job, earn money and choose the life they want. CDWs often do not have a chance to grow as healthy young people, which prevents them from contributing to society. NIS (2003) argues that CDWs are often prevented from learning crucial life skills and thus later have produced low productivity, representing a long-term loss to the economy.

Cambodia does not yet have a specific policy on CDW; however, the government of approved a National Plan of Action on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 2008-2012. This listed domestic work and 15 other areas of hazardous child labour for immediate elimination. Further, it aims to reduce the proportion of children aged 5 to 17 who are working from 13 percent in 2005 to 8 percent by 2015 and to eradicate the worst forms of child labour by 2016. The Cambodia Millennium Development Goals also adopt the objective of decreasing the share of children working to 8 percent by 2015.

1.2. Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of the study is to analyse the risks and benefits experienced by child domestic workers, parents and employers in three selected provinces and to understand the process of recruiting CDWs in order to generate evidence that will assist policy makers and relevant stakeholders to improve the working condition of child domestic workers.

The specific objectives are to: (1) analyse the risks experienced by CDWs in Phnom Penh and selected provinces; (2) analyse the perceived benefits of CDW for parents and employers, (3) explore challenges associated with CDW recruitment and (4) provide specific recommendations for changes in legal and regulatory frameworks associated with CDW.

1.3 Definition of ‘Domestic Work’ and ‘Child Domestic Workers’ (CDW)

According to the ILO (2011b) Domestic Workers Convention 189, “domestic work” means work performed in or for a household or households, and “domestic worker” means any person engaged in domestic work within an employment relationship.

“Domestic work” covers a wide range of tasks and services that vary from country to country and that can differ depending on the age, gender, ethnic background and migration status of the workers concerned, as well as the cultural and economic context in which they work.

“Child domestic work” refers to children’s work in the sector in the home of a third party or employer. This general concept encompasses both permissible and non-permissible situations.

“Employer” in Convention 189 is defined as “a member of the household, for which the work is performed, or an agency or enterprise that employs domestic workers and makes them available to households”.

1.4. Report Structure

This report is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on CDW. Section 3 details the research methodology. Section 4 presents findings and discussion. Section 5 concludes and provides recommendations.

2. Literature Review

This section provides a review of documents and literature on child domestic labour, focusing on the disadvantages, benefit, factors affecting CDW and Cambodian government’s policies and institutional mechanisms on coordination and enforcement to combating child labour.

2.1. Hazards Linked to Child Domestic Work

The ILO (2013a) has identified hazards that domestic workers are often exposed to and which can cause serious harm to children. Some of the most common include: long and tiring working days; use of toxic chemicals; carrying heavy loads; handling dangerous items; inadequate food and accommodation; and humiliating or degrading treatment including physical and verbal violence and sexual abuse. A study by NIS (2003) on child domestic workers in Phnom Penh reported that injuries result from punishment by employers and from working conditions. It also revealed that about 30 per cent of cases studied involved wounds from sharp objects, while 18 per cent involved bruising caused by heavy objects. The study also found that CDWs were burned by hot irons and hot cooking oil, fell down stairs or slipped in the bathroom. The study also reported verbal abuse in the form of warnings, scolding and use of harsh and vulgar words.

Blagbrough (2008) argued that domestic work is comparable to “slave-like” conditions, including forced labour, servitude and trafficking. He explained that some CDWs are given away, forced, sold or trafficked into work without their consent, and their general well-being is not respected by their employers. He added that some children are totally dependent on their employers for their basic needs and deprived of parental monitoring

and visits. This leaves children with no right to ask questions or to request proper treatment.

Denial of CDWs' right to education is widely discussed in both local and international research. ILO (2004) found that 55 per cent of Cambodian child domestic workers interviewed still go to school while working. However, 40 percent were no longer in school and 5 percent had never been to school. Research in Cambodia by Brown (2007) found that only 18 percent of 123 CDWs studied had completed their sixth year of education, and 14 percent had no education at all. Te (2005) noted that out of 19 child domestic workers studied, none were attending school at the time of her survey, and only one among them had finished the seventh grade prior to employment.

Understanding Children's Work (2006) had contrary findings. It noted that most working children attend school. However, it emphasised that the huge amount of work, long hours, sleep deprivation and the constant demands of housework prevent them from fully participating in school activities, leading them to repeat grades and eventually to drop out (Blagbrough 2008; NIS 2003). A few studies explain why employers do not send their child domestic workers to school or vocational skills training. For instance, Jensen (2007) found some concern that child employees would become smarter and more rebellious, making it difficult to keep them under control. He also found that there are employers who try to send their child domestic workers to school, but who are deterred because school timetables are inflexible and clash with the times when children are required to perform household duties.

Sexual exploitation is another concern. In Fiji, UNICEF (1999) noted that eight out of 10 domestic workers were sexually abused by their employers, while in Peru, there was an assumption that sexual availability was an "unspoken part" of the job (UNICEF 1999: 8). According to Blagbrough (2008 186), child domestic workers in Haiti are sometimes labelled as "there for that", meaning they are expected to be sexually available if the men in the house wish them to be.

There is very little research available on sexual abuse of child domestic workers in Cambodia. NIS (2003) suggests that this is probably because CDWs consider sexual abuse a sensitive subject and thus feel great reluctance to tell researchers about it. NIS (2003) and Te (2005) also report that, in many cases, CDWs were interviewed while their employers sat nearby, so they were afraid to talk about any serious problems. However, Brown's (2007) research on Cambodian child domestic workers and the pattern of trafficking reveals that sexual abuse of child domestic workers does exist.

Many CDWs work long hours. NIS (2003) found that 70 percent of female CDWs worked seven days a week and 60 percent of them did not get even an hour of rest during the day. In Vietnam, some children had to get up at 4 or 5 am and did not go to sleep until 9 or 10 pm, with little time for rest (ILO 2004). CDWs also tend to be the first to get up in the morning and be the last to go to bed at night (Human Rights Watch 2007: 5). Blagbrough (2008) concluded that long hours of work and little time for rest affect children's physical, intellectual and social development.

2.2. Factors affecting CDW

There are both push and pull factors for child domestic work. Push factors include poverty and its feminisation, social exclusion, lack of education, gender and ethnic discrimination, violence suffered by children in their own homes, displacement, rural-urban migration and loss of parents due to conflict or disease. Much research cites poverty and a poor education system as dominant factors that push children into domestic work. Understanding Children's Work (2006) reported that "economic motives" or "family economic situation" is the primary cause of children's work. In many cases, according to ILO (2004), parents or guardians send their children to do domestic work due to the poverty they face at home. They believe that, staying with families that are better off, their children will be provided with sufficient food, a roof over their heads, clothes and appropriate wages. They also hope that their children will have the chance of a better education (ILO 2004). Poverty in rural areas and the chance of a better life, education and income in urban areas induce some parents to send their children to work in the city (NIS 2003).

The World Bank (2006) report emphasised a number of education-related factors that can prevent children from entering the labour market. The study revealed that early childhood education, the availability and quality of schooling and parents' education are factors that can reduce the number of children engaged in labour. Conversely, poor quality and lack of access to education were driving forces of child labour.

Looking at the process through which children become domestic workers, Blagbrough (2008) argued that, in many cases, this involves mediation by brokers who negotiate with parents. They often make false promises regarding working conditions, salary, education and other opportunities. Pflug's (2002) study seems to support this claim. He indicated that it is not only brokers who trick the family and children; sometimes children are cheated and lured into employment by their own parents, family members, friends or neighbours. Some children might find jobs by themselves after migrating to the city. Moreover, NIS (2003) found that children enter domestic jobs due to being orphans. Similarly, "informal fostering" (Blagbrough 2008, 88) or what Pflug (2002, 18) calls "false adoption" has been used in many regions to exploit children's labour. However, NIS (2003), Pflug (2002) and Blagbrough (2008) do not mention where these children originally came from.

According to Basu and Tzannatos (2003), when economic growth increases, there is a decrease in the number of child domestic workers. In contrast, Black (2002) indicated that a consequence of economic development is increased demand for domestic work. Black further argued that, while people may enjoy greater income, children from disadvantaged families are also affected by the demand of labour needs.

As Blagbrough and Glynn (1999) indicated, child domestic labour mostly exists in a culture in which child work is acceptable. Additionally, Children Unite (2013) noted that

gender inequality is a major issue in child domestic work, where young girls often become “invisible”.

Moreover, Blagbrough (2008), Children Unite (2013) and Webbink, Smits and de Jong (2012) argued that, many parents place female children in domestic work to prepare them for being wives and mothers. There is also a belief that domestic work is safer than other jobs (Black 2002; Blagbrough 2008; Pflug 2002). Employers, according to Blagbrough (2008) and Blagbrough and Glynn (1999), often see employing children in domestic work as a charitable act because they believe that they help feed the child and provide remuneration to their families.

According to the literature, employers are often perceived by the public as abusive. Regarding Bangladesh, Blagbrough (2008) claimed that what hurts child domestics most is not the deprivation of food, nor the dangerous, long and hard hours of work, nor the physical and verbal punishments, but the discrimination, exclusion, isolation and disrespect and being treated as inferior.

Not all employers are bad. An ILO survey (2006: 45) in Ho Chi Minh City reported that only 1 percent of child domestic workers surveyed said they were not being treated well by their employers, while 39 percent said their relationship was good, and another 60 percent reported having a normal (not good, not bad) relationship. NIS (2003) revealed that many employers expressed sympathy for their child employees. According to the survey, 84 percent (18,363 out of 21, 966) of employers interviewed reported that they agree to let CDWs have one day off per week. Regarding education, almost 90 percent agreed to allow their child domestics to pursue an education or vocational training, although only half would fund for this.

2.3. Perceived Benefits of Child Domestic Work

Social and health implications notwithstanding, there are reports of economic benefits for families when children are engaged in domestic work. Camacho (1999) found that when children leave their families for domestic work they have less children for whom they are financially responsible. Moreover, when a child in the family works, parents can spare money for the other siblings’ to go to school. Meljeteig (1999) also recognizes the benefits of child labour though not specific to domestic work. He argues that, although the income CDWs make from their difficult work is meager, it can improve their families’ situation.

Camacho (1999) suggested that remittances from these children are minimal and not easily quantifiable because such contributions may address family issues in an emergency or may be used by parents for capital or to buy farm implements. Domestic work is said not to require high skill or education and to be a good opportunity for girls with low educational background (Black 2002). Domestic labour is also described in the literature as having noticeable benefits on for the employer. Black (2002) acknowledged that better off families take others to help with their domestic burden so they themselves can work

elsewhere. Albin and Mantouvalou (2012) support this, saying that with help from the domestic workers, family members, especially females, can perform outside paid work. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (2013) further emphasize that domestic workers, facilitate the participation of their female employers in the labour market and formal economy. While these benefits were discussed in the context of adult laborers, such benefits may be felt by Cambodian households employing a child domestic worker, thereby economically incentivizing child domestic work.

Though there are some benefits of domestic work, much of literature argues that these are too few compared to the disadvantages of the work.

2.4. Cambodian Government Policies and Institutional Mechanisms for Coordination and Enforcement of Child Labour

The government is working on specific policies to address CDW. The National Plan of Action on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 2008-2012 was an overall policy approved in 2008. It lays out the specific sectors, regions and activities in which these worst forms may be found.

The issue of child labour has also been incorporated into other key development policies. The Cambodia Millennium Development Goals adopt the objective of decreasing the share of children working to 8 percent by 2015. In 2009, the government began developing its first National Social Protection Strategy, which includes a focus on managing the risks of child labour in its worst forms.

The coordination and enforcement of CDW regulation is under the Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training and its Department of Child Labour and Department of Labour Inspection; these are the government bodies most directly working to monitor child labour. The Cambodian National Committee for Children (CNCC), which is the highest government institution to address children's issues, and comprises ministerial, provincial and city representatives, also addresses child labour. The committee makes recommendations and develops national policies and plans. Under it, in particular, there is a National Subcommittee on Child Labour and other Forms of Commercial Labour. The Working Group on Child Labour was also established to host a forum where national and international organisations, unions, employers' associations and coalitions can share experiences and make plans to combat child labour. These two bodies operate under the oversight of the Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training. The National Committee on Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labour and Sexual Exploitation of Women and Children, chaired by the Ministry of Interior, focuses on the prevention on labour exploitation (National Committee to Lead S.T.S.L.S 2011).

These inter-ministerial provincial and district bodies were established to localise plans of action on child rights and child labour (Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training 2008) through the Provincial Committee on the Protection of Children Rights and the Provincial Committee on Child Labour, which are often recommended to merge because

they have a similar agenda. These provincial mechanisms have been a venue for provincial authority and local child rights based-organisations to collaborate (Crossroads to Development 2005)

At the district level and below, there are also institutional committees that deal with child labour. There is a prominent district/municipal and commune Committee for Women and Children established in 2004 by UNICEF to enhance the performance of communes. The committees have many roles and responsibilities, including advocating, raising awareness on policies, and monitor the situation of women and children (NCMDD 2008).

3. Methodology

3.1. Data Collection Methods

Quantitative data and qualitative information were collected for this study. Quantitative data was derived from a household survey, while qualitative information was gathered through key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs).

Household survey: A structured questionnaire was used to gather information on the households. Questionnaires were tested using a structured household survey instrument to ensure the quality of the data. The interview teams each had four members including one team leader. The team leaders were trained in selecting sample households for interviews and checking the quality of their team members' work. The data from the household survey were coded, cleaned and entered using CSpro. Data analysis was carried out using STATA.

Key informant interviews: Semi-structured and open-ended interviews with key informants were conducted using key guided questions KIIs were used to collect deeper information and accurately represent the views of the CDWs, former CDWs, government officials and NGO staff. The employers of selected child domestics were also approached to participate in the research, and, again, KIIs were used to gather in-depth information. The Vulnerable Children Assistance Organization and their contacts were invited to assist with the identification of suitable key informants.

Focus group discussions: FGDs were held with selected CDWs from Siem Reap and Battambang.

3.2. Sampling Procedures

Household Survey

Battambang, Siem Reap, and Phnom Penh were chosen for the fieldwork, due to the availability and convenience of working with EXCEL's project partners.

District, Village and Household Selection

In each province, the sampling design for the survey was based on a stratified sample selected in three stages. The first stage was the primary sampling units to randomly select

the districts. The second stage was randomly to select villages with probability proportional to population size from the selected districts. A total of 51 villages were randomly selected from the Battambang, Phnom Penh and Siem Reap. From each household, the family head was asked to participate in the survey, regardless of gender. If no family head was present, any family members 18 years or older were asked.

In the third stage, 21 households from each village were randomly selected using systematic random sampling. First, the total number of households was requested from each selected village head. This total was divided by the required number of households from the village to get the interval between household. Then a random number, the last digit of the serial number on a bank note, was drawn from a pocket; this was the number of the first household selected.

Table3.1: Number of Districts, Villages and Survey Sample Households

Areas	Districts	Number of Studied Villages	Sample Households
Battambang	Thma Koul	5	105
	Sangkae	4	84
Phnom Penh	Tuol Kork	12	252
	Meanchey	9	189
Siem Reap	Puok	9	189
	Soutr Nikom	12	252
	Total	51	1071

Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

For child domestic workers, we used purposive and snowball sampling. Purposively, we selected the CDWs from the VCAO project beneficiaries and from other NGOs and orphanages to reach the desired number of interviewees, which was 33 in total and among those were 27 female children. Moreover, we interviewed 11 (F/4) government officials, eight (F/2) NGO staff, five employers (F/1) and 11 (F/4) interested individuals, including village chiefs, parents, policemen, governors and members of sangkat/commune Committees for Women and Children.

Table 3.2: Key Informants

	Phnom Penh		Battambang		Siem Reap		Total
	M	F	M	F	M	F	
CDWs	2	11	1	13	3	3	33
Government officials	3	1	2	1	2	2	11
NGOs	1	0	2	1	3	1	8
Interested	1	2	1	0	4	3	11

individuals							
Employers	0	0	0	1	4	0	5
Total	7	14	7	15	16	9	68

3.3. Data Management and Statistical Analysis

Data management and analysis were undertaken in the following ways:

- The unit of observation was the household.
- Survey data processing included manual processing (coding and counting) and computerised processing.
- Descriptive statistics were used for the data analysis.

3.4. Analysis of Qualitative Data

Notes from KIIs and FGDs were reviewed by researchers and coded and analysed based on predetermined themes from the literature review in response to the objectives. Newly emerging themes were also documented throughout the analysis. Triangulation between sources of data was conducted to clarify information and contribute to the final analysis and conclusions.

3.5. Limitations


The study of such a complex and hidden social issue has some technical and practical limitations. Longer interviewing time with CDWs would help trust and confidence building. Sexual harassment and physical abuse are very sensitive issues, and CDWs might not be candid with researchers. Only small numbers of employers (five) agreed to participate in the study.

4. Findings and Discussion

4.1. CDW Characteristics

The quantitative data reveal that one out of 10 studied households has a child domestic worker—14 per cent from provincial households and about 5 per cent from Phnom Penh (Figure 4.1). This is also suggested that province households have three folds of CDW from their own household then Phnom Penh ones. Qualitative data suggested that CDWs started working at a very young age. Some began working as young as 7 years old.

Figure 4.1: CDW by Regions



As shown in Figure 4.2, most household survey respondents would not allow their children to work as domestics. Respondents in Battambang and Siem Reap were more likely than in Phnom Penh to allow children to work.

Figure 4.2: Would Allow Children to Work as Domestics if Family Is in Hardship (%)




Figure 4.3 shows survey respondents' main reasons for allowing children to work as domestics.

Figure 4.3: Reasons for Allowing Children to Work as Domestics if Family Is in Hardship (%)




Figure 4.4 reveals why the 80 per cent of household survey respondents who would not allow their children to work as domestics think that way. The most common reason is the belief that children are too small to work.

Figure 4.4: Reasons for Not Allowing Children to Work as Domestics (percent)





Figure 4.5 indicates half of households were willing to hire a CDW when there was demand in the family. This percentage is higher in the provinces than in Phnom Penh.

Figure 4.5: Willingness to Hire CDW



4.2. Risks Experienced by CDWs

Most CDWs interviewed reported both physical and verbal abuse. They are often pinched, pinched on the ear, knocked on the head and cursed. Three female and male out of 13 CDWs interviewed in Phnom Penh reported both verbally and physically abused, while five female and one male out of 14 CDWs from Battambang reported blows to the head, slaps to the face and scolding.

Among the 33 CDWs, four (F/2) revealed that they were severely physically abused. For example, one male CDW was hospitalised as a result of physical abuse, which was followed by a court procedure, supported by human-rights NGO LICADHO. During the boy's 20 working days, he was hit by his employer daily. The main incident happened when the boy took his employer's mobile phone without informing him. Using the back of a knife, the employer (as described by the boy) hit him on the head, shoulders and limbs, leaving bruises to most of his body. A female former CDW reported her experience with her employer:

She has a high education but she mistreated me and abused me every day. When I washed clothes, I was beaten by her. I cried as a result of the beating; however, I was not allowed to cry. Then she didn't allow me to talk back to her and she asked me to sleep without eating any food.

Two CDWs revealed that they experienced sexual harassment. One of them described feeling uncomfortable about her male former employer's behaviour, which she considered a sexual advance:


When I turned 17 years old, I felt that the male employer did not have good intentions toward me ... He sneaked into my room. He asked me to open the door for him. He asked me to open the window for him.

He leaned and kissed me. I was so afraid and decided to leave the family.

Another CDW had a similar experience. The girl revealed an incident in which her male employer tried to touch her and how she struggled to escape. Though she did not reveal the whole story to a researcher who met her for the first time, it is understandable that the children are very much at risk at the hands of their employers.

Data from the survey (Figure 4.6) show that respondents knew that CDWs perform many tasks, ranging from housecleaning, washing, caring for smaller children, massage to employers, help running employers' business, and to do shopping.

Figure 4.6: CDW Tasks (%)



About two-thirds of the people surveyed had heard of CDWs who were injured at work (Figure 4.7). The highest percentage was from Phnom Penh.

Figure 4.7: Had Heard of CDW Being Injured at Work (%)





Figure 4.8 shows how respondents heard about CDWs' accidents. The most mean the respondents heard is from Newspapers which stands at almost 50 percent, followed by news heard from neighbours and relatives. It is interesting to note that there is a very little percentage showing how respondents learn the incident from the CDWs' family.

Figure 4.8: How Respondents Heard of CDWs Injured at Work (%)




4.3 Perceived Benefits for CDW, Parents and Employers

Key informant interviews showed that CDWs received monthly payments of USD25-60. CDWs indicated that they received some other benefits such as clothes, better sleeping arrangements and gifts to bring home for their family, especially for big festivals. About half of the child domestic workers said that they were given new clothes, and some

mentioned that their employers gave them their used clothes. Moreover, children mentioned that the new clothes they received were a good memory about their employers. Similarly, employers revealed that they provided child domestics with juices, fruit and cakes to take to their families for big festivals, such as Khmer New Year or Phchum Ben.

Some CDWs appreciated the sleeping arrangements provided by their employers. One reported that her employer provided her much better sleeping conditions than those offered by her family. However, we should recall that many CDWs come from very poor housing conditions. Thus, it is important to note that the perception of child domestic workers on sleeping arrangement at their better off employers' houses would be nicer compared to their own houses.

Figure 4.9: Perceived Benefit for CDW (%)



About 78 per cent of interviewees believed that there are benefits in being a CDW and only about 20 per cent believed that there is no benefit (Figure 4.9). Figure 4.10 reveals three perceived potential benefits becoming a good housewife, living in better house condition and getting chances education and or training.

Figure 4.10: Perceived Main Benefits for CDW




Figure 4.11 showed a number of perceived supplementary benefits, especially meals, clothes and medicine. It reveals that there are many respondents who believe that working as CDWs have received many benefits. However, these are only household survey respondents' perceptions.

Figure 4.11: Supplementary Benefits of CDW




Figure 4.12 reports the responses of respondents on the reasons that employers hire children to work as domestics. Nearly 70 per cent said that children are easy to manage, and more than 15 per cent said “they do not dare to challenge” the employers. Other reasons included that children are better than adults, can work faster than adults, can more easily be found and receive lower wages.

Figure 4.12: Reasons Employers Hire Children (%)






Figure 4.13 shows respondents' views on who should pay for CDWs' education. More than half thought that employers should pay. Only 4 per cent believed that the government should pay for CDWs' education.

Figure 4.6: Views on Who Should Pay for CDWs' Education or Training



The survey found that 99 per cent believed there is need for inspection of CDW. Figure 4.14 shows who respondents thought should carry out inspection. 42 per cent of respondents responded that the parents and guardians should do the inspection on their own children, 25 and 23 per cent placed the duty on NGOs and local authority. Interestingly, only 8 per cent thought that the government should do the inspection.

Figure 4.74: Views on Who Should Do the Inspection (%)



4.4 Recruitment of CDW

This section presents findings on how children are recruited for domestic work, identifying brokers' roles and fees.

4.4.1. Recruitment Flow

The recruitment of child domestic workers here refers to the process through which employers or others find and select child workers and the tactics they use. The process is complex and occurs informally via a hidden network involving close relatives, friends and brokers. It was found that there are different patterns of recruitment, such as from orphanages or by complete strangers.

Typically recruitment takes place within a close network and is not openly discussed with people outside the circle. As indicated by a government official in a key informant interview, the selection of CDWs is hidden and not easily seen by outsiders:

It happens in a whispering [mode]. It is hidden between guardians, brokers and receivers (employers). It is like a closed case that no one can control. (KII, government official)

Recruiters use a “snowball” technique to spread the word from one person to another until they get a worker they want. Usually, they work through people they know to spread the word:

My parents knew that I have no one to help look after the baby, so they asked a woman they know if she knows anyone we can trust. The woman said that she had her relative, so I asked her to bring the child. (KII, Employer)

Once we recruit one, we are often able to recruit more. The first CDW will help mobilise and spread the information for us. (KII, Employer)

People recruit CDWs through both relatives and non-relatives. Initially, employers use their relatives to help them identify young workers. The relatives are mostly based in rural areas or the employer's home village and are often aware of which families are trying to find domestic jobs for their children. When employers cannot find children through their relatives, they often reach out to non-relatives. A staff member of a local organisation indicated how people circulate the employment opportunity through relatives:

The first way [to recruit a child] is through the relatives. They spread the word from one to another. And normally, you can find rural kids very easily. (KII, staff member of a local organisation)

Similarly, a government official described the “snowball” approach being used through a network of friends:

They are recruiting secretly through friends’ networking. For example, [they might ask] do you know are there good children? Or do you have any relatives? Do you know any children who have left school? Let them live at my home. That is what I have experienced or heard [of “snowball” technique to recruit a child domestic]. (KII, government official)

There is also evidence from key informants that children are recruited from orphanages. In this process, children are adopted by would-be employers for the purpose of becoming domestic workers. For example, a staff member from a local NGO in Battambang revealed his experience with business owners who approached him to adopt children who were under his care. He said, “Some people would come and say directly that they want to adopt children from our centre. They are owners of restaurants or private gas stations.”

Recruiting CDWs through adoption occurs not only through orphanages, but can also be facilitated directly by parents or guardians who are willing to put their children up for adoption to become CDWs. A mother from Siem Reap said, “Some people would give the parents a little money and take the child in and use them for domestic purposes. I don’t accept such offers.” Similarly, a former child domestic said that she was adopted by a family while she was living with her grandmother because she had lost both parents. As a result, she was ordered to work as a domestic for that family. She said:

There was a family who asked people whether they knew of orphans because they wanted to adopt ... I desperately wanted to see Phnom Penh ... I was very determined to go. By looking at my clothes, people could recognise immediately that I was a servant. (In-depth interview, former child domestic worker)

It is sometimes unclear who starts the recruitment. But from the above, it is clear that employers tend to kick start the demand for domestic workers. Employers inform identified brokers that they are looking for domestic workers. Then the brokers circulate the news to families whose members are also looking for jobs.

4.4.2. Brokers and Their Roles

When asked who the brokers are, most people said that “brokers can be anyone.” It was observed that there are two main types: those who seek profit from recruitment and those who seek to assist the family in hardship.

The first type of broker seeks to make money from employers (also from CDWs’ parents in some cases). In this case, they might be called *mae kyal* in Khmer. On the other hand, some respondents believe that there are people who are more likely to be called “helpers

in finding employment”. A district governor from Siem Reap said, “Some people who find a job for the child are involved emotionally, rather than seeking financial benefits.”

Probably, those trying to help a family do not expect money as a fee because their role is only to circulate the news of a vacancy to family or children who are looking for employment. It is up to the parents or the CDW to make further inquiry of the employer. In this case, as an employer explained, a broker’s pay depends on the generosity of the employing family:

I gave money for her [broker] transportation. This is my gift to her. I had no idea [of the tip], but my mother suggested to me to give some money. So, I gave her 50,000 riels. (KII, employer, Siem Reap)

Brokers may have many roles in the recruitment process. Firstly, they facilitate the distribution of employment information from employers to the CDWs’ family. The brokers can tell the parents about the employer’s family background, characteristics and expectations and the tasks the CDWs will perform. Then, they transfer the news from CDWs who are in need of jobs to potential employers. Secondly, the brokers may negotiate on behalf of the employers. They might sit with the parents and describe the salary and the tasks the CDWs are expected to do. Thirdly, brokers may provide accommodation and transportation for the recruited CDWs to their employer’s residence. Another role of brokers is the guarantor for both parties. For example, an employer in Siem Reap province said:

The woman guarantees that the girl is nice and honest. We need to make sure about this because the girl lives with us and she also takes care of the house while I am often away for work.

4.4.3. Recruitment Fee

Recruitment fees vary, but brokers are typically given commissions in cash or gifts. An employer in Siem Reap revealed that the payment he made to a broker is between KHR40,000 and KHR50,000 per worker. It can be as high as \$40 per recruit in bigger cities. Some respondents said they have heard that some brokers take the first month’s salary as recruitment fee. In such case, CDWs are paid only in the second month.

The fee is paid for brokers’ transportation and communication, and is also considered a gift. The tip is a “one off,” and, in some cases, includes a condition: a broker may be paid only when the recruited CDW stays and work at the employer’s premises for an agreed time. If CDWs want to leave earlier than the agreed time, the commission will not be paid to the brokers.

4.4.4. Trust in the Recruitment Process

Trust is the core element that holds the recruitment process together. While parents or guardians seek to send their children to trusted employers, the demand from an employer for a reliable CDW is even more important. As employers explained, a reliable CDW

may reduce the time they need to spend overseeing them. Also, most of them are occupied with gaining income outside their home, so they are looking for someone they can trust to stay and look after their belongings. In addition, employers indicated that employing someone they know is convenient because they can contact brokers or the parents immediately if there is something wrong. On the other hand, CDWs' families want to choose a trusted employer who will not abuse their child.

Employers indicated that they will employ child domestic workers only through brokers who are close to them or who know the CDWs and their family quite well, so they can provide reliable information about or be a guarantor for the CDW. In other cases, employers look for a CDW themselves because they prefer to negotiate directly with the parents. Trust is also developed over time based on the performance of the CDW.

The trust between employers and parents may have some impact on employers' sense of responsibility for their child domestic workers. All five employers interviewed spoke similarly on the "required trust" in brokers if they are to recruit the type of CDWs they are looking for. A male employer from Siem Reap indicated how he keeps CDWs safe in his care:

Their parents trust us. Their children are female so if such a bad incident happens at my place, it will ruin my reputation ... They came to live at my place, I will take the responsibility. I won't allow them to go out at night unless they are accompanied by my own children or relatives."

This focus on building trust between employers, brokers and CDWs' families helps to ensure a smooth employment. Trust is observed to have some impact on how employers care for and take responsibility for their CDWs. However, it is normal for employers to say good things about the employment relationship because the topic is sensitive.

The findings on the recruitment process confirm and expand on previous studies, especially Pflug (2002) and Blagbrough (2008). They argue that children are not only lured into domestic work by brokers but also by their own parents, family, friends and neighbours who push children into domestic work because of their poverty.

This study finds that children are recruited from orphanages or alternative care centres, which adds to the studies of Pflug (2002) and NIS (2003). Pflug (2002) notes that families with higher incomes often "adopt" children from families with fewer economic resources and have them work as a CDW, which can blur the lines between adoption and domestic employment. Similarly, NIS (2003) demonstrates that orphans are especially prone to engage in employment or CDW. This study supports this literature, and, further, finds that children in orphanages or similar settings are targeted by potential employers who recruit children under the guise of adoption.

There is related evidence of a big gap in child protection policy and a failure of orphanages to comply with the government's minimum standards of alternative care (Al Jazeera 2012; Friends International 2011). The conjunction of this research with the findings of Al Jazeera and Friends International indicates that adopted children are still being turned into CDWs.

4.5. Contract Arrangements and End of Employment

4.5.1. Contract Arrangements

There is no proper written contract in domestic employment; rather the agreement is made orally through a broker, during a face-to-face meeting between employers and the parents or guardians (with or without the child).

They talk, but just spoken words, not written, and nothing formal. (KII, Staff member of a local organisation, Battambang)

I've never seen that [a contract being made]. Most of the time, if they [employers and CDWs or parents] can agree on the wage and the work, then they come to work directly. (Staff member of a local organisation)

They [employers] would say nice words like "The tasks are easy, there will be plenty of electricity to use", and probably the number of meals provided. (KII, village chief)

The salary is predetermined by employers, and CDWs or their parents are rarely able to negotiate the salary because of the power structure between employers and CDWs and their families. Employers are generally wealthy, whereas CDWs and their parents are poor. Additionally, families who send their children to work are generally in desperate need of money, so, according to the research participants, they will generally agree to whatever they are offered.

Once the salary is agreed, children and their parents briefly explain the tasks they expect to do. Typically only the amount of money and expected household chores are discussed. Working hours, work-related accidents or risks and educational opportunities are not discussed. This makes it easier for employers to overwork and exploit their young workers. Additionally, CDWs may not be aware of their right to demand legal working hours.

Asked to describe their views on written contracts, respondents expressed a mix of reactions. Some agreed that the contract is important for both employers and CDWs, while others indicated that the contract provides benefits only to employers. The five employers revealed that they do not have any contract with CDWs. They viewed a contract as possibly a burden to CDWs because the children must follow all written agreements in the contract. But one employer from Siem Reap emphasised that he could

not afford a contract because he could not follow, for example, the education obligation. He did not believe that there are employers who send their CDWs to school. Some of the NGO staff respondents have a strong desire to see a written contract although they admitted that they haven't seen one within their careers, while three out of three mothers had no idea about contracts.

It is interesting that, of those who said a contract is important, a noticeable number stressed that they would not witness a contract because they do not want such child labour to exist any longer. Most participants were aware of the number of hours children can legally work and believed that proper salary and good working conditions should be included if a written contract is developed.

4.5.2. End of Employment

We observed that there are three main reasons that CDWs end their employment. The first is abuse and unfair treatment. This study finds that the employment ended after several days of abuse. Children who were abused were not able to end their employment as they wanted. For example, in the case of the male CDW (also discussed in the 4.2. Risks experienced by CDWs), he was rescued from the employer's house only after a passer-by spotted him and reported to the nearby local authority. This implies that there are cases where CDWs stay in abusive employment because they do not know where to ask for help.

Secondly, CDWs might decide to leave their employer because they hear of better opportunities elsewhere. Frequently, respondents said that CDWs tend to turn to garment factory work because it offers higher wages and better working conditions. CDWs may also find that working in a restaurant provides them an open space to interact with people, which they likely wouldn't experience as a CDW. An employer gave this observation regarding CDWs' preference for working in a restaurant:

Although it's tiring to work at a restaurant, girls like to because they can meet different people and they can ask for a break to hang out in free time. It's different from domestic work in that we don't let them hang out that much. (KII, employer)

Moreover, CDWs may use their networks to hunt for new jobs that offer competitive pay. Employers often revealed that friends or immediate relatives of their current CDWs keep them informed of new jobs available elsewhere. An employer said, "Her older sister used to visit her and convince [her] that she lived with a family that is very nice that gives her 5000 riels a day on top of the monthly salary." This indicates how CDWs are often actively thinking about new employment opportunities.

CDWs are often looking for better paid formal employment and see informal employment in a negative light. The isolated nature of CDW also feeds the desire to move out of their jobs. Another phenomenon is that CDWs frequently do not return to

work after going home to their families during harvest seasons. This shows that there must be some underlying problem with their employment. Therefore, employers see it as critical to prevent CDWs from going home. In one case, a CDW requested an increased salary before she left to assist her family's harvest, which was refused by the employers and led to the end of a two-year employment.

The third reason for CDWs to end their employment is related to family. CDWs whose parents had migrated to Thailand and returned, moved back to be reunited with their family.

4.6. Monitoring Child Domestic Labour and its Challenges

One of the research objectives was to investigate the monitoring of child domestic labour. Even though the institutional structure to address children's issues exists, as described in 2.4, there is no regular formal inspection in the domestic labour sector by the government, though ad hoc monitoring networks are formed by some NGOs or associations. This study was unable to find specific statistics on CDW and where CDWs are located. Local authorities were not aware of the situation of CDWs in their areas unless violence was reported.

Some associations were seen as having important roles in monitoring and advocacy on domestic labour. For example, the Independent Democracy of Informal Economy Association (IDEA), which was established in 2005, aims to advocate for and provide protection to those in informal sectors, including domestic work. According to informants from the IDEA, about 10 percent of its current members in the domestic sector are children. The association also provides immediate support to CDWs who have been abused by directly intervening and collaborating with local authorities. IDEA also refers rescued CDWs to relevant NGO partners. Connected to IDEA, is the Cambodia Domestic Worker Network, which specifically addresses domestic workers' rights through advocacy and protects workers from abuse. The network mobilises domestic workers and provides them training on labour rights. Similarly, the Cambodian Working Group for Domestic Work focuses on issues faced by domestic workers, especially migrant domestic workers. These associations and networks advocate to the Cambodian government to ratify the ILO Domestic Workers Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers.

Government bodies to monitor domestic labour seemed to be far less active. Labour inspectorates operate only in the formal sector. Relevant provincial department representatives who are members of the Provincial Committee on Child Labour attend the meetings to share and provide updates on issues related to child labour and even report serious abuses. To assist victims, the committee collaborates with organisations for appropriate help. However, the research participants said that monitoring was "lacking". A majority of respondents said that "lack of power", "lack of resources", "lack of capacity" and "lack of enough funding" contributed to poor monitoring. According to most participants, the labour law does not empower them to conduct inspections in the

informal sector. This may be what participants are referring to when they say “lack of power”. When asked to explain, almost all the interviewees indicated that they do not have the authority to enter private homes unless there is an urgent report, in which the intervention needs to be accompanied by relevant departments and organisations.

We did [inspect], but we do not have full capacity to cover it all. For example, there is not much for us to see during daytime, while there are so many things happening at night. That is our challenge. (KII, government official)

We work only in daytime, but most of the underage children’s work is at night time. We don’t have a chance to inspect that. (KII, government official)

Inspection of child domestic labour is a part of our job, but we do not have enough staff or funds, and no means of transport. Thus, it is very difficult to implement. (KII, government official)

Commune/Sangkat Committees for Women and Children were the only committees that were supposed to monitor children’s issues and advise councils. This is then reported to the district/khan Women and Children Consultative Committee (WCCC) during their internal meetings if intervention is needed. This committee was the most active agent, although it often needed to engage a partner NGO for resources to assist child victims further. The following interviewees’ comments stressed how active the Commune Committee for Women and Children is:

We have a network, mainly the committee for women and children at the sangkat, which can report this issue to us. Within each sangkat, there is a network down to village. In each sangkat, the CCWC has a meeting every month. All members in each village are invited to attend the meeting ... Sangkat women know clearly about the households within their boundary, so they could bring us there. (KII, member of CCWC)

In the commune, there is a committee of women and children who respond to any issues related to women and children, and police are also members of this committee. (KII, district governor)

Another respondent, himself a member of the CWCC and a policeman, emphasised the involvement of CWCC in addressing children and women’s problems:

I think the Women’s Affairs team must be much involved in this [child labour] issue. They have more free time than me. Besides, they have a broader network within other villages in the commune. I got to know this through meeting [within the committee]. (KII, policeman)

The Commune Council for Women and Children (CCWC) had its own women's representative, who is called the commune gender focal person, based in each village to report on any issues related to children and women. Since they are close to local people, the village women's representatives can interact better with each household, so their presence in any intervention is important.

Even though CCWCs were active, their activity was not enough to monitor domestic work to prevent and respond to abuses. Often participants complained about the lack of funding and the burden these monitoring activities placed on their ability to meet their many other responsibilities. The research found that in one province, there are five different focuses on child labour: beggars, sellers of souvenirs, scavengers, construction workers and domestic workers.

Most respondents indicated that neighbours are a good source of inspection, reporting and assistance to child domestics, which could lead to further intervention from local authorities:

I know that our neighbours are good inspectors. They will inform local authorities or related NGOs if there is any child abuse. (KII, employer, Siem Reap)

Usually the neighbours are often the ones who get the information and report it. After hearing the problem [from neighbours], the women and children committee should intervene directly. (KII, policeman, Siem Reap)

When asked what a child domestic worker should do if he or she is abused, a government official indicated that children should seek help from neighbours or people who are nearest and available to them:

The first thing to do is to ask for help from people who are nearest. I would advise that they should look for motor taxi drivers or cyclo drivers. Mostly, what I have observed ... only neighbours are the first to see those CDWs [who are abused]. (KII, government official)

Key informants also refer child domestic workers to call any hotlines they know to report violence. It was observed that people would rather report to a local popular hotline rather than to a larger government-sponsored line. However, many local police officers do make their numbers available to many households, especially village chiefs.

Awareness raising through village or commune meetings and television and radio broadcasts was frequently discussed among the respondents as a tool to spread information on child labour and how to detect a child labour incident. According to key informants, awareness raising is conducted through meetings (district and commune) and occasional events such as Anti-Illiteracy Day or Child Labour Day. Additionally, educational TV and radio broadcasts are perceived as effective in combating child labour

in general. Consequently, many respondents believe that the population is now more able to understand and respond quickly to cases. Respondents cited the advanced technology and various awareness raising activities through local media as leading to action. For example, a policeman said:

People understand much better than before. They know where to report quicker than us. We must be very alert; otherwise we will be blamed that we are slower than the people to respond. People are well aware and quick to respond now. (KII, policeman)

A district governor admitted that child labour has been in the attention of local authorities:

We heard about the child problem before, but we didn't see the importance of it. Now child labour has become one of the government's key policies, so we hear about it often. When we attended meetings, we see and hear more about the problems of children.

5. Conclusions and Policy Implications

Conclusion

The survey revealed that about 10 per cent of studied households have family members working as CDWs and about 22 per cent would be willing to hire CDWs. Twenty-two per cent of households were willing to allow members to work as CDWs while about 22 per cent were willing to employ CDW because of two main perceptions: that children are easy to find and that children want to make money for themselves.

About two-thirds of interviewees had heard of CDWs injured during work, especially in Phnom Penh. CDWs perform many tasks, ranging from cleaning to shopping. Some experienced sexual harassment, abuse, beatings and accidents. There are insufficient inspectors to support and monitor CDW and the risks associated with it. There is also an inadequate legal framework. Inspections take place in only formal employment. Government officials raised a lack of resources as the major obstacle to increasing inspection of CDW. CCWCs and neighbours are quite active and useful in responding to women's and children's issues. However, the CCWCs were found to be under-resourced and to have many other obligations that prevent them from being more active in monitoring CDW. Awareness-raising activities in the community and through media have been effective in raising awareness of CDW issues among the public.

Almost 80 per cent of interviewees believe that there are some benefits to CDW, the main ones being preparing CDWs to become housewives, better housing and opportunity to go to school. CDWs receive monthly salaries of USD25-60, which go to their parents and are used to support their families. Employers also benefit from CDW as it is a cheap and simple way to find workers.

CDWs are recruited through hidden private networks involving people ranging from their own family members and friends to people they don't know. Brokers have many roles in the recruitment process. With or without fees, brokers can be the negotiators, guarantors, transporters and facilitators recruiting for employers. There is no written contract for this type of employment, which puts CDWs at risk of physical and sexual abuse, lower pay and poor working conditions.

Poverty and its related consequences, lack of knowledge and understanding of CDW and cultural beliefs lead to more CDW. Though some respondents agreed that cultural beliefs play a role, they believe that poverty is the main driver for parents to send their children to work.

Policy Implications

- **Awareness:** There is a need to promote awareness and educate households about the risks associated with CDW. Local media and awareness campaigns were

found to be effective ways to raise awareness. Continuing such activities with the support and involvement of civil society, local authorities, the private sector and community members would be a good way to bring awareness to and gain support from the general public to address the CDW issue.

- **CDW statistics:** There is a need for reliable CDW statistics that are updated every six months. The number of child labour inspectors should be increased and they should be provided with adequate resources to ensure regular enforcement.
- **Specific regulations on CDW:** The regulations should institute a compulsory education age and provide adequate legal protections for CDWs, including in recruitment. There should be a stricter regulatory framework around alternative care for children. The government's policy on minimum standards for alternative care should be expanded to put tighter controls on adoption.
- **CDW response programme:** There is a need for a wide programme to respond effectively to CDWs' complaints. There should be an interactive hotline created especially for CDWs and widely publicised. Existing laws, especially related to inspection, should be expanded to reach CDW. Inspectors should receive training on how to monitor and respond to CDW cases.

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